



AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PEACE TREATIES

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PEACE TREATIES

By

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PREFACE

The present volume does not purport to be an exhaustive or scholarly study of the Peace Conference and the Treaties. It is not based on any inside knowledge of what went on at Paris, or on any unpublished documentary material. It is simply the outcome of my attempt, in connection with teaching contemporary history, to keep in touch with some of the principal developments in international affairs. Necessarily I must rely largely on newspaper and magazine material, which in many respects is unsatisfactory. The situation has been constantly changing while the book was being written, and many important questions are still unsettled. The principal Treaties, however, are completed and, except for the United States, are now effective. I hope that a preliminary study of them may be found useful for classes interested in present-day problems. I also hope that the book may prove of interest and value to anyone trying to obtain a clearer idea of what is going on in the world.

Within the last six years the average American has been forcibly reminded of the connections between his affairs and those of the rest of the world. Regions and peoples and problems that

most of us never heard of until recently now figure in the headlines of the daily papers and are hotly debated in Congress. It is not at all improbable that the question of the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by the United States will become one of the principal issues of the presidential campaign of 1920. It is a matter of great importance therefore that those who wish to vote intelligently on this issue should inform themselves as to the terms of the Treaty, and should try to weigh the consequences to this country and to the world of its acceptance, unconditionally or with reservations, or of its rejection.

I have tried to gather and summarize material to help in the formation of such a judgment. A considerable part of the book is taken up with a detailed summary of the Treaty with Germany, including more or less extensive explanatory comments on many of its clauses. I have not intended either to attack or to defend the Treaty. I have attempted to state what the Treaty says, and to indicate the reasons which appear to have guided the Conference in its decisions. In the numerous instances where there has been and is still difference of opinion, I have summarized as fairly as I could the arguments on both sides. Personally, I should prefer a prompt ratification of the Treaty with only such explanatory reserva-

tions as those advocated by Mr. Taft, for instance, and a cordial entrance into the League of Nations. I should then hope and expect that the influence of the United States would be exercised to secure a modification of some of the undesirable and unworkable parts of the settlement. I have not written, however, with the idea of persuading anyone to adopt this point of view; I wish to present material on which the reader may form his own conclusions.

ARTHUR P. SCOTT .

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CHAPTER I

WAR CAUSES AND WAR AIMS

During the Great War millions were inspired in their fighting and toiling and sacrifices by the hope and expectation that future generations would be spared the experience through which they were passing. Men looked for a peace settlement which should remedy as far as possible the conditions which had led to the Great War, and they charged their leaders with the responsibility of devising rational and peaceful means for the equitable settlement of future difficulties and the prevention of future wars. All peace treaties have professed to desire these ends, and for the most part doubtless sincerely; but hitherto they have failed. Is the peace settlement of 1919 so different from those of the past that more may be expected from it? This is the question which overshadows all others.

I. THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

Before deciding whether the peace treaties have really attempted to remedy the conditions and to deal with the forces which led to the Great War, one should recall what these conditions and forces were. In part and in a general sense, the war was the outcome of the whole complex of modern movements and developments. In particular, and directly, it was forced by the aggressive ambitions of the Central Powers.

It is almost too elementary to repeat that the Serbian question was the occasion, not the cause, of the conflict; but the time-honored figure of the spark in the powder magazine is still useful. Any one of a dozen other issues might conceivably have started the war. Of the great underlying causes four or five deserve particular mention:

One of the most conspicuous and significant features of modern history, and particularly the history of the nineteenth century, has been the growth of the spirit of nationalism, and the organization of national states. There has gradually grown up the conviction that when a group of people in a definite geographical area is conscious of common interests, institutions, and ideals, typified by the use of a particular language, and based on a supposed community of race or on the memory of a historic independence now perhaps lost, it is justly entitled to a separate political existence. One of the facts of fundamental importance in the present situation is that political boundaries have not coincided with the nationalistic aspirations of various groups. The nineteenth century saw a number of important readjustments of the map of Europe, most of them in the direction of the nationalistic ideal. But the Poles and Finns in Russia, the Danes, Poles, and Alsatians in Germany, the Poles, Czechs, Rumanians, Ruthenes, Croatians, Serbs, and Magyars in Austria-Hungary, the Bulgarians in Serbia, the Greeks in Bulgaria and Asia Minor, the Italians in Trieste and the Trentino, have let

it be known in no doubtful terms that many ambitions were yet unsatisfied. Home Rule for Ireland, the Zionist movement for the Jews, Egypt for the Egyptians, all indicate a growing national self-consciousness. Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Serbianism, even Pan-Islamism and the more recent "Ottoman" policy of the Young Turks, have all attempted to take advantage of, or to stimulate, a consciousness of solidarity in groups which transcended existing political boundaries. The crux of the Macedonian situation for years has been the clash of Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian, Albanian, and Turkish nationalistic propagandas.

There are enormous practical difficulties in the way of any wholesale realization of the hopes of all these groups. Races, languages, religions, are inextricably mixed in the same geographical areas. Race groups are often isolated from the main body. Again, there may be deep divisions of sentiment between kindred groups; or conditions of geography or economic necessity may be more important than racial boundaries. But whether or not these nationalistic hopes can, or should, be realized, the fact remains that they are there, and a tremendously disturbing fact it has proved.

Another of the great movements of the nineteenth century has been the growth of liberalism, of democracy, of constitutional government. Not infrequently this has been closely connected with questions of national aspirations. It is a fair supposition,

for instance, that the French feeling in Alsace-Lorraine was kept alive in part at least by the failure to include the Reichsland as a genuine constituent member of the German Empire. It is quite certain that political oppression of the various Slav minorities in Austria and Hungary has done much to make them look outside the boundaries of the Dual Monarchy for relief.

Still another distinctive feature of modern history has been the enormous development of capitalism. Manufacturing, trade, and commerce have increased tremendously. Population also has grown steadily. The world has been made smaller by vastly improved means of communication. All this has resulted in an unprecedented expansion of European influence to all corners of the globe, accompanied by a struggle on the part of the nations of Europe for colonies, protectorates, spheres of influence. Outlets for surplus population, markets for home manufactures, sources of raw material, fields for capitalistic development and exploitation—these have been the prizes for which rival explorers, commercial travelers, traders, political agents, colonizers, financiers, and even missionaries, with diplomatic and if necessary military support, have been striving.

The movement toward national unification and commercial and colonial expansion has been accompanied by a certain amount of the spirit of imperialism, a desire to rule, a craving for aggrandizement, a passion for more square miles of territory, increased

thousands of subjects. There is something compelling and fascinating about a "far-flung battle line," a flag on which the sun never sets, an empire known and respected by all men. Not only have the aspirations of the stronger European nations led to the disregard of the nationalistic aspirations of weaker groups—Poles and Boers, for example—but there has been a clash between the imperialistic ambitions of the great powers themselves. There has been a regrettable lack of unanimity about "manifest" destiny.

Another important factor leading up to the Great War was militarism—defined not as the mere possession of great naval or military strength but as undue emphasis on force, the glorification of war and of the principle of struggle, the prominence or even the predominance of the military class in the counsels of the nation, and a readiness to regard an insult to an officer in uniform as a far more heinous offense than the most high-handed interference with the civil rights of an ordinary citizen.

These factors of nationalism, liberalism, commercialism, imperialism, and militarism, present all of them, though in varying degrees and combinations, in all the nations of Europe, are responsible in large part for having created such a tense international situation that the relatively slight pretext of the Serbian quarrel brought about a tremendous crash. Conflicting ambitions and aspirations, mutual jealousy, distrust and fear, endless quarrels and intrigues,

tariff wars, a feverish rivalry in armaments, combined with a widespreading network of loans, alliances, and diplomatic understandings, produced a situation which had long been recognized as dangerous.

More specifically, Germany felt aggrieved because it had not a more satisfactory "place in the sun." Acutely conscious of its own new-found national strength, fervent in the belief of a great historic mission in the world, justly proud of splendid achievements in art, science, literature, and government, developing in wealth and population with startling rapidity, Germany desired more colonies, a greater share in the exploitation of the non-European nations, a more important voice in the settling of the affairs of world-politics, a wider sphere of influence for German civilization. Germany professed to feel hemmed in by powerful and jealous neighbors, who waited only for an opportune moment to strike. To the east, with no physical rampart of sea or mountain between, crouched Russia, a half-Asiatic despotism, the land of the knout and the pogrom, the home of illiteracy and superstition, where red revolution alternated with benighted repression. Immensely powerful, insatiably ambitious, Russia was plotting to absorb all the outlying Slavic groups in one mighty political union, after which Western civilization might look for nothing less than extinction under the Cossacks' hoofs.

The outlook to the west through German spectacles was almost as bad. France, a decadent, unstable, irreligious nation, whose surface urbanity

could no longer conceal the frightful ravages of race-suicide and immorality, was plotting revenge. Elsass-Lothringen, violently torn from the empire some centuries back, but now peacefully and contentedly, nay joyfully, reunited to the Fatherland, was to be dragged again under the shadow of the tricolor. In vain had been the forbearance and moderation of Germany; all for naught had been her kindly help to French colonial expansion; the statues of the lost cities in the Place de la Concord remained draped in mourning; unquenchable hate burned in every French heart.

Across the channel perfidious England, laden with the ill-gotten gains of centuries of craft, greed, fraud, force, chicanery, and sheer luck, was watching with the jaundiced eye of jealousy the rapid growth of Germany. Conscious at heart of Germany's real superiority, raging impotently at the loss of trade to her abler rival, insanely angered to find her insolent dogma of naval and commercial supremacy threatened by the peaceful growth of Germany, England was éagerly awaiting a chance to destroy the German fleet, merchant marine, and foreign commerce with one treacherous blow. To that end the meshes of the Triple Entente had been spun and strengthened, in order that the Fatherland might be isolated, and choked within the iron ring of foes. Russia and France were to bear the brunt of the fighting; crafty England, following her invariable custom, would contribute money, but not blood, and

would hope nevertheless to carry off the lion's share of spoil.

Of course not all of the German people took this hectic view of their neighbors; but such impressions prevailed pretty widely, and they were quite openly expressed in the press.

Naturally to the other powers of Europe the situation looked rather different. In the eyes of the Entente powers, Germany was flushed by new-found power, genuinely strong, but insufferably arrogant, thoroughly selfish, and overweeningly ambitious. The Kaiser, though at times honestly striving for peace, somehow managed to allow Germany to remain the trouble-maker of Europe. Germany was striving by a mixture of blundering diplomacy and saber-rattling to secure the overlordship of Europe, if not of the world. A Pan-Germanic Confederation stretching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf would threaten India. England in particular regarded Germany's rapidly growing navy as a direct challenge to her own supremacy on the sea, a supremacy which was the cardinal necessity of her own national existence. France, doubtless hoping against hope to regain the lost provinces, feared yet another assault, another staggering indemnity, and the loss of more territory. Russia distrusted the tremendous influence which Germany was building up at Constantinople.

To recognize, however, that the war can be traced in part to great underlying causes for which no

nation is alone responsible, or to admit that the conduct and motives of the Allies during the last twenty years have not been entirely blameless, is not to say that both sides were equally guilty of bringing about the war. There have been those who have contended, with a fine appearance of impartiality and objectivity, that czarism and kaiserism were all the same, and that to differentiate between the imperialism of England and France on the one hand and the ambition of Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other was as meaningless as the attempt to distinguish Tweedledee from Tweedledum. Now that the war is over this same contention is repeated, by way of criticism of the Peace Treaty. It is important therefore to remember that the war which began the last week in July, 1914, was directly, deliberately, and solely forced by Austria-Hungary and Germany on nations which made every possible effort to avoid it. Any lingering doubts on this point must be dispelled by reading the minutes of the Austrian Council of July 7, 1914,¹ and the documents published in Germany since the Revolution. Without firing a shot, the Central Powers might have secured the redress of every legitimate grievance, and the satisfaction of every reasonable ambition by accepting the offers of the Entente. Instead they chose to strike for everything. They lost. And now they are held to accountability. In estimating the peace settlement this fact should never be overlooked.

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, December, 1919, p. 455.

II. WAR AIMS OF THE BELLIGERENTS

In order to follow the peace negotiations and to understand the peace terms, it is helpful to recall briefly the objects of each country in entering the war.

Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia in order to end the menace of a Greater Serbia. A successful war was expected to bring about a greater internal consolidation of the Dual Monarchy. A dominant position in the Balkans was sought, with better access to the Aegean Sea.

Germany backed her ally in order to reassert her own hegemony in Europe against the growing power of the Triple Entente. She desired to end the "Slav menace," and to crush France once for all. She wished to consolidate Middle Europe, and secure complete control of the Berlin-Bagdad stretch, and on to the Persian Gulf. She intended to seize agricultural territory to the east at the expense of Russia, besides gaining control of the Baltic provinces, the Belgian seacoast, and the mineral resources of France. She looked forward to ending England's mastery of the seas, to securing great colonial gains, and to expansion in South America. All these purposes were avowed by sober and responsible leaders, and they are clearly implied in the official declarations during the war that Germany must secure "guaranties against future attack," and must have "legitimate fields for economic expansion."

The group who forced Turkey into the war looked for a revived and enlarged Ottoman Empire, freed

from the peril of Russia. They expected to regain territory in Asia Minor, to oust England from Egypt, and perhaps drive Italy from Tripoli. Having crushed or assimilated the subject races, and having shaken off European control over their internal affairs, they hoped to rise again to the position of a great power.

The Bulgars desired to secure Macedonia and an extension of their Aegean seacoast, and perhaps the Dobrudja from Rumania, thus assuring the local overlordship of the Balkans. After negotiating with both sides, they decided that they were more likely to gain their ends by joining the Central Powers.

On the other side, Serbia and Montenegro had the war thrust upon them by the Austro-Hungarian invasion. They fought primarily in self-defense. Naturally enough, they hoped that with victory would come the long-desired union of the South Slavs in one state.

Russia entered the war to preserve her prestige as the protector of the minor Slav groups, and to protect her interests in the Balkans. In addition, the Russians hoped to gain Turkish Armenia and Constantinople, and to unite all the Poles under the suzerainty of the Czar.

France was drawn into the maelstrom primarily because of the alliance with Russia, and to defend herself against the ever-present menace of Germany. When France would not promise neutrality, Germany attacked. There is no evidence that France wished war in order to try to regain Alsace-Lorraine.

The chance was too desperate. But once the war had begun, the restoration of the lost provinces became a sacred object for every Frenchman. Similarly, when Turkey entered the war, after the Allies had offered to guarantee its territorial integrity, France felt disposed to press old claims for Syria.

Great Britain declared war in the first instance to protect Belgium, and to prevent the menace of a German-controlled Channel coast. Under any circumstances, however, the entrance of England was inevitable. The English were bound in honor to stand by their friends. Their interests demanded that they should preserve the balance of power against the threat of German hegemony. To preserve the empire, they desired to end the menace of the German fleet; and once the war was on they struck at the German colonies and trade, and planned to extend their political control at the expense of Turkey.

Belgium fought, rather than allow the Germans free passage, in order to preserve national honor and independence. The choice was a hard one, and the risks tremendous, but Belgium did not hesitate. Throughout the Belgian people sought freedom and restoration. At the end of the war they asked for the ending of the régime of neutralization, and for some territory in Prussia and Holland which they regarded as justly theirs. They also asked for the opening of the Scheldt River.

In August, 1914, Japan delivered an ultimatum demanding that Germany leave China, and followed

it up by attacking Kiau-chow. This action at the time was ascribed to the working of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It is more likely, however, that Japan was moved by the desire to expel a rival from China, and to extend Japanese interests, political and economic, in the Far East. It would perhaps be unduly cynical to deny the Japanese any interest in the destruction of militarism and the making of the world safe for democracy; but it would be unduly trustful to regard that as the main motive.

As the war progressed, other nations were drawn into it. Portugal had an ancient treaty of alliance with England, and had colonial interests in Africa which were threatened by Germany. It is also possible that the republican government, none too secure, felt that a war would consolidate national feeling.

Italy for some time remained neutral, asserting that the war had been forced by the Central Powers, and that therefore the Triple Alliance was not binding. While hastening military preparations, the Italian leaders negotiated with both sides to secure the largest possible realization of the national aspirations. These included the regaining from Austria of "unredeemed" Italian populations; the securing of strategic frontiers against Austria in the Alps and naval security in the Adriatic; the gaining of control in Albania and the extension of political and economic influence in the Balkans; and the extension of political power and trade and investment opportunities in the Aegean Islands, Asia Minor, and Africa. When they became

convinced that the Entente powers were more likely to help them to these ends, they declared war on the hereditary enemy Austria-Hungary, and later on Germany.

Rumania desired to add the "unredeemed" brethren in Austria-Hungary to a Greater Rumania. When Allied victory seemed probable the promise of these territories brought the Rumanians into the war. Bessarabia had also long been desired, but until the unexpected collapse of Russia there had been no hope of securing it.

When the Greeks finally entered the war on the side of the Entente, they too wished to bring within a Greater Greece the brethren under Bulgarian and Turkish rule in Thrace, the Aegean Islands, and Asia Minor. They cast longing but none too hopeful glances even at Constantinople.

The United States, after long hesitation, entered the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary in order to protect the national honor, rights, and interests. They were moved also by a desire to help in the overthrow of the power that threatened democracy everywhere. They felt it prudent to forestall the threatened German movement against South America. Lastly, they desired to aid in the establishment of a new and sounder international order.

China and Siam were finally induced to declare war, partly by the German menace to their rights and independence, partly through the persuasion of the United States, but principally perhaps with

the hope that at the Peace Conference they might secure redress for long-standing grievances, not only against Germany, but also against some of the Allied powers.

Brazil, with a large German element in its population, feared future German aggressions, and resented present German submarine outrages and intrigues in Brazilian affairs. There was also a desire to follow the United States, thus giving expression to American solidarity. Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay simply followed the example and yielded to the urging of the United States.¹

It is evident from this brief review that the nations arrayed against the Central Powers entered the war from a variety of motives, and with a multiplicity of aims. The more important powers felt that the war had been forced upon them, and that they were fighting in self-defense. Once the war had begun, they determined to seize the opportunity to change conditions which they had long regarded as dangerous to their security, and to realize as far as possible their national aspirations. Some of the Allied purposes were idealistic, some were distinctly selfish. In many cases the aims of two or more of the Allies clashed with each other. It is no wonder therefore that the business of making a satisfactory peace was a difficult one.

¹ Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay broke diplomatic relations. The others declared war.

CHAPTER II

PEACE PLANS AND NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE WAR

It has often been the case that the main features of a peace were settled long in advance of the actual negotiations between the belligerents. This was true for instance at the Congress of Vienna. In time of war nations prepare for peace, partly by private negotiations between allies, partly by informal and indirect attempts to arrive at an understanding with the enemy. Nations which commit themselves to war try first to secure from their allies an agreement as to the results of the expected victory. Sometimes of course circumstances prevent the hunters from carrying out the predetermined division of the bear-skin. Again, in the moment of complete victory, triumphant associates sometimes fall out over the division of the spoils, to the profit of their enemies. Thus in 1815 France was able to regain an influential place in the councils of Europe by taking advantage of the differences between Austria and England on the one hand and Russia and Prussia on the other over the settlement of the Polish and Saxon questions. Again in 1913 the outbreak of the second Balkan War gave Turkey an opportunity to regain Adrianople. In some of these respects the Great War and the resulting peace settlement showed familiar

developments. On both sides there were numerous secret agreements between allies. Both sides put out informal peace feelers, and endeavored through various roundabout channels to ascertain the views of the enemy. At the Peace Conference, however, although there were grave differences of opinion and conflicts of interest among the victors, the defeated powers were not able to exploit them to any very great advantage.

I. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ALLIES; THE "SECRET TREATIES"

In September of 1914 the Allies concluded an agreement not to make peace separately, and as other states entered the war in the next two years they made the same promise. By secret treaties or agreements these states were guaranteed certain gains in the event of victory. In addition there were numerous understandings between the Entente powers, notably as to territorial changes to be made after the war. These were modified from time to time. They took the form not so much of formal treaties as exchanges of notes, and records of "gentlemen's agreements." The same thing was true as between the Central Powers, but the fortunes of war have made their plans of purely academic interest. The others, however, were of the most vital importance, for by the time the Peace Conference met in Paris it had become known that many of the most important issues had been settled, at least

provisionally, by earlier negotiations between the Allies. Rumors as to some of these arrangements had become current, but the world at large is indebted to the Bolsheviki for making public the contents of many of them. Part of the negotiations as to China leaked out at the time, but some of them were not generally known until the Conference was actually in session. A review of the terms of these treaties and understandings is necessary before one can appreciate the situation when the plenipotentiaries met.

1. April 26, 1915, Russia, Italy, France, and Great Britain signed an agreement providing for Italy's immediate entrance into the war, and promising that "under the future treaty of peace, Italy shall receive the district of Trentino; the entire southern Tyrol to its natural geographic boundary, the Brenner"; Istria, part of the Dalmatian coast, and numerous islands along the eastern Adriatic; Avlona "in full right" and a protectorate over Albania; the Aegean Islands of the Dodecanese; an "equal share in the division of Turkey in the basin of the Mediterranean, and more specifically, in that part of it contiguous to the province of Adalia"; and "compensation" in Africa if England and France increased their colonial possessions there.

2. November 22, 1914, and in the winter of 1915, Greece was offered southern Albania and "important territorial acquisitions on the coast of Asia Minor," if she would enter the war. Great Britain also offered to transfer Cyprus in return for Greek help. Since

Greece did not at the time accept the offers, they lapsed; but when Venizelos was finally returned to power he undoubtedly received assurances that the interests of the Hellenes would be considered.

3. In March, 1915, England and France agreed that Russia might annex Constantinople and the Straits. Russia agreed that most of the neutral zone in Persia should come under British influence, and that there should be an independent Arabia. Britain expected from Russia "a benevolent attitude to the political aims of England in other spheres."

4. In the spring of 1916 the British, French, and Russian governments came to an agreement as to their "zones of influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey," and as to the boundaries of Arabia. Russia was to push westward past Erzerum, Trebizond, and Van. France was to receive the coast strip of Syria and parts of Asia Minor, Britain was to get southern Mesopotamia with Bagdad, and the Syrian ports of Haifa and Acre. Palestine was to be separated from Turkey, and its status determined by later agreement.

5. At the same time (February, 1916) Russia offered to let England and France fix the western boundary of Germany in return for "freedom in fixing our boundaries with Germany and Austria-Hungary." Poland was not to be the subject of international discussion. Continuing these "conversations" in January, 1917, France asked Russian

consent for the return of Alsace-Lorraine, control of the Saar Basin, and the separation of the German provinces west of the Rhine, "so that in the future the River Rhine shall be a secure strategic boundary against German aggression." Russia agreed in principle to these requests, but recalled her own earlier demand for a free hand in fixing the eastern boundary.

6. On August 17, 1916, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia guaranteed to Rumania the right to annex the Bukowina and a large part of eastern Hungary. The boundaries are specified in minute detail.¹

7. Japan entered the war apparently assured of obtaining the German holdings in the Far East. In 1915 China was forced to agree to the transfer of Germany's interests to Japan at the peace settlement. In 1917 England, France, Italy, and Russia agreed to support Japan in these claims, and in the possession of the German islands north of the equator.

8. The Russian Revolution led to a revival of the agreements as to Asia Minor, and on August 18, 1917, Italy was promised enlarged concessions, including Smyrna.² This was subject to Russian approval. The arrangements as to Turkey in Asia were still further affected by agreements with the Arabs of the Hedjaz and by British declarations in favor of Zionist aspirations in Palestine.

9. In the course of the war British leaders declared that under no circumstances would the German

¹ Text in *New York Times' Current History*, May, 1919, p. 346.

² *Chicago Daily News*, February 7, 1920.

colonial possessions be restored. As to the West African territories, the English and French reached a provisional agreement as to their occupation, which foreshadowed the lines of a permanent division. Similarly the occupation of various islands in the Pacific by Japanese, British, Australian, and New Zealand forces indicated the expectations as to their ultimate disposal, as did the conquest of German Southwest Africa by the Union of South Africa.

10. There may well have been other secret agreements which have not as yet seen the light, a knowledge of which would be helpful in understanding the peace settlement. It is obvious that some of the proposed territorial arrangements did violence to the principle of nationality, and some of them are hard to reconcile with the idealistic professions of the Allied spokesmen. The treaties with Italy and Rumania may be defended on the ground that the military situation made it a matter of the most desperate urgency that these powers should be induced to come to the aid of the Allies, and that it was better to meet their terms than to risk the failure of the whole cause. Similarly the aid of Japan was vital enough to justify concessions that would have been refused under other circumstances.

II. WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROPOSALS DURING THE WAR

When the war broke out there was a widespread feeling that it was on such a tremendous scale that

it could not possibly last very long. When the Battle of the Marne showed that the Germans could not win the speedy victory on which they had counted, talk of peace began to be heard. This was renewed after each German victory. In part it was based upon unfounded rumors. In part it was inspired by Germany, with a view to feeling out Allied opinion. Similarly reports kept appearing that Russia, or Austria, or Turkey, or Bulgaria, or Belgium, or France was contemplating a separate peace. In some instances the wish was father to the thought; in others there may have been some basis in fact. Enough has come out to make it certain that there were numerous indirect efforts to ascertain the exact terms on which peace could be concluded. These were in such a form that they could always be denied if necessary. Statesmen on both sides were constantly rising to address parliament, or issuing statements to the press, affirming most positively that they had never made or received any such proposals, had never heard of such things, in fact had never given the matter a thought. The real inside history of all these peace moves is still unknown. The memoirs of the German and Austrian leaders which are appearing will probably call for supplementary statements from their opponents. In the meantime it is enough to note that efforts were made and that they came to nothing.

It is possible, however, to follow the public statements of the war aims and peace terms and

certain open moves toward peace. Even here the real significance does not always appear on the surface. Both sides were engaged in a gigantic game of bluff, and every statement was phrased and every peace maneuver timed and staged with an anxious eye, not only on the enemy, but on the morale at home, and on neutral opinion.

At the outbreak of hostilities both sides declared that they had been attacked by ruthless enemies and they were fighting only to protect their territorial integrity and independence, that they aimed only at securing guarantees against another such unprovoked assault, together with assurances that their legitimate interests would be safeguarded. In England, Premier Asquith spoke of restitutions, reparation, guarantees; of establishing the sanctity of treaties and international law; of safeguarding small nations; of destroying the power of Prussian militarism. A distinction was drawn between the German government and the German people. While a democratized Germany was regarded as highly desirable, all intention of dictating how Germany should be governed was disclaimed. Later Lloyd George talked of a "knock-out fight" with Prussianism. French leaders spoke of restoration, restitution, and guarantees in much the same general terms. Specifically they demanded Alsace-Lorraine.

The German official spokesmen were equally vague, though concrete enough peace terms were indicated by more or less representative and responsible

groups and individuals. These were so sweeping as to harden the Allies in their purpose to fight to the end.

In December, 1916, the Central Powers made the first formal offer to enter into peace negotiations. They had just gained sweeping military successes over Rumania, and with much reason they could assert that they had demonstrated their invincibility. They felt, however, that the sooner they could make peace, on the basis of the war map, the better it would be. Time, they knew, was fighting on the side of the Allies. Their own people were weary of war, but they hoped their enemies were even more so. If negotiations could be started, they were confident of securing a "good German peace." If their offer was rejected, they could disclaim responsibility. In either case the offer would result in benefit. The only possible harm was in having it interpreted as a sign of weakness.

The German, Austrian, Turkish, and Bulgarian notes, transmitted through neutrals, began by asserting that the war had been forced on the Central Powers. These powers denied wishing to shatter or annihilate their opponents, and expressed a desire to avert the threatened ruin of Western civilization by a peace which would be "a guaranty of the existence of the honor, and liberty of evolution for their nations." They proposed therefore "to enter forthwith into peace negotiations." If the Allies rejected this offer, theirs was the responsibility for continuing the struggle.

The general opinion in Allied countries was that the bid was insincere; that the Central Powers expected it to be refused; and that their only purpose was to strengthen the morale of their own population by fixing on their opponents the blame for continuing the war. In some quarters it was interpreted as indicating a realization that the game was up, and that defeat was impending. France, England, Russia, and Italy promptly refused to enter into negotiations at that time and in that fashion. In England, Lloyd George had just replaced Asquith as Prime Minister—a change which may have been hastened by the knowledge that peace proposals were imminent. On December 19, before the House of Commons, he rejected the German offer as showing no inclination to heed the British conditions of restitution, restoration, and guarantees against repetition. In their official reply (December 20) the Allies repudiated the assertion that the war had been forced on the Central Powers. The offer of peace was denounced as a sham, designed to influence public opinion, and it was rejected as “empty and insincere.” No peace was possible which did not secure “reparation for violated rights, the recognition of the principle of nationality and of the free existence of small states,” and did not “end, once for all, forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations.”¹

In the meantime President Wilson, who had been hoping since the beginning of the war that the United

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, February, 1917, pp. 801-3.

States might be able to mediate between the belligerents, addressed a note to all the nations involved. He denied that his move was in any way inspired by or connected with the offer of the Central Powers. Calling attention to the obvious fact that the war aims of both sides, as stated in general terms, seemed to be much the same, he asked both sides to state specifically the "precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out." He pointed out that both groups were committed in principle to some league of nations, in which, he intimated, the United States would join. In view of the unrestricted submarine warfare which Germany was known to be planning, this move by the President was a final move to hasten peace before the United States should inevitably be drawn into the conflict.

The note was at first widely resented in Allied countries for apparently putting the war aims of both sides on the same plane.

The Central Powers replied (December 26) that they considered a direct interchange of views preferable to a public statement of terms, and renewed their proposals for negotiations on neutral ground between representatives of all the belligerent nations. The Entente powers answered the President (January 10) agreeing with the idea of a league of nations, but insisting that they must first secure restitution, reparation, and guarantees. They challenged the comparison drawn between their aims and those of

their opponents, and reviewed the facts as to German aggression and ruthlessness. They stated that their chief objects in the war were well known. Reserving the details until the hour of the negotiations, they added:

The civilized world knows that they imply the restoration of Belgium, of Serbia, and of Montenegro, and the indemnities which are due them; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, of Russia, and of Rumania, with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable settlement, based alike upon the principle of nationalities, on the right which all peoples, whether small or great, have to the enjoyment of full security and free economic development, and also upon territorial agreements and international arrangements so framed as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attacks; the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations; the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, or Rumanians, and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, decidedly alien to Western civilization.¹

The Emperor of Russia, they said, had already promised a united and autonomous Poland. In a supplementary note of January 13² Balfour, now British Foreign Secretary, amplified the need of reorganizing the Turkish Empire. The three conditions of permanent peace, he declared, were the removal of existing causes of international unrest; the discrediting among their own peoples of the

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, February, 1917, p. 784.

² *Ibid.*, p. 786.

aggressive aims and unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers; and the devising of genuine international sanctions for international law and treaties. These statements by the Allies were thus far the most definite that had been made on either side. They are repeated and amplified in President Wilson's later proposals.

To the Allies, Germany in behalf of the Central Powers retorted that they themselves had achieved their defensive aims, and were anxious to end the war; but that the Allies were now admittedly fighting on toward "the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine and several Prussian provinces, the humiliation and diminution of Austria-Hungary, the partition of Turkey, and the mutilation of Bulgaria." They charged their enemies with repressing small nationalities, and with violating international law by their blockade and their use of colored troops.¹

Continuing his efforts to pave the way for a lasting peace and a league of nations, President Wilson on January 22 addressed the Senate, outlining the kind of peace which in his judgment the United States could join in guaranteeing, with a view to preventing future wars. Such a peace he felt should be negotiated by equals on the basis of justice in each particular and should not be dictated by a victor. Specifically, the peace should recognize equality of rights between large and small nations; it must "accept the principle that governments derive all

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, February, 1917, p. 789.

their just powers from the consent of the governed and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." Poland should be "united, independent, and autonomous." Minorities should have guarantees of "inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development." Great peoples struggling for an outlet to the sea should secure it, if not by cession of territory, then by neutralization of rights of way. The seas must be free, and armaments must be limited. Allied opinion in general resented the "peace without victory" suggestion; but the new submarine warfare, the Russian Revolution, and the entrance of the United States into the war soon overshadowed all other interests.

There has been much discussion as to the possibility of peace in the winter of 1916-17. The Allies have been criticized for not taking the German offer more seriously. The correspondence between Ambassador von Bernstorff and Berlin shows that President Wilson really hoped to be able to find a basis of agreement. Von Bernstorff urged his government to postpone the submarine warfare which he said would inevitably lead to war with the United States. He begged for an explicit statement of German terms. The Foreign Office replied that the submarine campaign could not be stopped, and when the German terms were finally sent confidentially for the President's information, it was too late.¹

¹ *Ibid.*, March, 1920, 513-19.

In Germany the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare marked the culmination of a long struggle between the political and military leaders, the former striving for a more moderate policy and hoping to negotiate a satisfactory peace, the latter confident of their ability to starve England into complete submission before the United States could make any difference.

President Wilson's war message (April 2, 1917) was widely acclaimed as the finest statement yet formulated of the case against Germany and of the aims of the United States and of the Allies. Germany's specific offense in violating the international law of warfare at sea was denounced as an actual warfare against mankind and in particular against American rights, which the United States could do no less than resist. While we had no quarrel with the German people, the menace of autocratic government and free institutions everywhere must be forever destroyed. "The world must be made safe for democracy," and future peace guaranteed by "a partnership of democratic nations." In subsequent addresses these aims were restated and emphasized. In the Flag Day address (June 14, 1917) the German ambition for world-overlordship was set forth, the German eagerness for peace on the basis of the war map was explained, and the necessity for the defeat of German autocracy was explained.

Meanwhile Germany was trying to conclude the separate peace with Russia which had been almost

within her grasp just before the Russian Revolution. Russia was tired of war, was willing to forego Constantinople, and proposed a general peace based on the principles of "no forcible annexations and no punitive indemnities." Liberal Russian leaders holding out against a separate peace begged the Allies for specific statements of peace terms to dispel the suspicion that they were continuing the war for imperialistic ends.

In Germany a strong undercurrent in favor of a moderate peace was making itself felt. The government naturally wished to secure the best terms possible under the guise of securing "guaranties" for future security. Bethmann-Hollweg, trying to steer between extremes, pleased neither group, and finally resigned, July 12. Michaelis, his successor, insisted that the policies of the government would not be changed. No peace would be considered "with the enemy demanding the cession of German soil."¹ With the support of the Catholic Center Party the Reichstag passed a resolution, July 19, accepting in general terms the formula of peace without annexations or indemnities, and demanding a "peace of understanding and the permanent reconciliation of the people."²

The first of August the Pope addressed a note to all the belligerents, pleading for a peace of reason and

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, August, 1917, pp. 196-97.

² *Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims*, p. 44.

justice to be followed by a reduction of armaments and the substitution of arbitration, with sanctions, for warlike methods of settling difficulties. In particular he advocated the evacuation of Belgium and the restoration of complete political, military, and economic independence, and the restoration of occupied territories, including the German colonies. The territorial differences between Italy and Austria and between France and Germany he hoped would be examined "in a conciliatory spirit," with due regard to the aspirations of the people and the welfare of humanity. The Balkan, Armenian, and Polish questions should be examined in the same spirit.¹

The Allies however refused to regard peace with an unbeaten and unrepentant Germany as possible or desirable. On July 31 Lord Robert Cecil declared that Austria-Hungary must be dismembered, and Balfour said that Germany must be powerless or free. On August 29 Wilson replied to the Pope's note, declaring that there could be no return to the status of before the war, and asserting that no confidence could be placed in the word of the existing German government. The Central Powers, without specifically stating terms, answered the Pope sympathetically.² In October Kuehlmann, the German Foreign Secretary, said that peace rested with Germany's foes, adding later that Alsace-Lorraine was the only bar to peace. On October 11 Lloyd George

¹ *Documents and Statements*, p. 47.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 55.

declared that Britain would fight for the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France.

By this time the matter of peace with Russia was the most serious question of the hour. Russia seemed out of the war. German and Austrian troops had advanced after the Russian offensive of July. The Provisional Government under Kerensky was having enormous difficulties in keeping any sort of control within, and in carrying on a war on the old Front. Much talk was heard that the Allies in disgust would make a peace with Germany, at the expense of Russia, rescuing Belgium and Northern France, and in return giving a free hand to the Central Powers to exploit their gains in the east. Those who understood the real objects of the war loudly declared that such a policy amounted to an admission of German victory.

On November 6 the Bolsheviki came into power in Petrograd. Among their first moves were the publication of the secret treaties by which the Allies had planned the division of the spoils and the negotiation of an armistice with the Central Powers. The Central Powers now strove desperately for a general peace satisfactory to themselves. Numerous informal suggestions were made, refused, denied, and repudiated.

The Bolsheviki proposed a general peace on the basis of evacuation of all occupied territory; restoration of Belgium, France, Serbia, Rumania, East Prussia, and other devastated regions from an

international fund; a plebiscite for Alsace-Lorraine, Trieste, the Trentino, and contested areas in the Balkans; autonomy for Poland, the Baltic provinces, and Turkish Armenia; restoration of the German colonies; neutralization of all straits; renunciation of indemnities and commercial wars; and a progressive general disarmament.

Count Czernin, for the Central Powers, agreed to discuss a peace on these principles, if all the Allies would take part in the negotiations. All intention was denied of annexing occupied territory or of destroying the independence of any nation which had lost it in the war. The question of the subject nationalities, however, could not be settled between states, "but is, if required, to be solved by each state, with its peoples independently in a constitutional manner." As a general principle, it was admitted that "protection of the right of minorities forms an essential component of the constitutional right of peoples to self-determination," which the Central Powers would follow "in so far as it is practically realizable." Czernin agreed that both sides should renounce indemnities for war costs and damages. Germany's colonies must be restored.

The Allies refused to consider entering the Brest-Litovsk negotiations on these terms. The Bolsheviks rejected some of them, denouncing them as imperialistic, and hoping for a proletarian revolution within Germany and Austria. There were indeed some

strikes and riots, but they were quickly suppressed. Some of the German political leaders advocated a moderate peace with Russia, hoping that opinion in the Allied countries would then compel a negotiated peace in the west also. The military leaders however were determined to exploit to the utmost their advantages in the east. On February 9 a separate peace with the Ukraine was signed, but the next day the Bolsheviki broke off negotiations, and took the highly original course of declaring the war at an end on all fronts, and ordering the Russian forces demobilized.

The Central Powers advanced into Russian territory, and in March the Bolsheviki were compelled to sign terms of peace, by which Russia renounced sovereignty over Finland, Poland, the Baltic provinces, and Russian Armenia, and agreed to conclude peace with the Ukraine. In this western territory "Russia undertakes to refrain from all interference in the internal affairs of these territories and to let Germany and Austria determine the future fate of these territories in agreement with their populations." In addition Russia promised sweeping commercial concessions. Later, under the guise of reparation for destruction in East Prussia a large cash indemnity was exacted.

Rumania was similarly compelled to sign a peace giving up strategic territory to Austria in the west, and resigning the whole of the Dobrudja, together with a number of economic concessions that amounted to vassalage.

Triumphant in the east, Germany transferred all available forces to the west, and began preparations for the terrific offensives that were designed to force the discouraged Allies to make peace. The situation was critical for both sides. Turks and Bulgars were exhausted and anxious for peace. Within Austria-Hungary economic distress and growing rebellion on the part of the subject peoples made it certain that nothing but a speedy peace could save the empire. Within Germany it became increasingly difficult to maintain morale. On the other hand the submarines were cutting into English shipping and food imports at a genuinely menacing rate. American troops in France were still relatively unimportant. In the spring and summer of 1917 informal discussions were taking place between Austrian and French representatives. In a personal letter (March 31) to his cousin Prince Sixtus, the Emperor Charles said he would support "the just claims of France as to Alsace-Lorraine," using his personal influence with his allies. Belgian sovereignty and colonial possessions were to be restored. Serbia was to be re-established in sovereignty and given an equitable and natural access to the Adriatic Sea and wide economic concessions, on condition that groups aiming at the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy be suppressed. These proposals were to be secretly and unofficially laid before France and England. Later discussions between French and Austrian negotiators in Switzerland came to nothing because France would not yield

on Alsace-Lorraine. When the fact of these negotiations became known, the Austrian government charged that the text of these letters had been falsified, and that the original had read, "I would have used all my personal influence in favor of the French claims for the return of Alsace-Lorraine if these claims were just. They are not, however."¹

It was at one time reported that the Emperor Charles had offered to make territorial concessions on behalf of Austria, if Germany would concede part of Alsace-Lorraine to France. There is no doubt that the Allies tried desperately to induce Austria to agree to a separate peace. But however anxious the Austrians might be to end the war, they dared not defy Germany.

Early in January the demand for a restatement of Allied war aims led to Lloyd George's speech of January 5, followed on January 8 by President Wilson's "Fourteen Points" address to the Senate. It was evident from the close correspondence of the speeches that there had been a previous agreement on their main points. These fourteen items in "the only possible program of the world's peace" became so important that in spite of their familiarity they should be recalled:

1. "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at," with the ending of private international understandings.

2. Freedom of navigation in peace and war "except as the seas may be closed . . . by international action for the enforcement of international covenants."

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, March, 1920, pp. 519-24.

3. "The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance."

4. "Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety."

5. "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon" the interests of the populations concerned as well as equitable claims of the governments.

6. Evacuation of Russian territory, and co-operation in assuring unhampered determination of political development and national policy.

7. Evacuation and restoration of Belgium, without any limitation on sovereignty.

8. Evacuation and restoration of French territory. "The wrong done to France . . . in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine should be righted."

9. "A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality."

10. "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro to be evacuated and restored; "Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea"; Balkan relations "determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality," with international guarantees of political and economic independence and territorial integrity.

12. "The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development," with the Dardanelles opened under international guarantees.

13. An independent Polish state to "include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea," with international guarantees of political and economic independence and territorial integrity.

14. "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

These statements marked an important stage in the development of peace terms. They were sufficiently specific to indicate the particular changes sought by the Allies, yet they were so phrased as to allow a certain degree of elasticity in their application. Labor groups and moderate socialists expressed approval, and Allied liberalism gave them hearty support. Within the Central Powers the moderates were encouraged.

In succeeding months a very interesting long-range discussion of terms took place in the form of speeches by leaders on both sides. More and more President Wilson became the spokesman of the Allies. His terms were discussed in the Reichstag and the Austrian Reichsrath, and the positions of the Central Powers in turn were criticized by Lloyd George, Cecil, Balfour, Wilson, Clémenceau, and others.

The German chancellor, Hertling (January 24, 1918), agreed to open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, limitation of armaments, and consideration of a league of nations. Peace with Russia, on the basis of self-determination for the border peoples, was declared a

matter between Russia and the Central Powers alone. Evacuation of Belgium and Northern France was to be used as a "valuable pawn" in the final negotiations. Under no circumstances would Germany agree to give up Alsace-Lorraine or other German territory, including colonies. Germany and Austria were to determine the future of Poland. Questions covering Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey were to be decided by those powers, and Germany would energetically back any positions they took.¹

The same day Count Czernin spoke to much the same effect, though with perhaps a more conciliatory tone. Wilson's statement that he did not seek the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary was approved, but any "advice as to our internal government" was rejected. Support to Austria's allies in maintaining their territorial integrity was pledged.²

The Supreme War Council of the Allies declared that these speeches did not show "any real approximation to the moderate conditions laid down by all the Allied governments." On February 11 President Wilson replied, criticizing Hertling's desire for a peace based on individual bargains between the several belligerents. He professed to see more promise in Czernin's attitude. He took the occasion to restate the four principles to be applied to a peace settlement:

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, March, 1917, p. 389.

² *Ibid.*, p. 396.

such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.

Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the Balance of Power; but that,

Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival states.

Fourth, that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world.¹

Lloyd George refused (February 12) to see any hope in an attitude which made no provision for the oppressed nationalities of Turkey and Austria-Hungary, or for Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, and Serbia.

Continuing the long-distance debate, Hertling said² that, while Germany would not retain Belgium, it would be necessary to provide that Belgium should never be "an object or jumping-off ground of enemy machinations." Turning to Wilson's "four principles," he agreed without reservation to all of them, and was willing to discuss peace terms on that basis, provided they were recognized by all nations, and the Allies abandoned their plans of "conquest." Entente leaders concluded, however, from the remainder of

¹ *Documents and Statements*, p. 138.

² February 25, *Documents and Statements*, p. 152.

the speech, and still more from actual German practices, that the German interpretation of these four principles would differ so radically from theirs that no basis satisfactory to them could be reached. Within Entente countries, however, some liberal and labor leaders felt that a peace by agreement was possible, and Lord Lansdowne in an open letter urged private preliminary discussions.¹

Presently the military leaders of Germany made their supreme bid for victory and peace by the offensives in France and Belgium. Czernin's speeches continued to defend the Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest treaties, to denounce the Czech leaders who would break up the monarchy, and to express willingness for a "just" peace which would guarantee Austria-Hungary's security. Then Austria-Hungary could proceed to reform its own constitution.²

From this time there was little progress in the formulation of specific peace terms. Gigantic efforts were made to win a military decision, and the Allies strove to encourage internal disintegration within Austria-Hungary. President Wilson increasingly emphasized the need for the overthrow of the military masters of Germany, and the establishment of a democratic government, before any negotiations could be opened.

Within Germany the conflict of points of view between the political and military leaders continued.

¹ November 28, 1917, *Documents and Statements*, p. 84.

² *Documents and Statements*, p. 183.

On June 25, Baron Kuehlmann, Foreign Secretary, denied that Germany sought world-domination, and went back to the early German contention that Russia desired the war, France instigated it, and England encouraged it. The aims of the Central Powers were restated as territorial integrity, "a secure, free, strong, and independent life," with possessions beyond the seas "which correspond to our greatness, wealth, and proved colonial capacity," together with security for world-trade. He urged therefore an exchange of views, and closed with the admission that "an absolute end can hardly be expected through military decisions alone, without any diplomatic negotiations."¹ This last admission raised such a storm in Germany that Kuehlmann resigned. On July 16 Count Burian declared for Austria-Hungary that "the sole objects that really divide the belligerent parties are those of a territorial character."²

On August 8, in the course of an important speech in the House of Commons, Balfour declared that German colonies would not be given back, which led Solf, the German Colonial Secretary, to insist on a "compromise between the Colonial Powers," on the basis of their economic strength and ability to protect subject races.

Events were now hastening to a crisis. The military successes of the Allies, together with the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

² *Ibid.*, p. 200.

gathering discontent and despair in Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary, to say nothing of Germany, culminated in the offensives of September and November, which crushed Bulgar resistance in Macedonia, destroyed the Turkish army in Palestine, overwhelmed the Austrian army in Italy, broke the Hindenburg line in France, and cut the main German line of supply at Sedan.

On September 29 Bulgaria surrendered at discretion; October 31 Turkey followed suit. September 15 Austria had in desperation asked the Allies to agree at once to "a confidential and non-binding discussion on basic principles for the conclusion of peace." The United States replied briefly that its peace terms were already well known, and in his speech of September 27 President Wilson once more stated the issues and the general principles of a settlement.

On October 5 the new German government, which professed to be responsible to the Reichstag, requested President Wilson to initiate peace negotiations accepting the program of the Fourteen Points speech and later speeches as a basis. The President asked whether the German government accepted them in the sense that the only discussion was as to their practical application. He also asked whether the Chancellor spoke merely for the old masters of Germany or for the people; and he stipulated that before peace could be discussed the Germans should evacuate occupied territory.

On October 14 the German reply was received, accepting the Fourteen Points fully, agreeing to evacuations, and claiming to speak for government and people both. The President replied that any armistice must be arranged by the military leaders; that submarine warfare must stop; and that the arbitrary government of Germany must be destroyed or rendered impotent.

On October 7 Austria had proposed peace on the basis of Wilson's terms, and had been informed that the later recognition of the claims of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs no longer made it possible to offer peace on the basis of "autonomy" for the subject nationalities.

On October 20 the German government agreed to Wilson's terms and gave renewed assurance that it was responsible to the people. The President then transmitted the whole correspondence to the Allies. They replied that "subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses." They reserved "complete freedom" of interpretation as to the freedom of the seas, and they stated that by "restoration of invaded territory they understood that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by

land, by sea, and from the air." President Wilson agreed with this latter interpretation. On the basis of this correspondence, the armistice of November 11 was concluded.

In looking back over these two years of discussion it is difficult to see at what time and on what basis a peace might have been concluded. Each side had aims, which only a defeated enemy would concede. If Austria-Hungary and Turkey had been willing to become federalized, if Germany had been willing to restore the French-speaking portion of Alsace-Lorraine, if all had agreed to a united and independent Poland, if the Allies had been willing to restore the German colonies, negotiations might have been possible. But in view of the attitudes of the different groups no one of these was thinkable. The chief result of the prolonged discussion of war aims was a fairly complete statement of Allied principles and objects. The public statements, however, proved in some respects to be less significant than the secret understandings.

CHAPTER III

THE PEACE CONFERENCE

In a way the collapse of the Central Powers, particularly that of Germany, came as a surprise to the Allies. They had been making every preparation for a campaign extending into 1919. Consequently they were not entirely prepared for the Peace Conference, with its numerous and complicated problems. During the war public discussion of peace terms had been somewhat discouraged by the authorities, or even denounced as pacifistic and pro-German. Every energy was bent on winning the war. Until Germany was beaten no peace was possible.

It was of course true that in private the powers had made a number of arrangements among themselves. A complicating factor arose, however, through the general agreement to make peace on the basis of the principles formulated by President Wilson. At the very outset, the question was raised as to the respective status of the secret treaties and the Fourteen Points. The Germans took the very plausible position, in which they were supported by many liberals among their enemies, that the Allies by consenting to a Wilsonian peace thereby abandoned their own private plans, at least so far as they conflicted with the President's principles. The Allies maintained that, properly interpreted, there

was no necessary conflict between the two, at least in essentials. While in some cases they agreed to a reconsideration, they did not at all admit that their treaties with each other had automatically become inoperative.

In the autumn of 1917 the President had authorized the collection of information bearing on questions which would enter into the peace settlement. Under the direction of Colonel E. M. House, who as the President's confidential adviser had visited Europe several times to ascertain the views of the different belligerents, a group of experts was assembled in New York who spent the next year in an intensive study of the historical, legal, economic, geographic, and ethnographic situation in the areas involved in the war. Some criticism was expressed that this work was not put more directly under the State Department, but the general idea was excellent. Somewhat similar investigations were being carried on in England and France. Most of the members of the House "Inquiry" accompanied the American Peace Delegation to Paris, where by common consent the Peace Conference was to meet.

It was, however, more than two months after the armistice before it formally assembled. The delay was caused in part by the distance which some of the delegates had to come, in part by the large number of preliminary details which had to be worked out. Furthermore, the leaders were anxious to arrive at some tentative agreement among themselves,

in order that the work of the Conference might proceed as smoothly as possible. In England, Lloyd George wished to wait until after the general election in December.

On December 4 President Wilson sailed for France as the head of the American delegation. With him there went a large number of technical advisers and experts on the various questions involved in the settlement. He was received with the utmost popular enthusiasm in France, Italy, and England. The tribute represented an expression of gratitude for the share taken in the war by the United States, and it was also a recognition of the fact that the President personally had become the spokesman of the idealistic aims of the Allies, and the most prominent and disinterested advocate of a just peace to be guaranteed by a league of nations. So at least Mr. Wilson interpreted his welcome. These were the points which he emphasized in his public addresses; and his wonderful reception encouraged him to count on the support of public opinion in Europe and the United States to compel the Conference to make a peace of justice. "The peoples who constitute the nations of the world," he declared, "are in the saddle and they are going to see to it that, if their present governments do not do their will, some other governments shall."¹

These visits also gave the President an opportunity to have informal conferences with the English, French, and Italian leaders, and to get acquainted

¹ Boston speech, February 24, 1919.

with his colleagues. It was announced that Wilson and Lloyd George found themselves in substantial agreement. In Italy the President had little success in persuading the Italian government to modify its aspirations. Clémenceau did not attempt to conceal the fact that he was unable to agree with the American President in many important particulars.

As the world read of the gathering of the leaders of the nations, and discussed the approach of the "Great Peace," two general points of view developed. Different types of mind had different conceptions of the task before the Conference, and of the proper methods for it to pursue.

The "practical" men kept insisting that human nature never changed; that there always had been wars, and there always would be wars. To pursue utopian leagues of peace would only lead to disappointment and disaster. In their minds the immediate problem was the punishment of Germany and her allies for their atrocious crimes against civilization; the exaction of the utmost possible by way of reparation; the reduction of the Central Powers to military impotence; and the crippling of German economic competition for the future. In remaking the map of Europe, a fundamental consideration should be the creation of an impregnable frontier for France, the erection of powerful barrier states to the south and east of Germany which should guard against a revival of German aggression, and at the same time oppose the spread of bolshevism. As to Turkey

and the German colonies, the territory should be divided among the victors and added to their existing colonial empires.

The more idealistic liberals and radicals started from the premise that this peace must be different in kind from any that had ever been made in the past; that it must be based upon principles of fairness, moderation, and justice, even to the enemy. Old wrongs were to be righted, but not in such a fashion as to cause new and more dangerous conflicts of interest. A new world-organization must be set up which should not only minimize the danger of future wars, but also be the agent in time of peace for an increasing international co-operation in the beneficent work of advancing the common interests of mankind. The subject peoples in the former German colonies and in the Turkish Empire were to receive the largest possible degree of independence, and for the future were to be guided and helped, not exploited for the benefit of European capital and industry. Punitive indemnities were to be renounced, and economic discrimination even against the enemy abandoned. From motives of expediency, if for nothing else, the Germans were to be permitted and even helped to revive industrially, and allowed to resume their place in the family of nations. Otherwise they would not be able to pay the debt assessed against them, and in despair might turn to bolshevism. To deprive them of genuinely German territory, to condemn them to economic servitude, to

continue to treat them as an outcast nation, would pave the way for future world-unrest, and would lead almost certainly to a new world-war which would be so much more horrible than the last that it might well mean the end of Western civilization.

Few perhaps held exclusively to either of these points of view. The practical men admitted that a league of nations was an excellent idea and that something should be done about it, provided always that adequate guarantees were devised which would work in case the League proved a failure—as it probably would. The liberals admitted that Germany deserved heavy punishment, and that for some time the Germans must be regarded with suspicion. They had confidence, however, that the Revolution had made a genuine change in Germany, and that the moderate elements should be given every encouragement in their efforts to break with the past and establish a really popular government. Only by a “healing peace,” drawn up in a spirit of fairness and even generosity, could the war-weary world be given a chance to enter upon a new era of reconciliation and co-operation.

In each country these two points of view were in conflict, and the clash was reflected in the Conference itself, in each delegation, and for that matter in the mind of each member. Each country tended to support idealistic solutions of difficulties where its own interests were not immediately affected. But when it became a question of a strategic frontier, or

an indemnity, or a colony for any nation, the leaders of that nation became suddenly practical. It was inevitable that many decisions should take the form of compromises between ideals and practical considerations, or between the conflicting material claims of different groups. In such cases nobody was entirely satisfied.

Throughout the long negotiations, with the endless proposals and counter-proposals and discussions, the central ideas of the leaders of the different delegations remained fairly consistent. Clémenceau entered the Conference inflexibly determined to forward the interests of France, first, last, and all the time. Alsace-Lorraine must be recovered, if possible with the addition of the Saar Valley. The material damage to Northern France must be repaired, and as much of the French war debt as possible charged to Germany. Individuals guilty of atrocities must be punished in all cases where they were known. France must share in the economic opportunities of developing parts of Turkey and the former German colonies. In Russia bolshevism must be crushed to prevent its spread and to open the way for the recovery of the billions due to French investors. In Central Europe a strong barrier should be erected to check both bolshevism and Prussianism. But supremely, the German menace must be utterly and forever ended. Under that shadow France had lived for half a century, and before German aggression France had all but succumbed. It was all very well for

the United States, across the Atlantic, to expect that a league of nations would curb Germany in the future—perhaps it would; then again, perhaps not. But France lived next door to Germany, and France was determined to be safe even if the League failed to work. Optimists might point to the new German Socialist Republic, and insist that the old aggressive militarism was dead. Perhaps. Let us hope so, though there were few signs of repentance visible. But Clémenceau had lived too near the Germans, for too long, to have much confidence in the change of heart. For France he insisted that, no matter how much the Germans might ever wish to renew their aggressions, it should be physically impossible for them to do so with any chance of success. France must have an unassailable military frontier, and Germany must be permanently disarmed and hemmed in and guarded. In standing for these points the French Premier had strong support from public opinion, and from the French Assembly. Only a few socialists counseled moderation.

The British point of view was somewhat different. With the French desire for security British opinion was in hearty sympathy, but as to some of the French proposals for detaching the Rhine provinces there was hesitation. In dividing up the spoils outside of Europe, France and England would need to compromise conflicting claims in a friendly spirit. The surrender of the German fleet had already secured Great Britain in that supremacy of the seas which

formed a cardinal principle of national policy, and all that remained to be done was to prevent the growth of a similar menace, and to refrain from agreeing to any form of disarmament or any definition of "freedom of the seas" which should impair the superiority of the British fleet. The German merchant marine had been disposed of in large part, and the remainder could be claimed by way of reparation. German foreign commerce had been for the time extinguished. For the future, German economic competition, at least in its "unfair" forms, was to be prevented. It was unfortunate that in his campaign speeches Lloyd George had aroused extravagant expectations as to what would be exacted from Germany. The unreflecting public had been led to believe that the Kaiser and his chief aids would be promptly tried, and quite probably hanged in a row, and that Germany would be forced to pay the entire war debt of the British Empire. One of Lloyd George's tasks at the Conference was therefore to secure results which would not fall too far short of these expectations. Another of his difficulties was to keep the representatives of the Dominions in line, particularly as to the disposition of the German colonial possessions. With regard to these, and to the extra-European situation generally, the British leaders were determined to consolidate and protect their imperial interests in Africa and Asia, and to secure a satisfactory share in new commercial and investment opportunities.

In the dark days of 1917 much concern was felt lest Italy should consent to a compromise peace with Austria-Hungary, and probably many Italians at that time would have been glad to get out with the gains promised by Austria in 1915, or even with no gains at all. With the victories of 1918, and the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, Italian aspirations and expectations rose with a bound. For some years a strong and expansive nationalism had made itself felt in the peninsula. Many voices were heard proclaiming that Italy had only begun the great work of political, economic, and cultural expansion for which as the heirs of the Roman tradition the Italians were fitted and destined. The secret treaty of 1915 had revealed concern for three things: the recovery of the "unredeemed" brethren in Austria; a desire for strategic security on the north and in the Adriatic; and a determination to share more largely in the political control and the economic exploitation of Africa and Asia Minor. At the Conference the Italian representatives asked for the territories and privileges promised in the treaty of London, and in addition for the district of Fiume. They developed a willingness to make concessions in favor of Greece as to the Aegean Islands, and on the Dalmatian coast in favor of the South Slavs; but by way of compensation they demanded Fiume. While England and France were willing to stand by their agreement, they were not particularly enthusiastic about adding Fiume. The concessions in Asia Minor and Africa

also raised some difficulties. It was understood that Italy opposed the scheme of a Danubian Federation, which France favored as a bulwark against Germany. To Italy this seemed too much like a revival of the Hapsburg menace.

Japan's position throughout the Conference was consistent and intelligible. In connection with the League of Nations the Japanese stood firmly for a declaration in favor of racial equality. While on the surface this was largely a sentimental matter, in the background was the whole question of discrimination against the Japanese by the United States, Canada, and Australia. In practical politics Japan was concerned with her political predominance and economic expansion in the Far East. The German possessions and privileges in that area must pass to Japan. Under pressure Japan agreed to accept a mandate for the islands north of the equator, instead of annexing them, but the difference in this case may prove slight. As to Shantung, Japan was willing to promise to restore the sovereignty of China, retaining, however, the economic concessions which had belonged to Germany. "The Japanese delegates were the least expressive of any at the Conference; they said the least; but they were the firmest of any in hewing to the line of their interests and their agreements."¹ They felt—and Japanese opinion at home was strong on this point—that Japan deserved some reward for her sacrifices and efforts.

¹R. S. Baker, *What Wilson Did at Paris*.

The United States sought no territorial gains, or economic special privileges. We were trying in a disinterested fashion to bring about a permanent and satisfactory settlement based on the best possible solution of each specific problem. But the interest of America in such a peace is more than an abstract and idealistic one. It is perfectly clear that another world-conflagration will almost inevitably involve the United States. The most practical and selfish considerations therefore demand that we should use every effort to prevent conflicts by removing their causes. From the standpoint of trade also it is obviously to our advantage to see the various European groups turn from quarreling with each other over boundaries and unredeemed areas and devote their energies to the production and exchange of goods. President Wilson consequently did his best to secure decisions which seemed from the outside American point of view to be the fairest for all the interested groups.

The five great powers dominated the Conference, and made the final settlements. The lesser nations complained indignantly that they were called in merely to consent to decisions made in secret by the Big Five. It is true that they were given a hearing when their interests were involved; but they felt that their wishes were not given due consideration, or their rights sufficient weight. The situation was of course a difficult one. In many instances the interests of minor powers clashed with each other, or with those

of some great power. The Allies had endeavored to fix provisional boundaries, with neutral zones in some cases occupied by Allied troops. While the understanding was that these arrangements did not prejudice the rights of either party, all the claimants for territory felt that possession of disputed areas would be a good thing. As a result South Slavs, Italians, Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Greeks, and Rumanians kept large forces under arms, and not infrequently clashed with each other in debatable regions. Thus the Czecho-Slovak Republic and the Poles fought over Teschen. The South Slav kingdom prepared to fight Italy over the Adriatic situation and Rumania over the division of the Banat in Southern Hungary. Internally the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as it was officially called, was having difficulty. Some of the Croats and a faction of the Montenegrins were holding out for independence. During the course of the Conference the powers decided to recognize the new kingdom, and accordingly they refused Montenegro a separate representative. There was tension also between Greece and Italy, and the Greek aspirations in Thrace raised perplexing issues. China had a grievance against Japan. It is a noteworthy fact that the greatest difficulties encountered in making peace were concerned not so much with the terms to be imposed on the Central Powers as with the adjustment of conflicts between the victors. The Supreme Council had less difficulty in coercing Germany than in dealing with the Rumanian defiance of its authority.

Among the smaller combatants Belgium occupied a special position. Belgium was anxious to secure four things: prompt reparation from Germany, so that normal economic life might be restored as soon as possible; the addition of some small districts from Prussia, and the "rectification" of the frontier with Holland by the annexation of Maastricht and the left bank of the Scheldt River; the abolition of the old status of neutralization; and an extension of the Belgian Congo at the expense of German East Africa. Belgium would also have liked to have the Duchy of Luxemburg attached to it in some fashion, and there was a strong desire to have the seat of the League of Nations at Brussels. Only part of the Belgian claims were granted, and at one time Belgium indicated an intention of refusing to sign the Treaty unless further concessions were made. In particular, Holland refused to cede any territory, and the powers declined to bring any pressure to bear. Holland however agreed to discuss a number of long-standing difficulties connected with Belgian access to the sea. In matters where their interests were concerned, neutral powers were invited to present their views.

In addition to the recognized delegations at Paris there were present numerous other more or less authorized spokesmen for various struggling *de facto* governments seeking recognition and assistance. Such were Finland, the Baltic States, and the Ukraine. There were also representatives of different anti-bolshevist groups and governments in Russia, each with its own

policy to urge for the settlement of affairs in Eastern Europe. There came, too, delegations to plead the cause of dozens of minor groups, like the Armenians and the Lebanese, pathetically convinced that if only they could obtain a hearing, particularly with President Wilson, their "nations" would be made free and their old wrongs righted. The Persians came to ask the relaxation of restrictions on their independence of action and the restoration of territory taken from them by Russia. Much embarrassment was caused by groups who came to urge that self-determination be applied within the Allied states. Sinn Feiners, Egyptians, British Indians, Koreans, and others vociferated their appeals to the Conference for independence. Naturally the great powers refused to discuss such matters, which were regarded as of purely domestic concern.

It is clear, then, that the Peace Conference was anything but a simple and tranquil affair. With every printing-press in Paris working to turn out propagandist literature, with official and unofficial delegations rushing around, pulling wires, and trying to make private agreements, with war and famine and revolution raging in half of Europe, it is almost a wonder that anything at all was accomplished.

CHAPTER IV

THE FRAMING OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Nominally, at least, the great general principles of the peace had been agreed upon in advance, and were well understood by all. It was in the interpretation of these principles, and in their application to specific problems, that the difficulties arose.

All agreed in theory that the supreme purpose of the Conference should be to remake the map and readjust international relations in such fashion as to remove as many as possible of the old causes of friction, without causing new ones, and at the same time to provide some new international organization for the peaceful settlement of future difficulties. More particularly it was agreed: (1) that the Central Powers must make good the damage done to civilians through their acts of aggression on land, on sea, and from the air. (2) In determining new boundaries primary consideration must be given to the wishes of the populations concerned. The guiding principle must be "self-determination." Nevertheless, account must also be taken of historical claims, of geographic considerations such as defensible frontiers and access to the sea, and of the desirability of adequate agricultural resources and supplies of coal and iron.

(3) Racial, religious, and linguistic minorities necessarily placed under some other group must be protected in their rights. (4) Militarism and arbitrary power likely to be misused must be destroyed or made impotent.

The principles seemed clear enough, but in applying them there were a number of difficulties:

1. Some of them are vague and capable of several interpretations. This is particularly true of "self-determination." What, for instance, is to be the *unit*? Should Fiume, for instance, vote apart from its Slav suburbs?

2. In some cases two or more principles clash. For instance, in the case of Polish access to the sea: Poland's natural and historic port is Dantzig; but Dantzig is purely German; and to reach it, many Germans must be annexed; and the German district of East Prussia is thereby completely detached.

Also Fiume, though Italian, is claimed as the only practicable access to the sea for the South Slavs. Should the same kind of decision be made as in the parallel case of Dantzig? Again, giving Italy a "natural" and defensible frontier on the crest of the Alps detaches several hundred thousand Germans from the southern Tyrol.

3. The Allies have various conflicting interests; naturally each interprets general principles in the way most favorable to itself.

4. A great many points about the peace settlement were decided in advance by secret treaties

made for the most part in a spirit of self-interest and bargaining.

5. Old enmities and distrusts have made it hard to be generous or even fair with defeated enemies whose past record arouses no sympathy.

II. THE NEGOTIATIONS

The first plenary session of the Conference was held January 18, 1919. One of the earliest problems had been to decide what nations were entitled to a seat at the peace table. The old Russian Empire had collapsed and no stable government existed which the Allies would recognize as having the right to speak in the name of the Russian people as a whole. On the other hand, it was agreed that Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and the Arab Kingdom of the Hedjaz were entitled to be present as separate states. The newly proclaimed Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had not as yet been recognized by the principal Allies, who continued to regard Serbia and Montenegro as separate states, and the remainder of the South Slav areas as Austro-Hungarian territories, the status of which was to be finally settled by the Peace Conference. On the other hand, the British Dominions and India were represented separately, instead of being included in a panel of delegates for the empire as a whole. It was generally agreed that the enemy powers were not to be summoned until the treaty was ready for them to sign.

From the outset France, England, the United States, Italy, and Japan assumed the direction of affairs. As Clémenceau frankly pointed out, they had borne the greatest burdens of the war, their armies and navies had largely won the victories, their stakes in the world-settlement were greatest, and on them would fall the principal responsibility for seeing that the terms of the treaty were carried out. Clémenceau was chosen permanent chairman. It was only after a formal protest that the representatives of the press had been admitted, even to the formal sessions, and throughout the Conference there was much criticism of the secrecy maintained. "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at" had been one of the Fourteen Points. By this the President had intended to denounce secret treaties and understandings between statesmen, which might commit governments to undertakings of which the public was ignorant. By no reasonable interpretation could it be taken as a pledge never to thrash out difficult and delicate points in private. Many, however, felt that secrecy was being greatly overdone, and that negotiations were not being conducted "in the public view."

As a matter of fact the really significant decisions were made behind closed doors by the representatives of the five "Principal Allied and Associated Powers"—England, France, the United States, Italy, and Japan—and in the last resort by the "Big Three," Wilson, Clémenceau, and Lloyd George. Official

communications for the press were issued from time to time as matters progressed. The newspaper correspondents were given interviews which they were not allowed to quote. In one way or another, however, much that went on became known. Occasionally one delegation or another was suspected of allowing information to reach the press in order to influence pending decisions by arousing public opinion.

It must be remembered that the men who had the final responsibility for the decisions were obliged at the same time to consider two other sets of forces. As the executive heads of their nations they had from day to day to decide pressing questions of immediate policy connected with affairs in Europe. The Great War was supposedly over, but a dozen little wars were still going on. Everywhere various nationalist groups were attempting to anticipate the decision of the Conference by seizing as wide an area of debatable territory as possible. A supremely important question was the spread of bolshevism. The fate of the new governments in Germany, in German Austria, and in Hungary was also a matter of the gravest concern. Obviously peace could be made only with some stable government, capable of carrying out the terms. With Spartacan uprisings in Berlin and Munich, and with a bolshevist government in Buda-Pesth it seemed at times as if all Central and Eastern Europe was relapsing into chaos. These problems were dealt with by the leaders partly in

their capacity as peace negotiators, but in part also as members of the Supreme War Council, which since early in 1918 had been meeting at Versailles.

But in addition to these distracting movements, each leader had to consider public opinion and political developments at home. There were everywhere pressing problems of demobilization and finance and economic readjustment, to say nothing of the exigencies of party politics. Labor unrest in some places was assuming alarming and even revolutionary aspects. It was under such difficulties that the Conference had to deliberate on and decide the fate of Europe.

After the first meeting the Conference organized into subcommittees and commissions to consider various specific questions. The Supreme Council, consisting at first of two representatives of each of the five great powers, met regularly and heard representations and reports on various subjects. Later the Council was reduced to the five leaders, though Japan refrained from a decisive part in purely European questions.

One of the first important decisions of the Council was to issue a call to all the Russian factions for a conference (January 22). This came to nothing, but Russian affairs continued to take up much time. Behind the scenes during the early weeks two interesting and important struggles were going on, as to the disposition of the German colonies and Turkey, and as to the League of Nations. A strong tendency

developed in favor of dividing up the spoils, making a preliminary treaty which should penalize and disarm Germany and allow the world to return to normal as quickly as possible, leaving the question of a league of nations for the future. President Wilson, however, had long been convinced that the League of Nations should be established as an integral part of the new international order, and that it should have general oversight of the former German colonies and Turkey. Premier Hughes of Australia was at first in favor of a policy of annexation of the German colonies, as was even General Smuts of South Africa; Japan also was disposed to insist on the terms of the earlier treaties. At the second plenary session (January 25) the Conference voted that a league of nations as "an integral part of the general treaty of peace" was "essential," and appointed a committee to draft a constitution. Another commission was set up to report on the responsibility and possible trial of the authors of the war, and of Germans who had broken the laws and customs of war. Other commissions on reparations, international labor legislation, and international control of ports, waterways, and railways were also provided for, and from time to time particular questions were referred by the Council to special commissions, such as those on Alsace-Lorraine, Thrace, and Belgian-Dutch relations.

By the end of the month, owing largely to the persistence of President Wilson, the general idea of mandatories for the German colonies and Turkey

was accepted, with modifications, which secured the assent of Australia, South Africa, and Japan.

The League of Nations Commission met February 3, and continued to hold meetings daily. Very decided differences of opinion arose. The Japanese contended for a "racial equality" clause; the French insisted that the League must possess adequate military power to cope with Germany in particular. Only by making the armistice terms more drastic, and by promising a special defensive treaty by which Britain and the United States would aid France in case of a German attack, was it possible to secure unanimous agreement. At the plenary session of February 14 the draft of the League Covenant was read. The next day President Wilson sailed for the United States. On February 19 Premier Clémenceau was shot, but fortunately was able to be back at work in a short time.

For a while the chief interest centered in economic matters—the amount of reparation Germany should make, and the manner in which it should be assessed and collected. Territorial questions were discussed, and a special committee appointed to co-ordinate the reports of the territorial commissions. The disposition of the surrendered German fleet was debated. On March 1 Marshal Foch presented a report on the military terms of the Treaty.

In the meantime President Wilson was endeavoring to rouse public opinion in the United States in favor of the League Covenant, and the debate on the

subject in the Senate was becoming extremely bitter. As soon as possible after the close of the session of Congress, the President returned to Paris. He found a renewed disposition on the part of some of the Supreme Council to make a preliminary peace with Germany at once, leaving the League of Nations to be settled later.¹ This the President refused to permit, and in view of the complexity of the settlement, and the necessity for some organization for carrying out its terms, the Allied leaders became more and more sincerely convinced that the President was right, and that the League must be an integral and interwoven element in the Treaty.² There is no ground for asserting that debate over the League delayed the peace; the League really facilitated the Treaty.

By this time President Wilson's original popularity had somewhat cooled. The opposition in the United States encouraged those in Europe who had from the start disliked the President and his ideas. He was made the target of open attacks on the part of the press. He was blamed for postponing peace and delivering the world to bolshevism, war, and starvation, while he chased rainbows. To some observers it seemed as if the President had relied too much on the statement of general principles without having worked out a detailed and practicable solution of the specific problems which were bound to come

¹ R. S. Baker, *op. cit.*

² Seymour, *Yale Review*, October, 1918.

up. To be sure, this gave him the advantage of approaching particular questions with an open mind, but too often it put him in the ungracious position of a critic and obstructionist of some plan carefully worked out by one or other of the powers.

While some of the "practical" men were denouncing President Wilson as a self-willed visionary utterly incapable of dealing with real conditions, others of the liberal and radical wing were beginning to say, partly in sorrow, partly in anger, that he had surrendered to the reactionary crowd and was helping in the old secret fashion to make an old-fashioned imperialistic peace, thinly disguised with a few fine phrases. He was accused of refusing to listen to expert advisers. While he was posing as the friend of humanity the "trained diplomats of Europe" were privately laughing at his simplicity, and were manipulating things to suit themselves. Having put forward extreme claims with no real expectation of gaining them, they would make a special point of yielding, after which in decency the President was expected to concede something to them.¹

Defenders of the President and of the Conference generally, many of whom were in a position to know,² insisted that the President took every opportunity of consulting experts. They pictured him as one of the dominant figures of the Conference, respected by his

¹ Cf. editorial comment in the *Nation*, the *Dial*, the *New Republic*, etc.

² E.g., Ray Stannard Baker Harry Hansen, comment in the *Public*, the *Springfield Republican*, etc.

associates, regularly appealed to for a clear and dispassionate judgment on difficult points. Credit was given him for notable idealistic victories. As for the charges of delay, it was pointed out that the Conference was acting much more rapidly than the Congress of Vienna; that the problems were of tremendous complexity; and that the decisions being made were of such tremendous importance for the future peace of the world that every effort must be made to arrive at the best possible arrangements.

During the latter part of March, with this feeling of restlessness growing, the leaders of the Conference were struggling with the problems of the amount of reparation to be demanded from Germany, with the question of the Saar Valley and of the left bank of the Rhine. The American delegation favored fixing a definite sum for which Germany was to be held responsible. They objected to the annexation of the Saar Basin to France, and had no sympathy with the project of detaching the Rhine provinces from Germany. Increasing secrecy marked all the proceedings of the Council, now narrowed to the four leaders. Differences within the Council were intense. By April 3 the President's physical strength gave way and he was forced to remain in bed; but he was determined not to yield his positions, and on April 7 he ordered the "George Washington" to sail at once for France. This was quite correctly interpreted as an intimation that he was about to withdraw from the Conference. Almost immediately compro-

mise solutions were proposed, which the President felt he could honorably accept.

On April 11 the Labor Commission submitted a report, and April 28 the revised Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted by the Plenary Conference. By this time the treaty was regarded as so nearly finished that the German delegation was told to come to Versailles. Before they arrived, however, there arose two further crises which threatened again to disrupt the whole Conference.

First the Italian leaders, who had urged without success that their claims along the Adriatic should be settled before the German treaty was signed, threatened to withdraw from the Conference. The central issue was the disposition of the city of Fiume and parts of the Dalmatian coast. President Wilson had been opposed to all claims beyond "the clearly recognizable limits of nationality." He had been willing to consent, though with some reluctance, to give Italy defensible frontiers at the expense of the Germans in the Tyrol, perhaps not realizing at first the extent to which this did violence to nationalistic principles. On April 23 the President took the unusual step in open diplomacy of issuing a public statement of his reasons for opposing Italy's claims to Fiume and Dalmatia. The Italian leaders resented this appeal to Italian liberal sentiment, and they promptly left the Conference to lay their case before their people. Strengthened by the demonstrations of confidence, they accepted the

invitation of the leaders to return to Paris May 7. Meanwhile it had been necessary to placate the Belgian representatives, who felt they were not to receive enough of the indemnity or of new territory in Africa.

The last great crisis was with the Japanese over Shantung. The final decision was largely in favor of Japan, and the Chinese delegation decided not to sign the Treaty.

On the seventh of May (the anniversary, it was remarked, of the sinking of the "Lusitania") the completed draft of the Treaty was handed to the German representatives. Their attitude on receiving the terms did not make a very favorable impression. The powers refused the Germans' repeated request for oral discussion but they granted fourteen days in which to submit written objections or counter-proposals.

An extensive summary of the terms of the Treaty was made public, but the text was withheld. This decision, though technically justified on the ground that modifications were still possible, caused renewed criticism of the methods by which the "open covenants of peace" were being "openly arrived at." In the United States particularly opponents of the administration were scathing in their denunciations.

Although the German delegates had been prepared in advance for the main terms of the Treaty, the severity of the document as a whole was felt with stunning force. As soon as possible, the German

representatives sent notes to the Council protesting against particular provisions. The Allies replied to the separate notes, making a few modifications, but not on very substantial points. On May 17 Count von Bronckdorf-Rantzau, the leader, returned to Germany for a brief conference with his government. On May 20 a week's extension of time was granted. On the twenty-ninth the Germans submitted their counter-proposals, together with a long letter explaining their point of view, and summarizing their former objections to the various provisions of the Treaty. They contended that the Treaty was unjust, and that it was in many respects impossible to carry out its terms. They recalled the negotiations preceding the armistice and the agreement to make peace on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, and subsequent speeches, with a specific interpretation as to indemnities. They complained that the principle of self-determination was violated with regard to West Prussia, Dantzig, Memel, Upper Silesia, Eupen, and Malmédy, and the Saar Basin. The agreement on indemnities had been without warrant stretched to include an admission in principle of the whole cost of the war, while the actual payments were to be limited only by Germany's power to pay as determined by a Reparation Commission whose demands, together with the loss of the merchant fleet and the colonies, would condemn the German people to "perpetual slave labor." What had become of the idea that the

Allies were fighting the old German government, and not the German people?

Instead of the terms demanded, Germany proposed: to disarm at once, if admitted to the League of Nations; to renounce Alsace-Lorraine (with a request for a plebiscite) and most of Posen. Poland would be given access to the sea by making Dantzig, Königsberg, and Memel free ports, and by other special arrangements. They offered to supply France with coal from the Saar mines until the French mines were restored and to submit to a plebiscite in Northern Schleswig. The right of self-determination for the Germans of Austria and Bohemia was demanded. The German colonies would be submitted to the League of Nations if Germany was made the mandatory. In the matter of reparations, Germany offered to pay 100,000,000,000 gold marks, one-fifth by May, 1926, the rest in annual instalments without interest. Coal would be delivered to France, Belgium, and Italy, and Germany would co-operate effectively in restoring Northern France and Belgium. A world-pool of merchant tonnage was proposed. A neutral commission to fix responsibility for the war was demanded. The trial of the Kaiser was declared unjustified. Instead of the surrender of Germans accused of violations of the laws of war, Germany proposed an international tribunal of competent neutrals to judge violations committed by subjects of all nations. In all cases of a transfer of sovereignty, Germany insisted that the Wilsonian principles of

self-determination called for a plebiscite under neutral supervision. The economic restrictions on Germany were denounced as designed only to cripple her competition, and the fifteen-year period of military occupation was said to be unnecessary and wasteful. The counter-proposals closed by declaring the peaceful intentions of the new Germany, demanding a place in the League and a voice in international labor discussions.

The Allies replied June 16 in a letter and a detailed discussion of the counter-proposals. Germany's guilt in forcing the war and the atrocities committed during its course were recalled; and Germany was reminded that justice demanded the utmost possible reparation, from which they could not escape by an eleventh-hour change to a republic.

The Allies and Associated Powers therefore believe that the peace they have proposed is fundamentally a peace of justice. They are no less certain that it is a peace of right on the terms agreed.¹

While for the most part the Allies insisted on the territorial clauses as drawn, they agreed to a plebiscite in upper Silesia, and modified the arrangements as to Schleswig. They denied that it was their intention to strangle Germany economically. They pointed out that Germany would save \$400,000,000 a year in reduced armaments, and would have the productive efforts of the 600,000 men no longer kept under arms.

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, July, 1919, p. 29.

Provided that she abides by the treaty of peace, and provided also that she abandons those aggressive and exclusive traditions which have been apparent in her business no less than her political methods, the Allied and Associated Powers intend that Germany shall have fair treatment in the purchase of raw materials and the sale of goods, subject to those temporary provisions in the interests of the nations ravaged and artificially weakened by Germany's actions. It is their desire that the passions engendered by the war should die as soon as possible, and that all nations should share in the prosperity which comes from the honest supply of mutual needs. They wish that Germany shall enjoy this prosperity like the rest, though most of the fruit of it must necessarily go for many years to come in making reparation to her neighbors for the damage she has done.¹

When Germany proved her fitness to join the League, the Allies would admit her. The Germans were given five days to sign the Treaty as modified. There was much talk in Germany of refusing to sign, and the Allies made every preparation to extend their area of military occupation and to tighten the blockade.

The Scheidemann government resigned rather than accept the humiliation of agreeing to the Allied terms. After much difficulty an emergency government under Gustav Bauer received a vote of confidence from the National Assembly. Bauer then agreed to sign the Treaty as under duress, and with reservations and protests, and with the understanding that it should be revised by the League of Nations after two years. The Allies refused to accept any

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, July, 1919 p. 31.

reservations, or to extend the time limit. With bitterness of spirit, protesting that they yielded only to superior force, and denouncing the "unheard-of injustice of the peace conditions," the Germans at last yielded. On June 28, five years to a day after the death of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and in the Hall at Versailles where the German Empire had been proclaimed, the little-known German delegates, who had consented to serve, put their signatures to the Treaty which was designed to end forever the German menace. China refused to sign, and General Smuts signed with a separate statement that he considered the document in many respects unsatisfactory. The debate on the Treaty was transferred to the various legislative bodies, and the Conference turned to other important tasks.

CHAPTER V

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

The Preamble of the Treaty states that the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, which powers are described as "the Principal Allied and Associated Powers," together with Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, Czecho-Slovakia, and Uruguay, of the one part, and Germany of the other part, desiring to end the war originated by Austria-Hungary and Germany, in order to replace it by "a firm, just, and durable peace," have agreed on the present Treaty.

PART I

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

At the forefront of the Treaty is the Covenant of the League of Nations. In a very real sense this represents the culmination of centuries of modern history. It is true that, since the Middle Ages, Europe and the parts of the world under European influence have increasingly organized into national states, whose rivalries have tended against co-operation and harmony. On the other hand there have been growing indications that the process of integration which

has built the national states out of smaller units, often hostile at first, might in time lead to some more inclusive form of interstate organization. Similarly the hope has grown that as processes of law have replaced blood-feud and duel and private war within the several states, so there might be substituted processes of law and reason for war between states.

The concert of Europe, and more particularly the concert of the great powers, has existed in a more or less vague form for over a century. Its object has been to keep the peace, and to provide for matters of common concern. Although it has been nearly paralyzed by internal conflicts of interest, and by the working of the antagonistic balance-of-power theory, it has at times exercised a real influence, particularly in patching up Balkan difficulties and in settling African questions. Some beginnings were made toward joint international control of backward regions and matters of international importance. The different nations of Europe, joined in a few instances by the United States and Japan, have attempted to deal unitedly with such questions as Turkish, Egyptian, Greek, and Chinese finances, the navigation of the Danube, Macedonian reforms, the Cretan and Albanian questions, the Congo Free State, the Boxer Rebellion, the Act of Algeçiras as to Morocco, control of the city of Tangier, and others. Conferences have been held, treaties and conventions drawn up, commissions of inquiry or control created, joint naval and military action taken. While the results in most

cases have been unsatisfactory, valuable experience has been gained, and the need of some more workable form of co-operation has been shown.

The whole diplomatic and treaty-making machinery, supplemented by congresses, conferences, and commissions, has resulted in numerous international agreements, which added to a large body of precedents and customs make up an international law to which all civilized states are supposed to conform their actions. The difficulty has been that there have been no adequate sanctions for this law.

In such matters as the postal union, patents and copyrights, sugar bounties, extradition, suppression of the slave trade, piracy, traffic in women, and the opium trade, international co-operation has long been found possible and valuable. Before the war there was no inconsiderable amount of machinery already in existence for handling these matters. Similarly much more than a beginning had been made in submitting international disputes to arbitration and commissions of conciliation. To a greater degree than the average person realizes the way had been prepared for a more definite international organization. There is hardly a detail in the Covenant of the League of Nations that has not a suggestion or a precedent in some existing institution. The United States, for instance, has a score or more of treaties with individual nations by which we bind ourselves not to go to war until after a dispute has been submitted to arbitration or conciliation. No questions

are reserved. We have a disarmament treaty with Great Britain so far as the Canadian border and the Great Lakes are concerned. We are bound by treaty to defend Panama and Cuba against external aggression. The League of Nations, then, is not something entirely new; it has a basis in experience. But to meet new situations in a new spirit existing institutions must be expanded and, where necessary, supplemented.

The modern spirit of co-operation, the feeling after a larger unity, has been the outcome of many complex forces. One may attribute it in large measure to the closer knitting together of the different parts of the world through the great process of the expansion of Europe, particularly as a result of the vastly improved means of communication and the increased economic interdependence of the different countries and continents which followed the Industrial Revolution. Besides the expansion of trade relationships there has been a diffusion of European population, creating close bonds between the most distant regions. In the last four centuries Europeans and peoples of European stock have explored, colonized, and conquered nearly three-quarters of the earth, and their type of culture has profoundly impressed the few countries like Japan and China which have managed to retain political independence. Since the great age of discovery enlarged the world, it has been growing steadily smaller again, and with an increasing number of common interests. In 1914 a quarter

of the human race was already in the great league of nations called the British Empire. The republics of the New World formed another group with a growing sense of solidarity and a developing organization for purposes of co-operation.

Another movement, growing also in large part out of the Industrial Revolution, has been the rise of socialism and labor organizations. Socialism in particular has emphasized the community of interest between the proletariat of all countries as against the capitalistic bourgeoisie. "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!" The famous appeal of Marx and Engels in their Communist Manifesto of 1848 has found a growing response in modern industrialized nations. The fact that many radicals are more class-conscious than they are patriotic in the nationalist sense has caused many to look askance at the whole idea of a league of nations. Those who advocate the League must make it clear that it is not inconsistent with devotion to one's own country. There is no question that nationalism has been a fruitful and valuable element in modern life. The League checks nationalism only when it assumes an aggressive form and threatens the national existence of other groups. The national life of a group will be much freer to develop along its own lines if the fear of being crushed by some stronger neighbor is minimized. Internationalism is a word of many meanings. The internationalism

of the League has little or nothing in common with the type of internationalism advocated by revolutionists. The radicals denounce the "Capitalists' League" in language which shows that they have quite another ideal.

Capital as well as labor has become increasingly international in its outlook. The whole vast machinery of trade and banking and shipping and investment was one of the forces that were vainly expected to keep the peace. It is of course true on the other hand that rivalry for investment and exploitation opportunities in backward regions was one of the "stakes of diplomacy" which contributed to international tension. The framers of the League Covenant recognized this danger and tried at least to minimize it. In spite of everything, however, the internationalism of business and finance has some stabilizing effect.

The widening realization that there is a community of interests among national groups has found expression in the organization of scores of international bodies, some of them semi-official, others entirely private in their conception and management. Science, scholarship, and literature have become less provincial with every decade. The educated classes in all countries have become better acquainted, and in many cases the result has been the removal of misunderstandings and the lessening of prejudices. Religion, and in particular Christianity, has always held up the ideal of human brotherhood; and in

spite of shortcomings and unworthy rivalries religion has acted as a genuinely uniting force, and as an influence for peace. Outside of organized religious circles, individuals and societies have been urging improved international relations, especially with a view to preventing war. In one sense these efforts are an expression of the spirit of the time; in another way they contribute to the development of that spirit. A wide-reaching propaganda has been carried on to convince the nations that war was morally wrong; that it was irrational; that it did not pay materially even for the victors; and that it could be minimized and eventually eliminated by an intelligent and united effort to substitute process of law for the arbitrament of arms.

Before 1914 the most definite attempt at organizing the world for peace had been made at the two Hague Conferences. Although these failed to do more than secure certain modifications in the rules of warfare, and to provide the machinery for voluntary arbitration and conciliation, the Conferences had a real value in arousing interest in disarmament and arbitration and common action in world-affairs.

As is always the case, the early suggestions for a league of nations may be traced far back.¹ But down until the outbreak of the war, the whole idea was usually regarded as too visionary for the serious consideration of statesmen called upon to face the facts of an admittedly imperfect world. It was only

¹ S. P. Duggan, *League of Nations*, chap. ii.

under the overpowering sense of impending disaster that Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Berlin, July 30, 1914:

If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. . . . The idea has hitherto been too utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.¹

The failure of the old balance-of-power system, the stupendous suffering and loss of the world-cataclysm, and the consequent upsetting of all the old, accepted habits of thought and action, led to a re-examination of the whole question of international relationships. In every country men found to their surprise that under the stimulus of a great common purpose the most astonishing transformations of social organization were possible. Governments took over railroads, controlled all industries, fixed prices, managed all exports and imports, took charge of shipping, enforced food rationing and prohibition, granted woman suffrage, did in fact everything they regarded as necessary whether it had ever been regarded as possible or not. Under the stress of necessity the

¹ *British White Book*, No. 101.

nations which had joined forces against the Central Powers gradually developed a machinery for co-ordinating their efforts, without sacrificing individual sovereignty. Transport, raw materials, munitions, war purchases, finance, the blockade, all were handled by interallied commissions. The Supreme War Council at Versailles, culminating in the united command under Marshal Foch, was the final expression of the organization of common effort.

As the possibilities and advantages of co-operation became more apparent, as the senseless horror of war impressed itself more deeply, there came, not only from former advocates of internationalism and friends of a League to Enforce Peace, but increasingly from responsible leaders and the great average masses, the demand that some method be devised for ending wars forever. Men had learned that what had to be done could be done, and they were more and more convinced that war had to be abolished.

The whole plan of a league of nations is closely associated with the name of Woodrow Wilson, and rightly. It is not that he originated the idea, or was the first to realize that some form of international reorganization was imperative after the war. Nor were all the details, or even the main outlines of the plan now adopted, his work. The credit is his, however, for recognizing the essential facts in the world-situation and for stating the nature of the remedy demanded. His official position commanded attention and respect for what he said. His gift of lucid

statement and his steady, earnest, and disinterested advocacy of a league of nations enabled him to become the spokesman for a war-wearied humanity. He did not create the issues or invent the solution any more than Lincoln created the issues of union and liberty; but in a crisis of the world's affairs he had a vision of a better human order, and he formulated a program for its attainment which found a deep and wide response.

By the time the Peace Conference assembled, the leaders of all the nations had been definitely committed to the idea of some form of a league of nations; and at the second plenary session a resolution was adopted to make the League an integral part of the Treaty. There were some who had little faith in the idea, who voted for it only to humor the fantastic idealism of the American President with the one-track mind, and as a concession to public opinion. As the work of the Conference proceeded, however, it became apparent that without a league of nations the task of carrying out the terms of the Treaty would be almost hopelessly complicated. First its convenience, then its necessity, was recognized by many who had been indifferent or hostile.

In drawing up the Covenant of the League the special commission of representatives of fourteen nations, with President Wilson as chairman, considered several tentative drafts and numerous suggestions from many sources. A noteworthy document, the influence of which in the final draft is obvious,

was the memorandum which had been drawn up by General Smuts, the former Boer leader who had become a member of the British Imperial War Cabinet.¹ After two weeks of earnest effort, which was arranged so as not to interfere with the other work of the Conference, a preliminary constitution for the proposed League was unanimously agreed upon, and made public. As a result of the criticism and suggestions which were invited, a number of modifications were made, chiefly in the direction of greater explicitness to satisfy some sections of American public opinion. Thus it was provided that a nation might withdraw on two years' notice. It was made clear that the League had no jurisdiction in purely internal affairs. The Monroe Doctrine was recognized by name as unaffected by the Covenant. It was explained that a mandate could not be imposed on an unwilling state. The approval of each nation was explicitly required before it was committed to any program for reducing its armament.

Preamble

The Preamble of the Covenant states the purpose of the League to be the promotion of international co-operation and the achievement of international peace and security. At the outset, then, it is apparent that the League is intended to be more than a device for preventing wars. It is hoped and expected that it will also be the agency for common action in time of peace for handling affairs of common concern and for promoting the common interests of civiliza-

¹ Printed in the *Nation*, February 8, 1919, p. 225.

tion. These ends are to be secured "by the prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another."

The Japanese were unable to secure the adoption, even as a part of the Preamble, of an amendment to the effect that "the equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the high contracting parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all aliens, nationals of states members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality."¹ Even when modified to mention simply "acceptance of the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of its nationals" it could not gain the assent of the United States or Great Britain. Although the Japanese amendment was carried by a decisive majority in the commission, President Wilson ruled that it could not be included except by unanimous consent. Although harmless enough in appearance, it was feared that this clause might lead to an attack on the citizenship, immigration, and land-ownership laws of the United States,

¹ Hansen, *Adventures of the Fourteen Points*, p. 66; *Asia*, September, 1919, p. 896.

Australia, and Canada, which discriminate against Mongolians. Although it was pointed out to the Japanese that their presence as members of the Big Five was a recognition of their equality, they felt keenly disappointed at the result of the vote, and they declared their intention of reopening the question at a later date.

The first article of the Covenant provides that membership in the League is open to allied and associated nations signing the Treaty. Fifteen neutrals are named who may become original members by acceding to the Covenant without reservations within two months of its coming into force. By a two-thirds vote of the Assembly any other fully self-governing state, dominion, or colony may be admitted, if it gives effective guarantees of its good intentions, and accepts the regulations of the League as to its armaments. It is notable that Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India are original members, as well as the British Empire. The inclusion of India with the Dominions is significant of a new constitutional development within the British Empire. Germany naturally objected to being left out of the original membership, but had to be satisfied with the assurance that admission to the League would not be delayed after the new Germany showed its fitness. Mexico and Costa Rica, particularly the former, felt aggrieved at their pointed omission from the list. This was owing to the disorder and uncertainty in those republics, the revolu-

tionary governments of which were not regarded as definitely established. The more suspicious observers thought that Mexico was intentionally left out of the League so that the "inevitable" intervention by the United States might be accomplished with less embarrassment, perhaps under the guise of mandatory action. Santo Domingo, Afghanistan, and Abyssinia were the only other independent states of any size which were not invited to join. Santo Domingo is practically under American military occupation, Afghanistan is distinctly in the British sphere of influence, and Italy still claims that Abyssinia is within its sphere.

Members of the League may withdraw on two years' notice, provided that they have fulfilled their international obligations. One of the Lodge Reservations presented in the United States Senate seeks to make it clear that in case of withdrawal the United States shall be the sole judge of whether or not it has fulfilled its obligations. By unanimous vote the Council of the League may expel a member; and if a nation declines to be bound by an amendment to the Covenant, it ceases to belong to the League.

Art. 16

Art. 21

The League acts through an Assembly, a Council, and a permanent Secretariat. The seat of the League is at Geneva, though the Council may change it. All positions in the League are open equally to men and women.

Art. 2

It is expressly stated that the Covenant does not "affect the validity of international engagements,

Art. 21

such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." Although President Wilson has declared that there are no hidden implications in this language, this clause has been attacked as inadequate from the American point of view, and even as admitting by implication a sort of Japanese "regional" Monroe Doctrine for Eastern Asia. Accordingly the Senate favored a resolution declaring that the United States would not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council "any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to . . . the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision" of the Peace Treaty.¹

Art. 15

It is also specified that in case a dispute between members "is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement." This provision was intended to reassure those who feared that the League might interfere in such questions as immigration and naturalization requirements, or tariffs. It was not thought advisable to attempt to specify the topics reserved for the exclusive control

¹ Number 6 of the Lodge Reservations, adopted in November 1919.

of each state. The Senate approved the statement that "the United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction," and will not allow them to be arbitrated or in any way submitted to the consideration of the League.¹

The Covenant of the League of Nations is a treaty between the members. Like every treaty it restricts the freedom of action of the contracting parties. While any treaty is in effect it is a limitation on sovereignty. Such limitations are accepted for the sake of more important advantages which are gained. In this sense, but only in this sense, the Covenant affects the sovereignty of the independent states in the League. In attempting to understand the obligations which the United States would assume by joining the League, one may profitably group the things which the members of the League pledge themselves to do.

1. The members agree that when a general reduction in armaments has been approved by the individual governments no nation will thereafter increase its armaments without the concurrence of the Council of the League. The Senate would reserve the right to increase armaments if the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war.

Art. 8

2. "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of

Art. 10

¹ Number 5 of the Lodge Reservations.

any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.” Much controversy has centered around this provision. President Wilson, who framed the statement of the principle, is convinced that it is the most essential article in the Covenant. Without such a pledge, and without material force back of it, the League would have no meaning. The Council obviously has no power under this clause to declare war in the name of the member states. It has no armed forces at its disposal. It can only recommend a course of action. Before the United States could become involved, its representative on the Council must have concurred in the recommendation. If the recommendation involved going to war with an offending state, the consent of Congress would under the Constitution be necessary. If it involved a boycott a legislative act would be required. It is a fair presumption that the American representative on the Council, acting under instructions, would not assent to a proposal which would not be backed by American opinion. If Congress should decide otherwise, its failure to approve the recommendation would block any participation by the United States in the proposed action.

The Senate however did not feel that the independence of action of the United States was sufficiently preserved. It voted a reservation therefore declaring that “the United States assumes no obligation under the provisions of Article 10, . . . unless

in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war shall by act or joint resolution so provide." The President objects to this reservation, not because he has any doubt that the consent of Congress is necessary to a declaration of war, or to putting in motion an economic boycott, but because of the ungracious and suspicious tone.

From quite another angle, this article has been criticized because it seems to guarantee the existing boundaries, with all their imperfections. There is nothing in the Covenant, however, to prevent the readjustment of boundaries by mutual agreement. Neither does the Covenant bind the members to interfere to prevent revolution within a state. The sole object of the article is to prevent one nation from making a sudden attack on another, and to provide that if a nation is so attacked the rest of the world will consider at once how it may be protected.

3. Members declare that any threat of war is the concern of the whole League, which shall thereupon "take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." Any member has the "friendly right" to call the attention of the Council or the Assembly to any circumstance threatening to disturb the peace.

Art. 11

4. When disputes likely to lead to a rupture between nations arise over the interpretation of treaties, or involving international law, the members bind themselves to submit them to arbitration, or to

Arts. 13, 15

the Permanent Court of International Justice to be created. The members agree to carry out the awards, and not to make war on a state complying with the award. If the dispute is of a character which is not suited to arbitration, the members agree to submit it for conciliation to the Council of the League. If the Council (apart from the representatives of one or more parties to the dispute) makes a unanimous recommendation, the members agree not to make war on a state which complies with it. In any event, all bind themselves not to go to war until at least three months after the arbitration award or the Council report.

These articles adopt for the whole world the policy to which the United States is already committed by the Bryan treaties of arbitration. Older treaties of arbitration did not apply to questions where "national honor" or "vital interests" were involved. By binding themselves not to go to war until after the disputed issues have been submitted to arbitration or conciliation the nations go a long way toward making war improbable. There can be little doubt that a delay of a few months and the submission of the Austro-Serbian quarrel to a disinterested inquiry would have avoided the Great War.

5. In case a member of the League goes to war contrary to its agreements, "it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of

all trade or financial relations." In such a case, the Council is to recommend what armed forces each member should contribute to protect the League Covenant.

The Senate wishes to reserve the right to permit intercourse with those nationals of a covenant-breaking state who are outside the covenant-breaking state.¹

6. Members agree to register all treaties with the Secretary of the League. Without this no treaty is to be binding. They agree that all treaties or agreements inconsistent with the Covenant are abrogated. The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration of treaties. Arts. 18-20

7. The members (a) "will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organizations; (b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control; (c) will intrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; (d) will intrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic Art. 23

¹ Reservation 12.

is necessary in the common interest; (e) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League ; (f) will endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease."

Art. 24 8. If all the members agree, all international bureaus already established by general treaties will be transferred to the control of the League.¹

9. In Article 22 the members of the League assert their collective responsibility for dealing with the former German colonial possessions, and the subject peoples of the Turkish Empire. In these areas, in so far as they "are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant."

This article represents an attempt to deal with one of the most important and difficult problems of modern times, the relationship between the advanced peoples of Western Europe, and the backward peoples of other parts of the globe. The expansion of Europe has resulted in bringing practically all of Africa and most of Asia under the political control of some European power. The dominant motives

¹ The Postal Union, for instance.

have been the desire to trade, and to exploit the natural resources with native labor and European capital under white direction. Where this tendency has been unchecked, exploitation of native groups for the benefit of European capital has been the rule, particularly in Africa. There has usually been a professed desire to educate, to uplift, to civilize, to develop the native races, to "take up the white man's burden." In many instances quite sincere efforts have been made to carry out the professions, in some cases with genuinely gratifying results. It is true nevertheless that all too frequently profits have been more considered than native welfare and native rights. It has also been true that international rivalry for these exploitation opportunities, as in Morocco, Asia Minor, and China, has been an important element in causing international friction, and in leading up to the Great War.

Since the Allies were agreed that Germany's colonial possessions were not to be restored, and that the non-Turkish peoples must be freed from the Ottoman yoke, there were four possible courses of action. In the first place, all the territories might be divided among the victors and added as colonies or protectorates to their existing colonial empires. This was the plan favored by many in France, England, and some of the Dominions. It was felt however that such a course would not be consistent with the objects for which the war had professedly been fought. Furthermore it would do little to remove the old causes of

friction. Another possibility was the placing of all these territories under joint international control. The earlier experiments in this type of régime, however, had not been encouraging. In such cases as Samoa, Tangier, and Albania it had led to misunderstandings and hard feeling, and the populations concerned had suffered from a very inefficient government. The scheme was therefore rejected as unpromising. A third possibility was to make all these areas entirely independent. Most of them, however, would have great difficulty in standing alone. Arabia had been promised independence; but it was not felt that the other regions were sufficiently advanced for self-government. It would be for their own good to have European supervision of some sort—at least so the Conference decided. The final suggestion was to place different groups under the guardianship of some particular nation which by reason of experience, resources, or geographical position can best undertake the responsibility. Owing largely to President Wilson's insistence, this was the method finally adopted.

In outlining the scheme of mandatories, the Covenant sets forth several important principles:

a) Mandatories act on behalf of the League, and under conditions fixed by the Council.

b) The terms of the mandate will vary, some areas in Turkey being ready for provisional independence, "subject to the rendering of advice and assistance by a mandatory."

c) The ultimate purpose of the system is to prepare groups to stand alone.

d) In Central Africa the mandatory power must secure freedom of conscience, prohibition of the slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and must not allow the military training of natives for other than police purposes. There must also be "equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League."

e) In Southwest Africa and some of the Pacific Islands the mandatory state may administer the areas as "integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population." The reasons given are that the population is small, or remote, or contiguous to the mandatory, and so on. The real reason doubtless was to persuade Japan and the Union of South Africa to agree to the mandatory scheme at all. Administration as an integral part of one's territory cannot prove very different from outright annexation.

f) Mandatories are to report annually to the Council, which is to create a permanent commission to examine the reports and to advise the Council. Presumably, if the Council should so decide, a mandatory might be changed. With all the great colonial powers represented on the Council, and with a requirement of unanimity, this seems rather remote.

The whole scheme has been denounced as thinly disguised imperialistic annexation. The fact remains, however, that a new principle has been formally

announced for dealing with backward peoples, and machinery has been provided for bringing the conscience of the world to bear in any instance of misgovernment by a mandatory. When the nations have agreed to follow a disinterested policy, and when publicity is given to the manner in which they are carrying out their professions, there is a possibility of a gradual improvement.

In order to satisfy some objectors in the United States, the revised Covenant states explicitly that a mandatory must be willing to accept the responsibility; and the Senate added the reservation that the United States should not accept a mandate except with the approval of Congress.

This concludes the list of things which the members of the League pledge themselves to do, or refrain from doing. They represent an advance over any existing treaty pledges, but along lines already foreshadowed by previous agreements.

Much discussion has centered around the organization provided for carrying on the work of the League. It is important therefore to review the organization and the powers of the Council and the Assembly.

Art. 4 The Council is the most important body created by the Covenant. It consists always of representatives of the "Big Five," and four others, selected by the Assembly. With the consent of a majority of the Assembly the Council may name other powers which shall always be represented, and may increase

the number to be chosen by the Assembly. A member not represented on the Council is to have a representative present, sitting "as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that member." Unless otherwise specified, all decisions of the Council must be unanimous.

By giving the great powers a majority on the Council the fact is recognized that after all these powers control the affairs of the world, and that their agreement is necessary to the working of any scheme of international co-operation.

"The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League, or affecting the peace of the world." More specifically, the Council is empowered and directed: (1) to formulate plans for the reduction of armaments; but such plans go into effect only when approved by the individual governments; (2) to advise how the evil effects of the private manufacture of munitions may be avoided; (3) to formulate and submit for adoption by the members plans for a permanent Court of International Justice; (4) to investigate and to act as a body of conciliators with power to refer any dispute to the Assembly; (5) to recommend action in case a state breaks the Covenant; (6) to investigate and recommend action even in cases when one or more of the parties to a dispute are not members of the League; (7) to define the terms on which an area is intrusted to a mandatory.

In the Assembly the principle of the equality of all sovereign and independent states is recognized by giving one vote to each state, large or small. Except when otherwise provided, all decisions must be unanimous. Objection has been made to giving the British Dominions and India separate votes, and one of the Senate reservations declares that the United States assumes no obligation to be bound by a vote in which the British Empire¹ as a whole has more than one vote. As it stands this reservation is much more sweeping than is necessary. For one thing, the United States has more control over the votes of Liberia, Panama, Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua than Great Britain has over the votes of the Dominions. For another thing, the single vote of the United States in the Council or the Assembly can prevent the unanimous agreement which is necessary for most important decisions. The only reservation necessary to protect the United States from any possibility of danger would be one providing that in cases where a dispute between the United States and the British Empire was referred to the Assembly, the Dominions and India should be excluded from voting as well as Great Britain and the United States.

Art. 3

At its meetings the Assembly may deal "with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world." The specified powers of the Assembly are not numerous.

¹ Lenroot Reservation. The British Empire is not mentioned, but it is the one intended.

1. By a two-thirds vote the Assembly admits new members to the League. Art. 1

2. From time to time in its discretion it names four states which are to be represented on the Council. By majority vote it may approve recommendations of the Council for changing representation in that body. Art. 4

3. It may advise the reconsideration of any existing treaties, or "the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." Art. 19

4. Disputes may be referred to the Assembly by the Council for investigation and recommendation; and they must be so referred if either party to the dispute demands it. In such cases decisions of the Assembly have the force of decisions of the Council, "if concurred in by the representatives of those members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other members of the League, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute." Art. 15

It is clear that in framing the Covenant the attempt was made to secure an organization that would be strong enough to accomplish something definite, without at the same time creating a "super-state" which would limit the sovereignty of the members in any dangerous or humiliating fashion. Criticism of the Covenant has come from two curiously different points of view. To some the League has so little power as to be practically useless. Others

regard it as trenching dangerously on the individual freedom of the nations. Some liberals would prefer that the representatives to the Assembly should be chosen by popular vote, or at least by the lower house of the national legislatures. The United States Senate wishes it understood that any American representatives and council members and other appointees under the League will be chosen as provided for by an act of Congress, and that in the meantime no appointment will be made without the consent of the Senate.

The provision that most important decisions in the League must be unanimous, and the fact that the Council can only "recommend" action in such matters as disarmament and breaches of the Covenant, would seem to safeguard the individual sovereignty of the member states. It would be out of the question for the League to attempt to coerce one of the great powers into a course of action which it deemed unwise or unjust. If the League is to succeed at all it must be through a genuine willingness to co-operate for common purposes. Given this spirit, the machinery provided in the Covenant can be of vast service to the world. Any defects which appear can be remedied. Without the determination to make the League a success no mere machinery, however perfect theoretically, can succeed.

The opposition to the Treaty in the Senate of the United States centered around a few provisions in the League of Nations Covenant. The Senate was not

only within its rights in examining the Treaty with the utmost care, but was fulfilling its clear duty. The delay in ratification, however, had an extremely unfortunate effect. The United States, which had come to be regarded as the champion of a new world-order, lagged behind, and threatened to have nothing further to do with the movement which it had fought to make possible. It is to be regretted that the President attempted to force the ratification of the Treaty exactly as it stood; that he did not, or could not, arrive at an early understanding with moderate Republican Senators in framing explanatory reservations which would have made clear the American attitude on certain points. He overestimated his ability to bring a compelling public opinion to bear on the Senate. With the injection of partisan political considerations into the debate all chance of a prompt ratification was lost.

PART II

THE BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY

Part II of the Treaty fixes in detail the boundaries of Germany. On all sides territory is lost unconditionally, and in other territory the population is to decide for itself by plebiscite whether it desires to remain German or to become Polish or Danish. Dantzig and part of the Saar Valley are put under the control of the League of Nations. Thus the partition of Poland, the spoliation of Denmark in 1864, and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine are to

Arts. 27-30

be redressed. Altogether the Empire is certain to lose nearly 30,000 square miles, and it may lose over 37,000 square miles,¹ out of a former area of 208,834 square miles. Thus at least 14 per cent and perhaps 18 per cent of the German territory will be cut off. The original draft of the Treaty had been modified somewhat as a result of the German protests. The plebiscite area in Schleswig had been made smaller principally at the wish of the Danes, who did not desire the complications which would result from a possible addition of Germans who might favor joining Denmark in the hope of escaping the burden of reparations. The boundary of West Prussia had been changed slightly in favor of Germany; and a plebiscite in Upper Silesia was conceded. According to the German delegation, the Empire faced a loss of territory that would deprive it of 21 per cent of its cereal and potato crops, almost one-third of the coal production, and nearly three-fourths of the mineral resources. The Allies however refused any substantial change in the boundaries determined upon.

PART III

POLITICAL CLAUSES FOR EUROPE

Art. 31 Germany agrees to the abrogation of the special
Arts. 32-35 neutralized status of Belgium. The sovereignty of Belgium over the 2 square miles of contested terri-

¹ The official summary issued May 7 gives a possible total of 43,747. The *Geographical Review*, May, 1919, p. 289, corrects this to 37,796, from which should be deducted 895 for the Schleswig zone omitted from the revised treaty.

tory of "neutral" Moresnet is recognized. A village in Prussian Moresnet and the districts of Eupen (68 square miles) and Malmédy (314 square miles) are ceded to Belgium. The Belgian claims to these are in part historical, in part based on the fact that a considerable proportion of the inhabitants are Walloons, and in part on the claim to reparation in kind for the destruction of Belgian forests. The district of Eupen contains some coal. The Treaty provides that within six months the inhabitants of these areas, who are not very numerous, may express a desire to remain German. The League of Nations may then readjust the boundary in accordance with this vote.

All Belgian archives carried off during the war are to be restored. Art. 38

With regard to Luxemburg, Germany renounces all privileges acquired by various treaties, recognizes that the Grand Duchy ceased to be part of the Zollverein as of January 1, 1919, gives up rights as to the railways, recognizes the termination of the neutralized status, and "accepts in advance all international arrangements which may be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers relating to the Grand Duchy." Germany will give Luxemburg equal treatment with regard to economic questions, transport, and aerial navigation. In most parts of the Treaty, the Allies reserved the right to demand in behalf of Luxemburg the privileges accorded to them. Arts. 40-41

These provisions were necessary in order to remove Germany from a position of economic control of the

Grand Duchy, whose position as a neutralized state had been fixed by international agreement in 1867. On September 28, 1919, the inhabitants voted to continue as an independent duchy under the old line, but to enter into an economic arrangement with France.

Arts. 42-44 The next section, dealing with the left bank of the Rhine, is brief but very important. In order to guarantee France and Belgium against another attack, the Treaty forbids Germany to maintain or construct any fortifications or assemble armed forces on the left bank of the Rhine or for a distance of fifty kilometers east of it. Violation of this provision constitutes a hostile act. As a supplementary precaution, military treaties between France and Great Britain and France and the United States were signed, providing for immediate help to France in case Germany violated these articles.

Art. 45 "As compensation for the destruction of the coal-mines in the north of France and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation, unencumbered and free from all debts and charges of any kind, the coal-mines situated in the Saar Basin."

This small area (784 square miles) is important both economically and strategically. In 1766 it came into the possession of France as part of Lorraine, and in 1814 it was left within the French boundaries.

After Napoleon's return and Waterloo, however, it was taken away, partly because it contained the fortress of Saarlouis, partly because of the coal mines which were even then recognized as valuable.¹ In the course of the recent war the French decided if possible to secure the "re-annexation" of Lorraine with the "boundaries of 1814," which would restore this important coal area to French control.² The district however is solidly German in character, and its annexation by France would have violated the principle of nationality. Nevertheless the wanton destruction of the French coal fields around Lens, accomplished not so much for military purposes as with the idea of crippling French industry after the war, gave France a claim to some compensation in kind. The solution devised by the Peace Conference is a compromise. The ownership of the mines is transferred to the French government, leaving it to the German government to compensate the private owners. To permit the working of the mines, the area is withdrawn from the political control of Germany; but instead of intrusting the administration to France, the district is placed under the League of Nations "in the capacity of trustees." The League is to appoint a council of five (one a citizen of France, one a native of the Saar Basin, and three others not German or French), with complete governing powers. German law as of November 11, 1918, continues in

Annex to Sec. IV

Annex, chap. ii

¹ *Geographical Review*, August, 1918, p. 112.

² Secret Treaties, and above, p. 20.

force, with the existing courts. Modifications in the law are to be made "after consultation with the representatives of the inhabitants in such a manner as the Commission may determine." There is to be no compulsory military service. The area is to be included in the French customs régime. For five years products originating in the Basin may enter Germany duty-free, and German products for local consumption are admitted duty-free for the same period. French money may circulate in the Basin.

Annex, chap. iii

After fifteen years all inhabitants over twenty, who were residents when this treaty was signed, are to vote on the question of their future government. In accordance with the results of this vote, the League is to decide whether the district in part or as a whole is to continue under league control, or whether all or part is to be annexed to France or to Germany. In case any or all of the valley returns to Germany, Germany is to repurchase the mines from France at a price in gold fixed by arbitrators.

The Germans had protested vigorously at the whole Saar plan as an invasion of national rights. They asserted that the coal in the Basin was worth a hundred times the French coal destroyed. They feared that if after fifteen years the district should vote to rejoin the Fatherland, Germany would be unable to make prompt payment for the mines. Instead of the whole plan, they proposed to guarantee an annual amount of coal to France until the French mines were restored. The Allies replied that the

destruction of the French mines called for some conspicuous reparation. The control by the League, with the plebiscite, did no violence to nationalism. In the revised treaty it was made clear that if the district prefers to return to Germany, the Reparation Commission will facilitate the raising of the money by Germany.

France had not provoked the war in order to regain Alsace-Lorraine; but from the moment the war began, every Frenchman was determined that the old "open wound" in the side of France must be healed. Although during the war there had been some talk among outside observers of a possible division of Alsace-Lorraine along the lines of the prevailing languages, and although President Wilson had not specified just how "the wrong done to France in 1871" was to be righted, there was not the slightest doubt after the armistice that Alsace-Lorraine should be restored entire to France. The Germans admitted that in spite of their historic and nationalistic claims, they had, according to present conceptions of right, done an injustice in 1871 when they had not consulted the people of Alsace-Lorraine. In accordance with the new principle of self-determination, however, they demanded a plebiscite, which should decide whether the region wished to join France or Germany or become a free state. This proposal was summarily rejected. It was felt that restoration to France was necessary to redress the injustice of 1871. The will of the inhabitants had

Sec. V,
Arts. 51-79
Annex

been shown by their protests at that time, and later. Practically, a fair plebiscite would have been difficult in view of the fact that many French sympathizers had left after 1871, that many Germans had come in since then, and that during the war the Germans had treated the territory as enemy country.

Art. 255 The treaty therefore restored the provinces to France with the frontiers of 1871. Since Germany had refused to assume any share of the French debt in 1871, France now recovers the provinces free of obligations as to the German national debt. Similarly
Arts. 56, 256 German state property including railroads is transferred without payment or credit on Germany's reparation^{re} account.

Other articles fix the details as to customs, pensions, court proceedings, and the like. For five years products of Alsace-Lorraine are to enter Germany duty-free, up to the average amounts of 1911-13. Germany also is to allow free export and reimport of yarns and textile products. The French government has the right to exclude German capital from public utilities and mines, and it also reserves the right to retain and liquidate the property of German citizens in Alsace-Lorraine. An annex provides for the restoration to French citizenship of the old Alsace-Lorrainers and their descendants, with some exceptions. Various others within a year may claim French nationality, though in individual cases the French may reject the claim. Germans born or domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine before the war must be

naturalized, a period of three years from November 1, 1918, being required.

The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine is doubly significant. It has a moral and sentimental value, as marking the failure of that Prussian policy of blood and iron which seemed so triumphant in 1871. For France, the stronger frontier and the added population are additional safeguards. But still more important is the iron of Lorraine, the richest field in Europe. From it Germany drew nearly all her ore.¹ With it Germany was able to forge her industrial and military machine. Without it Germany will be helpless for aggression, and dependent for her industrial development on the cultivation of friendly economic relations with France.

For France the reacquisition of the lost provinces brings not only renewed strength but perplexing problems and responsibilities. Germany had signally failed to win the affection and loyalty of Alsace-Lorraine. On the other hand, the German connection had brought much prosperity to the provinces, and by no means all—perhaps not even a majority—of the people were in 1914 anxious to return to France. In 1918, however, the French were welcomed with a heartiness which even the Germans had to admit. The problem of the complete reincorporation of the provinces in France is not a simple one. Great caution will have to be exercised in applying the

¹ In 1913 Lorraine produced 21,135,000 out of 28,607,000 tons of the Empire's iron ore.

French laws as to the separation of church and state, and limiting clerical control of education. If Alsace-Lorraine should prove less prosperous than under German rule, or if the anticlericalism of France should offend the strong Catholic sentiment of the people, grave dissatisfaction may yet arise. It is to be hoped that as little occasion as possible will be given for the growth of a new irredentism, and that the historic wrong of 1871 may have found its final solution.

Sec. VI

Art. 80

Continuing its survey of the boundaries of Germany the Treaty next deals briefly with the question of German Austria. Germany is forced to recognize the independence of Austria, and to agree that "this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations." This is an obvious interference with the right of self-determination, for both the German Empire and German Austria are desirous of uniting. There are strong reasons of policy for permitting this, moreover. German Austria cannot exist as a separate economic unit, and obviously must gravitate toward Germany. The addition of this German population would go a long way toward reconciling Germany for the forcible loss of so much of its territory. It would strengthen the more moderate South German elements and help to balance the predominance of the more dangerous Prussian elements. In the interests of European peace, a contented Germany would be a much safer neighbor than a Germany smarting under a sense of injustice. On the other hand, it is urged that Ger-

many is as yet unrepentant; that for a long time to come plans of revenge will be cherished, and an opportunity sought to regain the overlordship of Europe. To add territory and population would make Germany more of a menace. France in particular, always fearful of a renewal of the attack from the east, has stood unyieldingly against allowing Austria to join the Empire. When the new German constitution mentioned the possibility of members from German Austria sitting in the German National Assembly, the Peace Conference at once protested, and forced the elimination of that section. This action still further excited German resentment.

One may expect in the course of time, if Germany proves a peaceful and reliable neighbor, that this attitude of suspicion may be relaxed, and France may be won to consenting through the League Council to the reunion of German Austria with the main body of the German people. Until Germany demonstrates her change of heart, however, precautions are perhaps justified.

Germany agrees to recognize the independence of the Czecho-Slovak state, and cedes to it a small frontier district in Silesia. Here also Germany objects that several million Germans in Bohemia are not allowed a chance to join either the Empire or German Austria.

Sec. VII
Arts. 81-86

The boundaries with Poland formed one of the most difficult problems with which the Conference had to deal. Ever since the thirteenth century

Sec. VIII

when the Teutonic knights and other German crusading orders had pushed eastward the relations with the Poles had been productive of trouble. East and West Prussia were conquered from the heathen Slavs and to a considerable degree Germanized. Then West Prussia including the old Hansa^r town of Dantzig came directly under the Polish King, who became also the feudal overlord of East Prussia. East Prussia passed to the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns in the seventeenth century and at the^y time of the first partition of Poland in 1772 West Prussia, the long-coveted bridge of territory, was seized, linking up East Prussia with Brandenburg. Of the other partitions of Poland, Prussia retained after 1815 Dantzig and the province of Posen. The Polish-speaking population within the Empire in 1900 was over three million. Although the body of the Polish state was thus murdered, the spirit of Polish national feeling survived.

The most systematic attempts on the part of Prussia to stamp out Polish nationalism failed. At one time or another the Prussians tried to limit the use of the Polish language and to force the use of German in the schools and courts. They attempted to check the passing of land into Polish hands. They passed laws for the forcible expropriation of Polish landowners, and by sending German colonists into Polish districts they attempted to break up Polish solidarity. In Russia similar efforts met with no greater success. In Galicia the Poles were better

treated, but nevertheless they too cherished the hope of national reunion and freedom.

The war brought the long-awaited opportunity. All the oppressors of the Poles announced that at last Poland was to be free, with reservations. Russia wished to add Prussian and Austrian Poland to an autonomous state of which the Czar was to be head. Germany and Austria wished to "free" Russian Poland, without adding their own Polish provinces to it.

President Wilson announced that genuinely Polish districts must be made free, with access to the sea. The language used is capable of several interpretations, probably by intention.

There are a number of fundamental difficulties in fixing the boundaries of a free Polish state:

1. Historically, Poland has at one period or another ruled over an enormous stretch of territory from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Extreme nationalists pressed claims to practically every foot of this territory. The least they consider are the boundaries of 1772.

2. Geographically, except toward the Bohemian mountains, there are no natural boundaries to the Polish area, the heart of which is the Upper Vistula Basin.

3. In all directions the Polish population merges gradually with non-Polish groups, which in past times were governed by the Poles. Toward the east there is a minority of Polish landowners governing an

exploited Slav peasantry. Westward the Poles are peasants under German overlords. By no human possibility can all the Poles be brought within one state without the inclusion of at least as many non-Poles, most of whom do not welcome the prospect.

4. The natural outlet of Poland to the sea is down the Vistula to Dantzic. But Dantzic is a purely German city, and the "corridor" down through West Prussia along the Vistula contains a large number of Germans. Furthermore, to give Poland sovereignty over a strip to the sea involves the entire detachment of East Prussia again, and the creation of a permanent grievance.

Poland had a seat at the peace table, but pending the decisions of the Peace Conference the Poles attempted to occupy and defend various areas which they hoped to include in their state. This led to fighting with the Germans, the Czecho-Slovaks, the Ukrainians, and the Bolsheviks. The Allies had to try to secure a suspension of hostilities while they sought a permanent settlement.

Nationalistic principles would indicate leaving Dantzic to Germany, and retaining a connection with East Prussia. The righting of historic wrongs and giving a great inland state its natural economic outlet to the sea called for Polish sovereignty up to and including Dantzic. The Peace Conference did the best it could with a naturally tangled problem. The areas of Posen which in the judgment of its experts were "indisputably Polish" were assigned to Poland,

though considerable German elements necessarily went with them. Inasmuch as some of these represented German immigration since partition it was felt that the historic claims of Poland should not be prejudiced thereby. The Germans complained that purely German districts were included for strategic or economic reasons. The "corridor" through West Prussia contained a very considerable Polish population—in some districts 60 to 80 per cent, in others only 40 to 60 per cent. Here again historic claims were resolved in favor of the Poles, and the decision was against Prussia. In such a case the power which had partitioned Poland and started the Great War was not considered entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Germany is guaranteed free right of transit for "persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons, and mails in transit between East Prussia and the rest of Germany over Polish territory, including territorial waters."

Art. 89

Premier Paderewski went to Paris to urge the Polish claims to Dantzig. It was reported that the American experts favored this, but that Lloyd George was opposed. The final solution was a compromise, strongly favorable, however, to Poland. Dantzig, with a surrounding area of 729 square miles, was made a free city and placed under the protection of the League of Nations. Representatives of the free city, in agreement with a High Commissioner appointed by the League, are to draw up a constitution which shall be placed under the guarantee of the

Sec. XI,
Arts. 101-8

League. The Commissioner shall deal in the first instance with all disputes between Poland and the free city. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to negotiate a treaty between the free city and Poland which shall effect the inclusion of Dantzig in the Polish customs frontiers, give Poland complete access to wharves, etc., with the right of extending them, and assure Polish control of the Vistula and of all railways. Poland is to conduct the foreign relations of the free city, and extend diplomatic protection to its citizens abroad.

This solution has been denounced as thinly veiled annexation to Poland, and considerable sections of liberal opinion have not been enthusiastic with regard to it. Germany has naturally protested, insisting that such a solution was not within the "secure access of the sea" of President Wilson's Point XIII. In their counter-proposals Germany offered to guarantee Poland unimpeded economic rights of transit to Dantzig, Allenstein, Memel, and Königsberg as free ports. The Allies, however, refused to yield, although such a solution might have been defended as a substantial fulfilment of their pledges.

The two remaining boundaries between Germany and the new Poland were fixed subject to plebiscites. Upper Silesia has a considerable Polish population, but has not been under Polish sovereignty since 1163. The Germans insisted that the population was really German in sentiment, and they ascribed the Polish eagerness to secure the region to the fact that it is a

very important mining and industrial district. To turn it over to Poland would not only cripple Germany but would injure the material interests of the inhabitants. The Allies yielded their original demand for unconditional cession, and provided for a plebiscite under Allied supervision, to be held not less than six months nor more than eighteen months after the Treaty goes into effect. The vote is to be by communes, and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are then to determine the boundary, paying regard "to the wishes of the inhabitants as shown by the vote, and to the geographical and economic conditions of the locality."

Art. 88

In the southern regions of East Prussia around the Mazurian Lakes there is also to be a plebiscite under Allied supervision. The vote is to be by communes, and the Allies are then to fix the boundaries in accordance with the vote and with regard to geographical and economic conditions. Here there is a mixed population of Germans and Polish-speaking Mazurs.¹ The latter have been under German rule since the fourteenth century, and have absorbed much German culture. They are also Protestants. It will be interesting to see whether the language bond or the bond of religion and long historical association will prove the more effective element in determining national consciousness. Of course in this instance, as in Upper Silesia and indeed all plebiscite areas, the economic prospects, with perhaps a hope of escaping

Arts. 94-97

¹ In 1900 the census showed 142,000 Mazurians.

from part of Germany's reparation burden, will have some weight.

The remaining boundaries of Poland are to be fixed when the Russian situation shows some signs of settlement. While the Conference deliberated, the Poles and the Bolsheviki carried on campaigns over territory where the Lithuanian and White Russian peasantry has no affection for either side. In preliminary discussions with the Bolsheviki, the Poles have demanded the frontiers of 1772.

Art. 99 Germany cedes to the Allies the town of Memel with an adjoining area of about 900 square miles, and agrees to any disposition which they may make. The Germans objected that the town was German in sentiment; that in the district there are 68,000 Germans as against 54,000 Lithuanians; and that the Lithuanians were satisfied with German rule. The Allies, however, wished to be in a position to assure to a possible independent Lithuanian state a direct outlet to the sea, and they accordingly insisted on detaching this tip of East Prussia, which they regarded as properly Lithuanian.

Arts. 109-14 On the north the Peace Conference reopened a question not directly involved in the war, the boundary with Denmark. In 1864 Prussia and Austria had detached the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein from their connection with the Danish crown, and in 1866 Bismarck had utilized them in his larger scheme of forcing a quarrel with Austria. As a result of the victory in the Seven Weeks War, both

provinces were annexed to Prussia. The treaty with Austria provided that the northern areas should be allowed to vote for return to Denmark. After lying inoperative, this section was later abrogated.

The Duchy of Holstein was purely German, and Prussia had some excuse for its annexation. So was the southern part of Schleswig. The northern part, however, was strongly Danish, and it has continued to resent its forcible separation from Denmark. In spite of heavy-handed attempts at Prussianization, the Danish population has continued to desire reunion with their brethren. Here was a case where self-determination might be practiced to advantage.

Some extremists urged the restoration to Denmark of all the territory up to or including the Kiel Canal, so that Germany might not be able to use that strategic waterway in future naval operations. Having decided to deprive Germany of a navy, the Allies felt that the Kiel Canal was no longer dangerous. Their first plan provided for plebiscites in three zones of territory, voting successively. The Danes, however—and in this respect they were unique—did not desire part of this territory under any circumstances, and at their request the southern zone was left unconditionally to Prussia. The northern zone, delimited to contain the predominantly Danish section, is to vote as a unit.¹ The next area is to vote later by communes. Here the population

¹ The vote was taken February 10, 1920. The result favored Denmark by 75,023 to 25,087.

is mixed, and the boundary line will be drawn so far as possible to follow local preferences.¹

Art. 115

Heligoland is to be completely dismantled as a naval base and harbor; but harbor facilities for the fishing population and for peaceful navigation are allowed to remain.

Arts. 116-17

Germany acknowledges the independence of all territories which were part of Russia in August, 1914. The abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk treaty and all other agreements entered into with the Bolsheviki is recognized. "The Allied and Associated Powers formally reserve the rights of Russia to obtain from Germany restitution and reparation based on the principles of the present treaty." Finally Germany agrees in advance to any treaties which may be made with states formerly part of Russia, and to recognize the frontiers thereby determined.

PART IV

GERMAN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OUTSIDE GERMANY

One of the most important factors in arousing the anxiety, suspicion, and fear of the other nations has been the development of an aggressive German program in world-politics. In the eighties the newly unified Empire entered the scramble for colonies in Africa and the Far East. The rapid growth of German trade and the increase of German investments in various backward areas led in the twentieth

¹The vote in the second zone favored Germany by 48,000 to 13,000.

century to the building of a fleet which it was hoped would some day challenge Britain for the mastery of the seas. At every point outside Europe—in China, in South Africa, in Asia Minor, in Morocco, in South America—German merchants and German capitalists, with the backing of their government, were seeking for trade and investment opportunities, with always a hope of extending political control. One need not pretend that the nations like Britain and France, whose established interests were threatened, were particularly pleased. One need not deny that the Entente was formed, on the basis of settling the differences between England and France and between England and Russia, for the purpose of watching Germany. It remains true that Germany set the pace, forced the competition particularly with her new navy, and in the end precipitated a war which she might have avoided with honor and profit. On the very eve of the struggle Britain had made sweeping concessions as to the Bagdad railway, and Germany's "place in the sun" was never more secure than in 1914. There was not the slightest chance of an unprovoked attack. Germany, however, was not satisfied with the situation, and struck for "world-power or ruin." For a time the dream of world-power seemed realized. The war map showed a solid stretch from the North Sea to Bagdad and from the English Channel to the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea. And then the dream faded, the structure crumbled, and after Brest-Litovsk came

Versailles. During the course of the war all of Germany's possessions beyond the seas had been occupied by her enemies. Japanese and British troops held Kiaochow; New Zealand, Australian, and Japanese forces took the Pacific Islands; French and British colonial troops captured Togo and the Kameruns; South African forces conquered South-west Africa and co-operated with British, Indian, and Belgian forces in East Africa. German commerce vanished from the seas, and a large part of the merchant marine was captured. In enemy countries German property was sequestered and sold. The amazing extent to which German capital had secured a hold on public utilities, mining and manufacturing enterprises, banks, and insurance companies was revealed, and in England, Australia, Canada, Italy, the United States, and Russia the governments took vigorous measures to tear their economic life free from the grip of German financial influences.

Art. 118 The Treaty of Versailles strikes in thoroughgoing fashion at German interests outside of Germany. One motive was to secure reparation, but a more important aim was to prevent the re-establishment of German economic and financial control. "In territory outside her European frontiers . . . Germany renounces all rights, titles and privileges whatever in or over territory which belonged to her or her allies." In particular "Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions." Thus

Art. 119

passes Germany's colonial empire of over a million square miles in Africa and the islands of the Far East.

Germany, though a late comer in the race for possessions outside of Europe, managed to secure control of considerable areas between 1880 and 1890. Most of them are tropical and unsuited for white settlement, and of late years Germany has been anxiously looking for better fields to conquer and exploit. German methods of colonial administration were not particularly successful. The officials had too much of the Prussian drill-sergeant in them, and in numerous cases the natives were treated with utterly indefensible brutality. Since 1907, however, there has been an improvement, and some competent and unprejudiced outside observers were willing to admit that the German administration compared not unfavorably with that of other powers. The Allies, however, insisted that German misgovernment had been so bad as to forfeit all claim to control of any backward groups. The danger of these possessions as submarine bases, and as points from which attacks could be launched against the possessions of other powers, was pointed out.

The Germans protested vigorously that to deprive them of their possessions beyond the seas without any investigation was not within the spirit of "a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims."¹ They defended their

¹ The fifth of the Fourteen Points.

administration, and pointed to the loyalty of their native troops in East Africa as an evidence that the natives were satisfied with German rule. The Germans asked at least to be appointed mandatories for their possessions. The Allies retorted briefly that the soldiers were a specially recruited class, and that they were satisfied that native opinion was solidly against being placed again under German rule in any way. They contended that the mandatory system was fair to all concerned, within the spirit of President Wilson's declaration.

Art. 122

German government property in the overseas possessions passes to the mandatory power, which has also the right to decide whether or not Germans may remain in these regions, "hold property, trade, or exercise a profession in them."

Sec. II,
Art. 128

Germany renounces in favor of China the unpaid balance of the Boxer indemnity. With the exception of diplomatic and consular residences and offices, the German concessions at Hankow and Tien-tsin are ceded back to China. Among other minor points Germany agrees to restore the astronomical instruments carried off in 1900-1901

Secs. III, IV

In Siam, Germany renounces the right of extra-territorial jurisdiction, and in Liberia all rights and privileges under earlier treaties.

Sec. V,
Arts. 141-46

In Morocco, Germany recognizes the French protectorate, and gives up various privileges. Germany's share in the State Bank of Morocco is credited to the reparation account.

In Egypt, Germany recognizes the British protectorate. The Egyptian government may fix the terms under which Germans are permitted to establish themselves in Egypt.

Sec. VI,
Arts. 147-54

Germany agrees to recognize any arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers may make with Turkey and Bulgaria as to German rights in those countries. The most important concessions here involved are those connected with the Bagdad railway.

Sec. VII,
Art. 155

The concluding section of those dealing with German rights outside of Europe is concerned with Shantung. Around this question raged one of the most bitter controversies, and the solution finally adopted is among the most widely criticized. The situation is extremely complicated, and very powerful interests are involved.

Sec. VIII,
Arts. 156-58

In the expansion of Europe no chapter has been more interesting and significant than the opening of the Far East to Western influences. The Japanese, after a brief period of resistance, determined to learn from the West in order to meet the West at its own game, and thereby to preserve their own political independence and safeguard their own type of civilization. The great empire of China, however, for long resisted. Conservative and proud of its ancient culture, it yielded only to the superior military force of the West. Until 1894 Russia, England, and France loomed the largest in the politics of the Far East. Russia from the north had been steadily preparing

for the final drive southward into Korea and Manchuria, which should give the coveted warm-water port on the open sea. England had a "sphere of influence" in the great Yangtsi Valley; and France in the south claimed a smaller sphere. In 1894-95 Japan decisively defeated China in a war over Korea, only to be deprived of the chief prize of victory—the control of Port Arthur—by the action of Germany, Russia, and France. During the next few years events moved rapidly. The outstanding developments were the addition of Germany and Japan as formidable contenders for power in the Far East, the loss of important territorial and economic concessions by China, and the growth in China of a new spirit. At the time of the Boxer outbreak in 1900, it seemed as if the partition of China was imminent; but under the guidance of the United States the powers were led to agree to the principles of the integrity of China and the open door of equal economic opportunities for outside nations. The Russo-Japanese War checked Russian expansion, and established Japanese control in Korea and Southern Manchuria. China, however, did not profit much, for the former rivals soon established a working agreement and proceeded to tighten their grip on Manchuria and Mongolia.

In the meantime Germany, the new arrival in the expansion race, had secured a strong position. Having reached a previous understanding with Russia, Germany selected the port of Tsingtao as the most desirable spot. By great good luck, in November,

1897, two German missionaries were killed in some local riots in Shantung Province. German warships at once proceeded to Tsingtao, already marked out as the desired port. China was forced to pay heavy indemnities for the loss of life and property, and to punish severely various persons connected with the riots. Then in 1898 the Chinese government was coerced into giving a "special proof of their grateful appreciation of the friendship shown to them by Germany" by granting a ninety-nine-year lease on the harbor of Kiaochow and the city of Tsingtao. The treaty provided that the Emperor of China, while reserving "all rights of sovereignty in a zone of 50 kilometers surrounding the Bay," agreed to allow the movement of German troops in that zone, and himself to "abstain from exercising rights of sovereignty in the ceded territory." In addition the Germans were allowed to build two lines of railway, and to work all mines within some ten miles of the lines. Provision was made for the possibility of some Chinese capital participating in these enterprises. In case any foreign assistance "in persons, capital, or material" was needed in Shantung Province, China engaged to turn first to Germans. Germany specifically disclaimed any "treacherous intentions" of seizing land unlawfully.

These economic concessions were later extended and modified in detail. Russia immediately secured a lease on Port Arthur, and England and France demanded and obtained "compensation" at Wei-Hai-Wei and Kwang-Chou-Wan.

Germany proceeded to fortify the harbor of Kiaochow, to build a modern city at Tsingtao, and, through private corporations, to construct a railroad to Tsinanfu and to develop the important mines of coal and iron. At the same time every effort was made to stimulate import and export trade through Tsingtao.

Such was the situation in August, 1914, when the Central Powers precipitated the world-war. Not much is known of the discussions between Tokyo and London at that time. Under the treaty between England and Japan, the latter power was not necessarily called upon to enter the war.¹ It was obvious, however, that the chance to eliminate Germany, and to consolidate the position of Japan in the Far East could not be overlooked. On August 15 therefore Japan delivered an ultimatum to Germany, the preamble of which closely followed the wording of the politely insulting note of 1895 in which Germany, Russia, and France had "advised" Japan to withdraw from Port Arthur in the interests of peace. Germany was "advised" to withdraw or disarm her war vessels, and to deliver to Japan "the entire leased territory of Kiaochow, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." Naturally Germany paid no attention to the ultimatum. Although the territory could not be held for long, the German government counted on ultimate victory in the great contest. It might have been a wise move

¹ Speech at Boston by Viscount Ishii, July 4, 1917.

if Germany had at once restored the territory to China, for the lease provided that this might be done at any time, in which case China had promised to grant a lease on some other port; but the opportunity was lost. China had tried without success to secure an agreement to exclude all the leased territories from the field of hostilities.¹ President Yuan-Shi-Kai then desired to join the Allies in taking Kiaochow, but was not permitted to do so, chiefly it is understood because of Japanese opposition. In September Japan landed troops in purely Chinese territory and proceeded to besiege Kiaochow. A small British force co-operated, but only within the leased zone. The Japanese also sent troops to occupy all the stations on the railroad and also the mining properties. The city surrendered November 7, and the Chinese authorities requested the Japanese to withdraw within the leased area. Instead of this, the Japanese Cabinet prepared to seize the opportunity while the rest of the world was critically busy elsewhere, "for strengthening Japan's position in Eastern Asia." Accordingly, January 18, 1915, the famous "Twenty-one Demands" were secretly handed to President Yuan-Shi-Kai. The inevitable result of their acceptance would have been to place China in a position of vassalage, and the most strenuous objections were made by China.² Great Britain and the United States when they learned the nature of the

¹ *Asia*, September, 1919, p. 937.

² *Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings*, p. 456.

demands are understood to have protested. Reluctantly Japan reserved Group V of the demands dealing with Japanese administrative control for future settlement; but acceptance of the others was forced, May, 1915, by a threat of war. With the clauses strengthening the Japanese grip on Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and forbidding China to lease territory to any third power, we are not concerned in this connection. The first article of the first group, however, provided that "the Chinese government engages to recognize all matters that may be agreed upon between the Japanese government and the German government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests, and concessions which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses vis-à-vis China in relation to the Province of Shantung." Japan at the same time promised to restore the said leased territory to China under the following conditions: (1) The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a commercial port. (2) A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese government. (3) If the foreign powers desire it, an international concession may be established. (4) China and Japan are to agree on the disposal of German government buildings and property.

The United States formally stated that it would not recognize any agreement impairing our treaty rights, "the political or territorial integrity of China, or the Open Door Policy." As reinsurance

against interference by the United States, Japan and Russia made a secret treaty in 1916.¹ Meanwhile Japan was establishing control of Shantung Province far more effectively than Germany had ever done.

In February, 1917, Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare. England called on Japan for additional naval assistance. The United States broke relations with Germany, and urged China to do likewise. Japan feared that if China entered the war her own interests in Shantung might suffer. Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy were therefore asked to agree to support at the Peace Conference "the claims of Japan in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator." Great Britain agreed on condition that the Japanese would "treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the equator." France also agreed on condition that Japan should urge China to break relations with Germany. Russia and Italy also acquiesced. These assurances were not known to China or the United States, except by rumor, until 1919, at the Peace Conference. On March 14 China broke relations with Germany, and on August 14, after a Cabinet crisis, declared war.

In November, Secretary Lansing for the United States and Viscount Ishii for Japan came to an agreement which was made public. The governments "recognize that territorial propinquity creates special

¹ *Senate Hearings*, p. 456.

relations between countries, and consequently the government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China." The two nations agree in reaffirming the principles of the independence and territorial integrity of China, and the open door of equal opportunity for commerce and industry. Japan attempted to interpret "special interests" as equal to "paramountcy." Secretary Lansing, however, had expressly told the Viscount that he would not admit Japan's "paramount interest."¹ During the next year Japan continued to extend control over Shantung, and the presence of Japanese troops caused increasing friction. In September, 1918, in return for permission to finance two new railroads, Japan agreed to withdraw troops to Tsingtao. The Chinese government was to police the railroad, with the Japanese at the head of the force and at the principal railway stations. This agreement was never confirmed by the Chinese government, however.²

The Chinese had entered the war hoping to secure from the Peace Conference some support in their contest with Japan. The whole situation, however, is greatly complicated by the interference of Japan in the internal affairs of China. It is openly charged that Japan is interested in promoting dissension between North and South. There is no doubt that through granting or withholding loans much pressure has been

¹ *Asia*, September, 1919, p. 944; *Senate Hearings*, pp. 445 and 224.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 444-45.

exerted on Peking; and a number of the members of the government have been pro-Japanese in their policy. The Chinese people, however, have steadily grown more resentful, and by protests and boycotts of Japanese goods and occasional riots have expressed their dissatisfaction.

At Paris the Chinese delegation made a very favorable impression. They were well advised, and most of the newspaper correspondents gave them friendly publicity.¹ President Wilson was decidedly sympathetic. He found himself however tremendously handicapped by the firm attitude of Japan and by the decision of England and France that they must adhere to their agreements of 1917. In effect Clémenceau and Lloyd George said they would be delighted if the President could persuade Baron Makino to modify the Japanese demands; but if he could not, they felt bound to support Japan.

Great Britain and France, with immense Asiatic interests, had to reach an agreement with Japan, a fighting power with a definite policy. The United States has had no consistent Far Eastern policy which it was prepared to back with force, and its influence has been correspondingly slight. Logically the Shantung question forms a part of the whole question of the relations of China with foreign powers, and since the Peace Conference did not propose to go into the entire matter, Japan could demand that no new principles should be applied to its disadvantage.

¹ Hansen, *Adventures of the Fourteen Points*, chap. vi.

The Chinese representatives demanded that all Germany's holdings and concessions in Shantung should be restored directly to China. Their arguments may be summarized as follows:

1. China entered the Great War because it was avowedly fought for great principles of international justice, in particular the safeguarding of weaker nations, the right of self-determination, and to "make the world safe for democracy." To hand over control of one of the wealthiest provinces of China, sacred as the birthplace of Confucius, with nearly forty millions of Chinese, to the control of an alien power, violated every ideal for which the war was fought. Strategically it placed the Chinese capital in an indefensible position. Japan was a much more dangerous tenant than far-off Germany. Economically it interfered with the development of the Chinese railway system, and deprived China of the control of its most valuable coal and iron resources.

2. The treaty of 1898 with Germany had been secured under duress, and represented an injustice which should be righted. Furthermore, by the very treaty Germany was not allowed to transfer its rights to a third party.

3. By China's declaration of war on Germany all treaties were abrogated, and automatically China became repossessed of all territory and concessions granted to Germany.

4. The treaty with Japan in 1915 had been obtained under duress, and was therefore legally invalid.

5. The treatment of China in the past had been notoriously unjust. At the opening of a new era a new policy should be inaugurated.

6. In the interests of peace, Japan's militaristic and imperialistic scheme for building up an overlordship on the basis of an exploited China should be checked.

The Japanese argued that the war was fought on the theory that international treaties were not "scraps of paper," and they stood pat on their treaties.

1. They pointed out that the treaty of 1898 has been universally recognized as valid for twenty years.

2. They professed surprise that the Chinese, without any formal denunciation of the treaty of 1915, which in form was perfectly binding, should now appeal to the Peace Conference to disregard it. Japan served notice that it insisted on China's carrying out its promise to agree to the transfer of the German concessions. It also demanded the support of Britain, France, and Italy as pledged in 1917.

3. By right of conquest, Japan was entitled to take territory and concessions which were legally German in 1914. Furthermore, Japan's undoubted services to the Allies during the war, and her sacrifices of blood and treasure, deserved some reward.

4. The transfer of the German interests to Japan made no difference to China. China would be better off than before the war, for Japan was prepared to restore China's sovereignty over the leased

areas, retaining only the economic concessions. Other foreign powers had such concessions; why should Japan, admittedly the most closely interested in Chinese affairs, be refused them?

5. Japan, with rapidly growing population, was compelled to live as an industrial nation, and must depend on coal and iron from China. But the development of these resources and the increase of trade relations with Japan would be for the benefit of China also.

From this position the Japanese refused to recede. To allow the transfer from Germany to China would cast discredit on the good faith of their promise to restore Kiaochow to China. They were willing to agree to an international concession in Tsingtao and give up the exclusively Japanese concession. They would take up with China the question of withdrawing Japanese troops from the railway. But first they must receive the title to all that had been Germany's. President Wilson was compelled, though reluctantly, to yield the point. Without the help of England and France he could not compel Japan to change. He may have feared that Japan would withdraw from the Conference and wreck the League of Nations. On the other hand it was clear that the United States would not go to war to eject Japan from Shantung. Short of withdrawing altogether from the Peace Conference, or driving Japan to withdraw, there seemed nothing else for the President to do. China was bitterly disappointed, and, not being

allowed to sign the Treaty with reservations, refused to sign at all. The Chinese government later declared that the state of war with Germany was at an end.

Few of the decisions of the Conference have been more hotly criticized, and these sections are undoubtedly among the most unsatisfactory in the Treaty. The United States Senate, however, cannot mend the matter by refusing to ratify the Treaty, or by withholding its assent to these clauses. The real hope for a satisfactory solution lies in the development of China into a state able to take care of its own internal affairs. In time the whole question of territorial concessions and economic concessions and extra-territorial jurisdiction and control of the Chinese customs revenue should be reopened. Not only Japan, but England, France, and other powers should co-operate in this. The obvious agency for carrying out these readjustments peaceably is the League of Nations. Much of the discussion of the question ignores the fact that China is to have rights of sovereignty over Shantung, and that those rights will be guaranteed by the League Covenant. It is perfectly proper to note that nominal sovereignty may be valueless, as in Manchuria, and that control of railways and mines may involve real subjection. There is this danger in Shantung. Nevertheless Japan has given explicit assurances on these points, and, through the League of Nations, China may insist that they be kept.

PART V

MILITARY, NAVAL, AND AIR CLAUSES

Germany had set the pace for the European competition in armament which had been so ruinous economically and so ineffective in keeping a general peace. The victorious Allies were determined to prevent Germany from again threatening the conquest of Europe. With Germany disarmed the rest of the world might proceed to reduce armaments.

Arts. 160-72

The Treaty therefore provides for the reduction of the German army first to 200,000, and then, not later than March 31, 1920, to not over 100,000. The Great General Staff is abolished, the number of units is fixed, and the maximum equipment for each branch is stated. Supplies above this are to be surrendered to the Allies. Manufacture of munitions is to be restricted by the Allies. Import of munitions, or the manufacture or import of gas, armored cars, and tanks is forbidden. The number of customs officials, guards, gendarmes, and police may not be larger in proportion to the population than in 1913.

After Jena, Napoleon had limited the size of the Prussian army. By increasing the proportion of officers, however, and by giving intensive training to successive batches of recruits the Prussians succeeded in evading the restrictions, and in 1813 they had a trained force several times as large as they were supposed to possess. With this precedent in mind, the Allies demanded that "universal compulsory mili-

Art. 173

tary service shall be abolished in Germany. The German army may only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment." The men must enlist for twelve years, and officers for twenty-five. The military academies are reduced. Military training in schools or societies is forbidden. Arts. 174-79

While the fortifications on the west are to be destroyed, those on the south and east may be retained. Art. 180

The chief criticisms of this general plan are that it introduces a professional army which may become a sort of Pretorian Guard, dangerous to the liberties of the people, and that it may be made into a training school for officers in case of another war. It is understood that Lloyd George was particularly insistent on the small long-term professional army. If the terms are carried out, it is hard to see how Germany can again be a menace. The German negotiators objected not so much to their disarmament as to the fact that their enemies reserved their own disarmament for future discussion within the League of Nations. Since the exchange of ratifications, the Allies have agreed to extend the time for carrying out the reductions in the army. The present German government needs a considerable force to maintain itself against a more radical revolution.

By the Treaty Germany surrenders practically all its fleet, including submarines, to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Just before the Treaty was signed the ships which had been interned at the time Sec. II

of the armistice were sunk at Scapa Flow by their crews. For this violation of the armistice the Allies later exacted damages in the form of shipping, docks, dredges, etc., although the German government tried to disclaim responsibility. This was felt to be rather severe, inasmuch as Great Britain and the United States had been in favor of taking the German Main Fleet out and sinking it anyhow. The reasons for so doing were that Allied naval supremacy was secure and that the German fleet was so different in construction that it could not profitably have been assimilated to the other units. France, however, had wished to replace its naval losses with German ships.

Art. 181

The German navy is to consist of not more than six small battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and twelve torpedo boats. No submarines may be constructed even for commercial purposes. As in the army, recruiting is to be voluntary, and enlistment of men and officers is to be for twelve and twenty-five years respectively. Fortifications commanding the routes between the North Sea and the Baltic are to be destroyed. Other existing coast fortifications may be retained, but not extended or strengthened. Reserves of munitions are limited.

Arts. 162-96

Art. 197

For three months after the Treaty comes in force Germany may not use the high-power wireless for the "transmission of messages concerning naval, military, or political questions of interest to Germany" or the Central Powers without the consent of the Allies.

“The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces.” Up to October, 1919, seaplanes might be used to search for submarine mines. Until Allied forces completely evacuate Germany, their aircraft are to enjoy freedom of flying and landing in Germany. For six months after the Treaty comes in force, Germany may not manufacture or import aircraft or parts. When the Treaty becomes effective, all military and naval aircraft and material must be surrendered. Art. 198

“All the military, naval and air clauses contained in the present Treaty, for the execution of which a time-limit is prescribed, shall be executed by Germany under the control of Inter-allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.” This Commission is given full power to investigate and give directions, and the German government is to give all necessary information and co-operation. Art. 203

PART VI

PRISONERS OF WAR AND GRAVES

The repatriation of prisoners of war and interned civilians is to take place as soon as possible after the Treaty comes into force. The Allied and American prisoners had been released by Germany under the terms of the armistice. The Germans had constantly pressed for the release of their prisoners, but they had met with only partial success. The prisoners held by the Americans had been sent back, and the Arts. 214-24

English also, as a favor and not as a right, did the same. The French, partly because they wished to utilize the labor of the prisoners, and partly to be able to bring pressure to bear on the German government, refused to anticipate the exchange of ratifications. German public opinion regarded the retention of the prisoners as an unnecessary hardship. There had been some talk of retaining German prisoners for labor in restoring the devastated areas of France and Belgium, but it was realized that this would be impracticable. By international usage nations may ask for the cost of maintaining prisoners, but in this case both sides waived their claims. Germany, however, had to repay the amounts the Allies had expended in sending supplies to their own prisoners in Germany.

Arts. 225-56

The graves of the dead are to be respected and maintained, and, so far as possible under existing laws and health regulations, bodies may be transferred to their own country. Information as to the dead and missing is to be exchanged.

PART VII

PENALTIES

Public opinion in the Allied nations was practically unanimous in blaming the Central Powers for deliberately forcing the war on the world. From the beginning the chief responsibility was placed on the German Kaiser and the Prussian Junker military caste, and the determination grew to hold them

personally responsible for the misery and loss occasioned by their actions. The instinctive resentment of the masses led them to cry "Hang the Kaiser!" and responsible leaders were not far behind in the vigor of their denunciations. In particular, Lloyd George, in the election of December, 1918, and Clémenceau, in his addresses, had practically pledged their governments to secure the punishment of William II.

But besides the all-inclusive crime of precipitating the war, and the treaty violations involved in the invasion of Belgium and Luxemburg, there were the countless enemy actions so contrary to all the laws and usages of war that they were unanimously called "atrocities." Day by day and month by month the list mounted, and with each new outrage the resolve of the Allies to bring the perpetrators to justice grew more determined. With the long-deferred day of victory came the opportunity for the punishment of the guilty.

One of the first acts of the Conference (January 25, 1919) was the appointment of a Commission "to inquire into and report upon the following points:

"1. The responsibility of the authors of the war.

"2. The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war.

"3. The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces,

including members of the General Staffs, and other individuals, however highly placed.

"4. The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offences."¹

The Commission had no difficulty in agreeing that "the war was premeditated by the Central Powers together with their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable," and that the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg was "deliberately violated." There was also no doubt that "the war was carried on by the Central Empires together with their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, by barbarous and illegitimate methods in violation of the established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of humanity." Thirty-two separate classes of these offenses were indicated. The Commission report proceeded to state that "all persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution." As to trial for all these offenses before an appropriate tribunal, the Commission felt that "the acts which brought about the war should not be charged against their authors or made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal." However, in view particularly of the violation of Belgium, "it would be right for the Peace Conference,

¹ *Senate Hearings*, p. 313.

in a matter so unprecedented, to adopt special measures, and even to create a special organ in order to deal as they deserve with the authors of such acts." These two declarations the American delegates regarded as inconsistent with each other. For the future, it was recommended that penalties should be provided for violations of international law. For the trial of violators of the "Laws and Customs of War and of the Laws of Humanity," the Commission proposed a joint inter-allied High Tribunal. The Joint Tribunal was necessary because many of the offenses had been against two or more Allied nations. They suggested that Germany be required in the Treaty to surrender any persons for trial whom the Allies might demand, together with all relevant documentary material.

To some of these conclusions and recommendations the representatives of the United States, one of whom was Secretary Lansing, took exception, as did also the Japanese Commissioners. They objected that under international law Chiefs of States could not be held responsible for their official acts, except to the political authorities of their own countries. Furthermore, they should be punished only in accordance with the laws in force at the time of the offense.

The Commission had considered violations of the "law of humanity" as calling for criminal prosecution. This the Americans regarded as unwarranted. Finally they objected to the criminal prosecution of persons "however high their position" who with

knowledge of the violation of the laws of war, "and with power to intervene," abstained from preventing "or repressing violations of the laws or customs of war." The Japanese representatives expressed similar doubts in somewhat less positive terms.

Art. 227 The clauses as finally incorporated in the Treaty are based on this report, with some modifications in the direction of the American position. In order to satisfy public opinion, something had to be said about the Kaiser. It was agreed that international law provided no precedents for trying him. Therefore it was declared that "the Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defense." The United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan will each appoint a judge. "In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed.

"The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial."

The German delegates objected vigorously to this article, but without avail. In neutral and Allied countries opinion was divided. Some were impressed with the doubtful legality of placing the whole blame on one individual, and of trying him before a court of his enemies for an act which, however immoral, was not punishable under international law at the time it was committed. Others felt the inadvisability of making a martyr of the Kaiser, and thus risking his rehabilitation in the affections of the German people. Others insisted that in the interests of future peace the dead past should be forgotten and forgiven as soon as possible. On the other hand warnings were heard against sentimental softening which should weakly overlook the German crimes. In the name of Louvain and the "Lusitania" and the Armenians, in the name of every soldier who had died to save civilization, the protest was raised against extending an unsought forgiveness to the unrepentant author of the greatest crime of history.

As a matter of fact, the prospect of the actual trial of the Kaiser was somewhat of an embarrassment. The request was duly made on the Netherlands for his surrender, and promptly refused as unwarranted by international law. If the matter rests there, the Allies will probably be secretly relieved. It would have been simple to have provided in the Treaty that Germany should request the extradition of the ex-Kaiser, and then deliver him to the Allies. The fact that Germany was spared this supreme humiliation

may indicate that the Allies were willing to pass the responsibility to Holland, with the expectation of thus escaping from the whole situation. An assurance from Holland that the Kaiser will be interned will probably be accepted.

Art. 228 The question of trying those guilty of atrocities rests on a different plane. The German government is forced to recognize "the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war." Violations of the "law of humanity" are not mentioned, nor is the phrase "however highly placed" inserted, though it is of course implied. "Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her Allies.

The German government is required to "hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, office or employment which they held under the German authorities."

Art. 229 "Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before the military tribunals of that Power. Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and

Associated Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed of members of the military tribunals of the Powers concerned. In every case the accused will be entitled to name his own counsel." The German government must co-operate in furnishing information and evidence.

Art. 230

The plan of the Joint Tribunal was given up, and the accused are to be tried as they would have been tried if they had been captured. Some Germans indeed, who had fallen into the hands of the Allies, had already been tried before military courts.

During the discussions, the German delegates had protested against delivering their nationals for trial by their enemies. No attempt was made to deny that some Germans had committed crimes for which they deserved punishment. They contended, however, that the German government was ready and willing to proceed to the trial of such persons and the infliction of suitable penalties. The German criminal code forbade their surrender for trial by foreigners. They pointed out that proceedings had already been begun against certain persons. The Allies, however, were unwilling to trust the German courts to do justice to high and low for all the acts of "frightfulness," and would not yield. "The powers cannot intrust the trial of those responsible to . . . their accomplices." They even insisted that action by the German Courts should not affect the question of surrender to the Allies. The Germans also had their grievances against certain Allied officers and men, and asked that the preliminary

question whether offenses against international law had been committed "should be submitted to an international tribunal of competent neutrals to judge all violations by subjects of all the signatories, Germany to have her share in the formation of this tribunal, and the meting out of punishment to be left to the national courts."¹ The Allies refused to admit the participation of powers which had taken no part in the war. They promised the German delegation, however, to submit within a month after the Treaty came into effect a final list of those who would be tried.

These clauses were particularly hard for the German pride to accept, and they were denounced by the German press with especial bitterness. On no point however has Allied opinion been more settled than on the necessity for punishing the individual authors of atrocities, whenever they can be identified. The only differences have been as to the degree to which a subordinate, for instance a submarine commander, would be excused by the fact that he acted under orders, and the exact manner in which responsibility could be fastened on those higher up for the consequences of general policies which they initiated.

Even after the Treaty was signed, the German press and the government continued to ask for some relaxation of these penalty clauses. One proposal was that the Allies should appoint associate justices to sit in the German tribunals to try those accused

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, July, 1919, p. 25.

of crimes against the laws and customs of war. The German government professed to be afraid that the surrender of a large number of persons, including a number of popular heroes, would provoke widespread disorder which they would be powerless to repress. The Allies, however, went ahead with the gathering of evidence and the preparation of their list. Meanwhile many who suspected that their surrender would be called for took refuge in neutral countries.

The list as finally submitted early in February, 1920, contained 896 names. The inclusion of Bethmann-Hollweg, von Hindenburg, von Ludendorf, von Mackenzen, the Crown Prince, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, and Admiral von Tirpitz showed that the Allies were determined to bring home to the civil and military heads of the old German government the responsibility for such general policies as deportations, submarine warfare, requisitions, devastation of property, and the like. The list was submitted as a whole, with separate lists showing the demands of each of the Allied governments. The offenses for which each individual is to be tried are specified.

The presentation of the list caused a grave crisis. The German representative in Paris resigned rather than transmit it to Berlin. All sections of German opinion solidly opposed the surrender. On all sides it was declared that the Allies would have to come and get their victims. It became evident that to press the demands would result in the fall of the

German government, causing a period of confusion which might have the most disastrous consequences. The Allies therefore decided to allow the German government to proceed with the trials in the first instance, reserving the right to demand revision in cases where justice does not seem to be done.

This represents a distinct victory for the German point of view. In various sections of the Allied press the warning is uttered that if the Allies yield on this first test case the Germans will be encouraged to repudiate other obligations under the Treaty. In France particularly various papers urged that if Germany was not going to carry out the terms of the Treaty, France would be justified in retaining a hold on the left bank of the Rhine.

PART VIII

REPARATION

The German people entered upon the war with enthusiasm and subscribed to the early war loans willingly with the expectation that the cost of the war would be assessed on their defeated foes. This belief was encouraged by the leaders; and as the war dragged on, and the burden of debt became more staggering, it was felt increasingly that Germany must win, or face bankruptcy. There is not the slightest doubt that a completely victorious Germany would have exacted the last possible farthing of indemnity for their expenses incurred in defending themselves against "the unprovoked attacks of their

jealous enemies." Frequent references were made to the mistake that had been made in 1871 in not "bleeding France white."

Allied leaders declared early and emphatically that they would fight until Germany was compelled to make restitution for the damage done Belgium, France, and Serbia. The British also were determined to secure compensation for the merchant ships destroyed, and "ton for ton" became a popular slogan. The United States also was preparing claims for lives and property lost in the submarine campaign.

The Russian Revolution gave a new turn to the discussion, and the formula "no forcible annexations and no punitive indemnities" soon became famous. The Russian radicals took up and urged the suggestion that all the belligerents should contribute to a fund for the restoration of Belgium, East Prussia, Poland, and other devastated districts. The Reichstag resolutions of July 19, 1917, gave a qualified assent to the principle of "no indemnities," and in their reply to the Bolsheviki at Brest-Litovsk, December 25, 1917, the delegates of the Central Powers declared their willingness to renounce indemnification for war costs and war damages.¹ The treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, however, showed how enormous advantages might be exacted without using the unpleasant word "indemnity."

In the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, the "restoration" of Belgium, France, Serbia, and

¹ *Documents and Proposals*, p. 102.

Rumania was mentioned. When the Germans declared their willingness to make peace on the basis of the Wilson program, the Allies qualified their acceptance by giving their interpretation of "restoration." "By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." President Wilson agreed with this interpretation.

In the preliminary discussions over the drafting of the Treaty, it soon became evident that a powerful group was strongly in favor of stretching these general phrases to the utmost. Many of the unthinking public in England and France had been led by incautious statements of their leaders to expect that the entire cost of the war to the Allies could be transferred to Germany. The French press talked of demanding the repayment with interest of the indemnity of 1871, and even that of 1815. Lloyd George and Clémenceau had to make as good a showing as possible toward meeting these extravagant expectations. President Wilson attempted to moderate the claims, but without much success.

The most elementary thinking on the subject soon made it clear that the entire national wealth of Germany would not begin to pay the whole cost of the war. The Allied policy therefore came to be, first, to fix the German responsibility in as broad terms as possible, and then to make the Germans pay as large an amount as they were physically able to do.

The American representatives throughout, without any feeling of leniency toward the Germans, were impressed with the practical undesirability of imposing such a crushing burden that the Germans would become bankrupt, or be driven to bolshevism, to the loss of their creditors. They wished to fix a definite total sum for Germany to pay, in order to end uncertainty and hasten the restoration of more normal world-conditions. The Allies recognized the theoretical validity of this position; but they looked across at the undevastated fields of the Fatherland, and saw the factories with their machinery intact, and contrasted the situation there with the ruined areas of France and Belgium, and they refused to take any chances of letting Germany off too easily.

At the forefront of the general provisions in the section on reparation the Allies inserted the clause "the Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." The Germans naturally objected to admitting in principle their responsibility for the entire cost of the war to their enemies. In their note of May 13, they declared "the obligation to make reparation has been accepted by Germany by virtue of the note from Secretary of State Lansing of November 5, 1918, independently of the question

Art. 231

of responsibility for the war." They went on to disclaim responsibility for the faults of the old German Government. The latter contention was of course of no weight in international law, and it was demolished by Clémenceau's reply of May 20. The statement, however, that by failing to protest against the phrase "Germany's aggression by land, sea, and air" the German government therefore "recognized in 1918, implicitly but clearly, both the aggression and the responsibility" seems far-fetched. Certainly the German government had no such understanding or intention. The fact would appear to be that the clause was inserted in the Treaty in an attempt to satisfy public opinion.

Art. 232 Having fixed the complete responsibility of Germany for all costs and damages, the Allied and Associated Governments go on to say that they recognize that the resources of the reduced Germany will not be adequate to make complete reparation. They therefore require Germany to undertake to make reparation for damage done to civilians.

In the first place, they interpret Germany's pledges as to the complete restoration of Belgium in such a way as to require the reimbursement of the Allies for all the sums loaned to Belgium for the purpose of defending herself against the violation of the treaty of 1839. For this purpose Germany is to turn over 5 per cent gold bonds payable in 1926. The amount will be about a billion dollars. Morally of course Germany is responsible for these payments,

and in a sense this burden of debt incurred by the Belgian people is a damage to the civilian population. Furthermore Belgium was peculiarly wronged, and has a just claim to special consideration. Nevertheless it has seemed to many who cannot be accused of pro-German sympathies that this clause cannot be justified by any reasonable interpretation of the agreements preceding the armistice.

Germany is required to make an immediate payment, before May, 1921, of the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 gold marks, in gold, commodities, ships, and otherwise. After deducting the expenses of the army of occupation, and the cost of food and raw materials supplied to Germany, the balance will be credited to the reparation account. Art. 235

The Annex which describes the different categories under which Germany must make reparation to the Allied civilians again stretches "damage done to the civilian population" to the utmost. Of the ten classes of injuries, some are obviously fair. Thus compensation is claimed for death or injury of civilians and injury to their property due to all acts of war. Damage caused by acts of cruelty, violence, or maltreatment, including deportation, forced labor, exposure in small boats, is to be made good so far as possible to the victims or their surviving dependents. Damage caused by maltreatment of prisoners of war may fairly enough be exacted. More doubtful is the cost of assistance to Allied prisoners of war and their dependents.

The Treaty further classifies as "damage caused to the peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers" all pensions to wounded and disabled soldiers and sailors and their dependents, and all separation allowances paid to the families of men in the service. The American delegation strongly opposed these provisions, partly as a breach of the understanding on which the Germans surrendered, partly because it would be utterly impossible for Germany to pay over as required a capital sum the interest on which would pay the pensions "on the basis of the scales in force in France." The argument in favor of including these claims seemed to be in brief that Germany had it coming; that Germany had to accept any terms the Allies chose to impose; that the Allies had been led to expect that Germany would pay the bills; that the Allies needed the money; and that it was possible that Germany might turn out to be able to pay all, or at least part, of the sums demanded. Liberal opinion has quite generally condemned these exactions as unwarranted and ill advised.

Annex III

Germany further recognizes the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to the replacement "ton for ton and class for class" of all merchant ships or fishing boats lost or damaged in the war. Since the whole German merchant marine would be inadequate, the Allies will accept all ships over sixteen hundred tons, half the ships between one thousand and sixteen hundred tons, and a quarter of the trawlers and fishing boats. In addition, Germany is for five years to build

and turn over as directed by the Reparation Commission not to exceed 200,000 tons of shipping a year.

Naturally enough, the return of cash, animals, machinery, and property of all kinds carried off by the Germans is required. In this connection it should be remembered that the several armistice agreements had provided for this, and that ever since November, 1918, this particular form of restoration had been going on steadily.

Art. 238

As a direct contribution to the rebuilding of France and Belgium, Germany "agrees to the direct application of her economic resources to reparation." These are to include animals, building material, machinery, and tools. Their value is to be credited to Germany in the reparation account. The Allies, however, are to consider the domestic requirements of Germany, and "the maintenance of Germany's social and economic life." In particular the German government is to deliver within three months after the Treaty comes in force specified quantities of live stock.¹

Annex IV

In addition, Germany grants to France, Belgium, and Italy the option of purchasing coal, benzol, dyestuffs, and chemicals in specified quantities for a number of years. For ten years France is to have the right to buy 7,000,000 tons of coal a year, besides enough to make up the deficiency in the

Annex V

¹ To France: 500 stallions; 30,000 fillies and mares; 2,000 bulls; 90,000 milch cows; 1,000 rams; 100,000 sheep; 10,000 goats. To Belgium: 200 stallions; 5,000 mares; 5,000 fillies; 2,000 bulls; 50,000 milch cows; 40,000 heifers; 200 rams; 20,000 sheep; 15,000 sows.

output of the wrecked mines of the north. Belgium may purchase 8,000,000 tons for ten years, and for the same period Italy may take amounts increasing from 4,500,000 to 8,500,000 tons. The options are to be exercised through the Reparation Commission, which may postpone or cancel deliveries if they "would unduly interfere with the industrial requirements of Germany."

Annex VI

The Reparation Commission is given an option on half the German stock of dyestuffs and chemicals at the time the Treaty comes into force, and on a quarter of the stock each year until 1925.

Annex VII

In addition to all these provisions, Germany is compelled to give up most of the submarine cables. There was a great deal of discussion as to whether cables are properly "spoils of war," to be taken by the victors. As usual, the decision went against Germany, and credit in the reparation account was given only for the portions privately owned.

Sec. II,
Art. 245

As special provisions of the reparation settlement, Germany is required to restore trophies and flags taken in 1870-71. When this requirement became known, a number of these flags were burned by a mob in the streets of Berlin, a proceeding which only confirmed the world's belief that the Germans are poor losers. Certain documents also are to be returned, which are interesting historically because they are supposed to contain the correspondence of Napoleon III with the South German states before the Franco-Prussian War. Through their capture

in 1870 Bismarck gained information which is said to have helped greatly in forcing the South German states to join the new Empire.

To the King of Hedjaz is to be restored the Koran of the Caliph Othman, given to William II by the Turks. To the British is to be handed over the skull of the Sultan Mkwawa, taken from East Africa. The Sultan was an object of reverence in East Africa, and the British as prospective mandatories will undoubtedly gain local approbation by restoring the skull. Art. 246

Finally, Germany is to give to the library at Louvain books and manuscripts corresponding in number and value to those burned, and is to give to Belgium the portions to complete two famous paintings. Art. 247

In order to see that all these provisions are carried out, there is created by the Treaty a Reparation Commission, consisting of delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. The first four vote on all questions, and a fifth vote is cast by one of the others on matters in which his country is directly interested. "The Commission shall in general have wide latitude as to its control and handling of the whole reparation problem as dealt with in this part of the present Treaty and shall have authority to interpret its provisions." For whatever part of the total proved claims as is not paid in gold, ships, securities, or commodities, Germany is to issue bonds. Germany's taxation must always be as heavy proportionately as that in any country represented on the Commission. Annex II

A first issue of bonds amounting to 20,000,000,000 gold marks is to run without interest to May 1, 1921. The balance remaining to Germany's credit from the payments required by Article 235 will retire a corresponding amount of these bonds when due. Bonds not retired are to be exchanged for new interest-bearing bonds.

Another immediate issue of bonds to the amount of 40,000,000,000 gold marks bears interest of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent from 1921 to 1926, and 5 per cent, with an additional 1 per cent for amortization, after 1926. In addition, a written agreement is to be deposited with the Commission to issue another 40,000,000,000 marks worth of bonds, bearing 5 per cent "when, but not until, the Commission is satisfied that Germany can meet such interest and sinking fund obligations." Still other issues "by way of acknowledgment and security" may be demanded by the Commission from time to time.

The German delegation, and German public opinion, read into the reparations provisions the intention to condemn the German people to "perpetual slave labor." They offered instead to pay a maximum of one hundred billion gold marks, twenty billion by 1926, the rest in annual instalments without interest. They offered up to 20,000,000 tons of coal annually for five years, and up to 80,000,000 for the next five years. They offered to place their merchant tonnage in a world-pool, part of their freight space constituting part of their reparation,

and to build for a series of years more tonnage than demanded of them in the Treaty. The Allies replied that they had not exceeded the armistice agreement, and that the Reparation Commission had no power to interfere in Germany's internal life. Germany is invited to create a co-operating commission. However, in order to facilitate a definite settlement, Germany may within four months of the signature of the Treaty submit any desired proposals. "In particular, she may offer a lump sum for all or part of her liability, undertake to reconstruct all or part of a damaged district, offer labor, technical service or materials for reconstruction, or, in short, suggest any feasible plan to simplify the assessment of damage, eliminate any question from the scope of the inquiry, promote the performance of the work or accelerate the definition of the ultimate amount to be paid. . . . Within two months thereafter the Allied and Associated Powers will return their answer to any such proposals, which they agree to consider seriously and fairly, for the reason that no one would be better pleased than they at a speedy and practical settlement."¹ With this offer the Germans had to content themselves.

PART IX

FINANCIAL CLAUSES

Subject to exceptions approved by the Com- Art. 248
mission, the reparation payments are made a first
charge on the German revenues. Until May 1, 1921,

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, July, 1919, p. 35.

Germany may not export gold without permission. Germany is to pay all costs of the army of occupation. Germany confirms the surrender of all material handed over under the armistice agreements, receiving credit for such of it as the Commission judges of non-military value.

Art. 249

Art. 250

Art. 254

Art. 255

Following the general custom, it is provided that the powers to which German territory is ceded shall assume a proportional part of the imperial and state debt as it stood on August 1, 1914. Since in 1871 Germany refused to assume any part of the French debt with Alsace-Lorraine, France now assumes no part of the German debt. Poland need not pay any portion of the debt contracted for the German colonization of Posen. Belgium also assumes no part of the German debt. The Allies flatly refused to consider assigning any part of the actual war debt to the liberated territories, since most of the inhabitants had opposed the war, and since one of Germany's objects in the war had been to keep them in subjection.

Arts. 256, 257

German public property, including private property of former rulers, passes to the powers to which territory is ceded. Except in Alsace-Lorraine and the colonial possessions, the value of this property is credited to the reparation account.

Art. 258

The remaining clauses require Germany to give up representation on international bodies operating in allied countries, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, or Russia. The Reparation Commission may within a year demand that the German government

Art. 260

buy up from German subjects and turn over to the Commission their interests in any public utility or concession in Russia, China, Turkey, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, or any territory administered by a mandatory. The value of these interests will be credited to the reparation account.

PART X

ECONOMIC CLAUSES

This part of the Treaty is the longest and most complicated. It provides for the resumption of commercial relations, for the revival of various treaties, for the payment of private debts and the carrying out of contracts suspended by the war, and for the disposition to be made of enemy private property. The clauses seem to have been drawn with the following objects principally in view:

1. The protection of allied and associated nationals and their economic interests against discriminating German legislation or action for at least five years.
2. Special provision for the economic interests of those portions of the German Empire which are transferred to other states during the period of readjustment.
3. The uprooting of all German economic interests and control in allied and associated countries, in the territory of Germany's allies, and in Asia and Africa.
4. The revival of such pre-war treaties and international conventions as the victors desire to have continued with Germany as a party.

Chaps. i, ii, iv

Germany undertakes not to discriminate in any way whatever against import or export trade with allied or associated states, or against their shipping, or against their nationals resident in Germany. Germany undertakes to protect the manufactured goods of the Allied and Associated Powers "from all forms of unfair competition in commercial transactions."

Art. 274

Art. 268

For five years natural and manufactured products of Alsace-Lorraine, up to the pre-war average amounts, are to be admitted to Germany free of duty. Textiles sent from Germany to be finished in Alsace-Lorraine are for this period to be exported from Germany and reimported without duty. For three years natural and manufactured products of the parts of Poland formerly German are to be admitted to Germany without duty.

For six months after the Treaty comes into force, Germany may not increase the 1914 tariff rates, and for thirty months longer certain schedules may not be raised. A special customs régime may be applied by the Allies to the occupied Rhine provinces if thought necessary to safeguard the economic interests of these territories.

The Germans comment with bitterness upon the fact that their enemies do not promise not to discriminate against German trade or shipping or nationals resident in their countries. What, it is asked, has become of the third of the Fourteen Points, "the removal, so far as possible, of all eco-

nomic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance"? It is true that the Germans are not to be allowed to join the League of Nations as yet, but that is only an added grievance.

The second section lists numerous international treaties and conventions, such as those dealing with the Postal Union, the suppression of the white-slave traffic, and the like. These, and no others, are to be revived. Each of the Allied and Associated Powers may decide which of the treaties between itself and Germany is to be revived, so far as they do not conflict with the present Treaty. German treaties with Turkey, Austria, Hungary, or Bulgaria since August 1, 1914, are abrogated, and all treaties whatever with Rumania and with the Russian Empire or states formed from it are also abrogated. In part these provisions are intended to bring about the resumption of normal international intercourse; in part however they are designed to deprive Germany of all political and economic control in the territory of her former allies and in Russia.

For the settlement of debts between the citizens of opposing powers, the payment of which was suspended by the war, two plans are outlined. Any of the Allied and Associated Powers within a month after its ratification of the Treaty may give notice that it will settle such debts through clearing-houses, one established by itself, and one in Germany. In this case

Sec. III

Art. 296 (c)

each of the opposing powers guarantees the payment of debts due from its nationals to the subjects of the other state. "The sums due to the nationals of one of the high contracting parties by the nationals of an opposing state will be debited to the clearing office of the country of the debtor, and paid to the creditor by the clearing office of the creditor."

The representatives of the United States did not wish to adopt this plan, so that it was made optional.¹

Art. 298,
Annex, 4

Section IV deals in the most sweeping fashion with private property, rights, and interests in an enemy country. In the first place, the property of allied and associated nationals which has been affected by exceptional war measures in Germany, such as sequestration or liquidation, is to be restored to the owners, with damages for any injuries. On the other hand, all such exceptional measures against German property are confirmed, and the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to complete the liquidation of German interests. "All property, rights, and interests of German nationals within the territory of any Allied or Associated Power and the net proceeds of their sale, liquidation or other dealing therewith may be charged by that . . . Power in the first place with payment of amounts due in respect of claims by the nationals of that . . . Power with regard to their property, rights, and interests, including companies and associations in which they

¹ *Senate Hearings*, pp. 14 ff.

are interested in German territory, or debts owing to them by German nationals, and with payment of claims growing out of acts committed by the German government or by any German authorities since July 31, 1914, and before that Allied or Associated Power entered into the war." These amounts may also be used to satisfy claims as to private property in other enemy territory not otherwise satisfied. This latter provision makes German private property available to compensate for allied and associated losses of private property in Austria, Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. So far as the United States is concerned these provisions validate the action taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act by the Alien Property Custodian. The proceeds of German-owned property in this country can be used, if Congress so desires, and provides for paying damages to American-owned property in Germany, or to pay amounts owed to Americans by Germans, or to settle such claims as those arising from the sinking of the "Lusitania."

The owners of all this German private property are referred to their own government, which undertakes to compensate them. Art. 297 (i)

Contracts between enemies are to be regarded as dissolved as from the time when they became enemies; but the Allies reserve the right to make exceptions within six months. This article, together with the Annex covering special forms of contract, such as insurance, is not to apply to the United States, Sec. V,
Art. 299

Brazil, or Japan, where the constitution and laws do not permit the impairment of contracts.

Disputed matters as to debts and claims to property rights are to be referred to a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal which each power is to establish with Germany. Of the three members, each government chooses one; the president is chosen by agreement, or appointed from some neutral nation by the Council of the League of Nations.

Sec. VII

Unless otherwise provided in the Treaty, and subject to special measures taken during the war, "rights of industrial, literary, and artistic property" are restored to all their owners. Nevertheless, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right, except as to trade-marks, to impose such limitations and conditions on the working or control of German rights of this character "as may be considered necessary for national defense, or in the public interest, or for assuring the fair treatment by Germany of the rights of industrial, literary, and artistic property held in German territory by its nationals, or for securing the due fulfilment of all the obligations undertaken by Germany in the present Treaty."

Sec. VIII

Germany agrees to transfer to any power to which territory is ceded, or given as a mandatory, a proportional part of the reserves accumulated for the payment of social or state insurance in such territory. These funds must be used for this purpose only.

PART XI

AERIAL NAVIGATION

The aircraft of Allied and Associated Powers are to have full liberty of passage and landing in Germany, but subject to any regulations governing German aircraft. These obligations remain in force until 1923, unless Germany is sooner admitted to the League, or allowed to adhere to the Aerial Navigation Convention concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers.

PART XII

PORTS, WATERWAYS, AND RAILWAYS

Germany is required in general terms to grant freedom of transit, without discrimination in charges or service or otherwise, to persons, goods, vessels, railway carriages, freight cars, and mails going between any Allied and Associated Powers. Germany agrees not to favor by surtax or bounties imports or exports through German ports. Sec. I

“The nationals of any of the Allied and Associated Powers as well as their vessels and property shall enjoy in all German ports and on the inland navigation routes of Germany the same treatment in all respects as German nationals, vessels and property.” Here again the chief grievance is the lack of reciprocity. Sec. II,
Art. 327

Germany is required to continue the free zones in her ports, in which goods may be landed and re-exported without going through the German customs. Art. 328

Since Germany had established these before the war for her own convenience, there can be no objection to continuing them.

Chapters iii and iv dealing with waterways are of great interest and importance. Four great rivers, with all navigable parts of the systems which naturally provide more than one state with access to the sea, are declared international. These are the Elbe from its confluence with the Moldau; the Moldau from Prague; the Oder from its confluence with the Oppa; the Niemen from Grodno; and the Danube from Ulm. On these waterways, including parallel canals, and a Rhine-Danube canal if one is built, "the nationals, property, and flags of all powers shall be treated on a footing of perfect equality." No dues may be levied except reasonable port charges. A convention is to be drawn up by the Allied and Associated Powers, and approved by the League of Nations, fixing the details of administration. To this Germany promises assent. Germany is to cede to the Allied and Associated Powers a portion of her tugs and vessels on the rivers, the number to be determined by arbitrators appointed by the United States, "due regard being had to the legitimate needs of the parties concerned." The Elbe is to be under a Commission comprising four representatives of the German states bordering on the river, two representatives of the Czecho-Slovak State, and one each representing Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium. The Oder Commission is to be made up of three

Prussian representatives, and one each from Poland, the Czecho-Slovak State, Great Britain, France, Denmark, and Sweden. On a request to the League of Nations from any riparian state, the Niemen is to be placed under a Commission composed of one representative of each riparian state, and three representatives of other states specified by the League. Art. 342

The Danube Commission reassumes its powers, although "as a provisional measure, only representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Rumania shall constitute this Commission." For the Upper Danube, beyond the point where the existing Commission has control, a new Commission is created, made up of two representatives of each German riparian state, one from each of the other riparian states, and one representative of each non-riparian state in future represented on the Danube Commission. Art. 347

For the Rhine and the Moselle, the Convention of Mannheim of 1868 is revived with modifications. In particular the Central Commission is enlarged to consist of two representatives each from the Netherlands, Switzerland, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium, four representatives of the German riparian states, and four of France, who in addition nominates the president. Germany cedes to France a number of tugs and vessels and the German port facilities in Rotterdam, their value to be credited as reparation, Germany paying the owners. France receives the right to

take water from the Rhine for canals, and the exclusive right to power derived from "works of regulation" on the river, on paying Germany half the value of the power. In neither case is navigability to be interfered with. Germany will not object if the Commission extends its jurisdiction, subject to the consent of Switzerland and Luxemburg.

Chap. v

"In the ports of Hamburg and Stettin, Germany shall lease to the Czecho-Slovak State, for a period of ninety-nine years, areas which shall be placed under the general régime of free zones and shall be used for the direct transit of goods coming from or going to that state." This is to facilitate access to the sea for independent Bohemia.

At first sight the provisions dealing with the rivers seem to some to be very radical, and an unwarranted interference with German sovereignty. There are, however, excellent reasons for them, and they by no means represent an entirely new departure.

Traffic on European rivers is much more important relatively than in the United States. Where rivers flow through, or between, several states it long ago became apparent that practical and equitable considerations demanded some modification of doctrines of territorial sovereignty over such navigable waterways. By the Treaty of Vienna, 1815, it was provided that navigation on all such rivers "from the point where each of them becomes navigable to its mouth shall be entirely free, and shall not, in respect to commerce, be prohibited to anyone; it is under-

stood, however, that one will conform to the regulations relative to the police of this navigation. These regulations shall be uniform for all and as favorable as possible to the commerce of all nations.”¹ Numerous conventions have been drawn up, and commissions created, to regulate commerce on the great international rivers, notably the Rhine. The commissions, however, have represented only the states bordering on the river, and their acts have been subject to confirmation by the different states.

After the Crimean War, the Treaty of Paris applied the principle of the Treaty of Vienna to the Lower Danube, and set up a European Commission to improve the navigability of the river and to regulate commerce. The Commission was made up of one representative from Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey. It was expected that later a commission composed entirely of representatives of the riparian states would succeed it, but it was found necessary to continue the original plan. Subsequent conventions and treaties extended the jurisdiction of the Commission, and a Rumanian representative was added. The work of this Commission has been a decided success, and it undoubtedly furnished the suggestion for the Treaty of Versailles.

The essential difference between the Danube Commission and the old Rhine Commission is that the former contained representatives of the great

¹ Article 109; quoted in Sayre, *Experiments in International Administration*, p. 400.

powers whose territory is not touched by the river, while the latter did not. All that the Treaty of Versailles does, therefore, is to change the type of commission controlling the Rhine by the addition of members representing Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy. France, by regaining Alsace-Lorraine, becomes again a riparian state on the Rhine. In view of the success of the Danube Commission, and looking forward to increased international co-operation through a League of Nations, the plan seems reasonable and promising.

Sec. III

The third section deals with railway traffic, and amplifies the general provisions for equality of treatment for traffic going into or through Germany. The various Berne conventions covering through-freight traffic are revived, but Germany agrees to accept a new convention if it is concluded within five years. Germany agrees to co-operate in establishing through-ticket services and through express trains.

Disputes under any of the articles on ports, waterways, and railways are to be settled as provided by the League of Nations. The League may recommend the revision of any articles relating to a permanent administrative régime, and after five years the Council of the League may modify a number of the general provisions.

Sec. VI

The Kiel Canal is to be open to merchant and war vessels of all nations at peace with Germany on equal terms, without discrimination in favor of German ships. Tolls may be levied only for the maintenance of the canal. The decision to leave the canal under

German control was reached only after some hesitation. There were various suggestions for internationalizing the canal, or for making it the boundary between Germany and Denmark. Since Denmark did not wish this, and since the limitation of the German navy and the destruction of the neighboring fortifications on the Baltic made the canal of little value from a strategic point of view, the Allies felt that it was unnecessary and unwise to take it over—one instance, at least, of moderation.

PART XIII

LABOR

The part of the Treaty dealing with labor and its conditions and providing for an international labor conference is in its possibilities one of the most important. At a time when the foundations of the whole existing order were being shaken by bolshevism, when in every Allied country and the United States economic unrest was causing the gravest anxiety, the Conference could not avoid taking some action intended to conciliate labor and looking forward to the removal of the causes of discontent. Although the radical groups had little or no faith that anything good could come out of Versailles, the representatives of the organized labor unions were deeply interested. The Peace Conference appointed a commission to consider a labor program. In addition to the five great powers, Belgium, Cuba, Poland, and the Czecho-Slovak Republic were represented. Samuel

Gompers was chairman, the other American delegate being A. N. Hurley. One of the British representatives was G. N. Barnes, the labor member of the War Cabinet. The Commission agreed on a general declaration of principles regarding the rights of workers and on a plan of organization which included an International Labor Conference and a permanent International Labor Office. Their report is incorporated in this part of the Treaty.

In drawing up the provisions for the Labor Conference, two points in particular caused much discussion, the number and voting power of the delegates and the method by which their decisions should be given effect in the various countries. It was agreed that the governments, the workers, and the employers should be represented by delegates. The French, American, Italian, and Cuban members of the Commission were in favor of giving the three parties equal voting power. On the other hand it was urged that unless the government delegates agreed to any measure, it would have a poor chance of being approved and carried out by the several states.¹ It was finally agreed that each state should appoint four delegates, two to represent the government, one to represent labor, and one to represent the employers. The representatives vote as individuals. This is a departure from the accepted rule in international conferences, the object being to allow the

¹ Introduction to the Commission Report, in *New York Times' Current History*, June, 1919, p. 516.

labor representatives of the different delegations, as well as the employers, to vote together. There is a chance therefore for divisions along group as well as national lines.

While the Commission hoped that in the course of time the Labor Conference might develop into "a truly legislative international assembly," they realized that at the present this was impossible. At first it was suggested that conventions approved by two-thirds of the Conference should be binding on each state unless the national legislature within a year expressed its disapproval. The French and Italian members of the Commission wished to have each state bound whether its legislature approved or not, subject to an appeal to the Council of the League. It was realized, however, that any infringement on the sovereign right of each state to legislate for its own labor conditions would only result in wrecking the whole plan, and perhaps the League itself. The compromise finally incorporated in the Treaty provides that draft conventions, or recommendations, passed by a two-thirds vote of the Labor Conference must be submitted to the legislatures of the member states for action within a year. In the case of federal states, where the power of the federal government to enter into labor conventions is limited, all actions have merely the force of recommendations. In the case of the United States, our obligations under the Treaty would be first to submit to Congress for its action any proposed international convention, or

recommendation, which under our Constitution it is empowered to deal with. Any proposals which concern matters reserved to the states must be referred to the state legislatures, which are entirely free to accept, modify, or reject them.

There is no possible way of compelling a government, federal or state, to enact into law any measure of the Conference. In case, however, that a nation has formally ratified a convention and then does not carry out its undertakings, complaint may be made to the governing body of the Labor Office, which may ask the offending government to explain, and may publish all the correspondence. It is expected that this appeal to public opinion will be effective. In case one member government complains that another member is not carrying out its agreements, the governing body of the Labor Office may appoint a Commission of Inquiry which is to report with recommendations, including an indication of economic measures which other governments would be justified in taking toward the offending state. The matter may still be taken before the Permanent Court of International Justice for a decision and recommendations. These provisions are somewhat elaborate, and it is not expected that they will be often invoked. They detract nothing from the sovereignty of any member state and expose it to no more danger of economic reprisals than at present, when any government may take action against a state which it feels is injuring it by not carrying out its agreements.

The Conference is to meet at least once a year, ordinarily at the seat of the League. It decides for itself what subjects it is to consider.

There is to be established as a part of the organization of the League an International Labor Office, under a governing body of twenty-four. Twelve members are appointed by governments, eight appointed by the members which are "of chief industrial importance," four by the delegates at the Conference of the other governments. The employers' delegates at the Conference nominate six members of the governing body, and the labor delegates the remaining six. The Labor Office has a staff, and concerns itself chiefly with collecting and distributing information on subjects connected with industrial life and labor, and such other subjects as the Conference may refer to it.

The general principles included in this part of the Treaty are of such importance that they should be quoted:

The League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice. . . . Conditions of labor exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled. . . .

Preamble

The High Contracting Parties recognizing that the well-being, physical, moral and intellectual, of industrial wage-earners is of supreme international importance, have framed, in order to further this great end, the permanent machinery provided for in Section I and associated with that of the League of Nations. They recognise that differences of climate, habits and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial

Art. 427

tradition, make strict uniformity in the conditions of labour difficult of immediate attainment. But, holding as they do, that labour should not be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there are methods and principles for regulating labour conditions which all industrial communities should endeavour to apply, so far as their special circumstances will permit. Among these methods and principles, the following seem to the High Contracting Parties to be of special and urgent importance: *First*—The guiding principle above enunciated that labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce. *Second*—The right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers. *Third*—The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country. *Fourth*—The adoption of an eight hours day or a forty-eight hours week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been attained. *Fifth*—The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable. *Sixth*—The abolition of child labour and the imposition of such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development. *Seventh*—The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value. *Eighth*—The standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labour should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein. *Ninth*—Each State should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed.

Without claiming that these methods and principles are either complete or final, the High Contracting Parties are of opinion that they are well fitted to guide the policy of the League of Nations; and that, if adopted by the industrial communities who are members of the League, and safeguarded

in practice by an adequate system of such inspection, they will confer lasting benefits upon the wage-earners of the world.

As usual, the radicals scoff at these provisions in the Treaty, professing to believe that the declarations are empty generalities which will not be followed by the governments concerned. Many employers rather hope they are right. Many moderate labor leaders and most liberals rather hope that much good will result, and that these principles may more and more be embodied in adequate legislation.

In accordance with the terms of the Treaty, the first International Labor Conference met in Washington from October 29 to November 29, 1919. The United States could be represented only informally. German and Austrian delegates were appointed but did not arrive. It was the feeling of the Conference, however, that they should be admitted to the next meeting, and that Germany should be one of the eight industrial powers entitled to representation on the governing body of the Labor Office. The meetings of the Conference attracted comparatively little attention. They drew up six draft conventions and six recommendations, dealing with hours of work, night work for women, employment of children, and occupational poisoning and diseases.

The Senate of the United States voted to withhold assent from the entire Labor section of the Treaty and to take no part whatever in the International Labor Conference.¹

¹ McCumber Reservation, November 18, 1919.

PART XIV

GUARANTEES

Arts. 428-32

As a guarantee for the execution of the Treaty by Germany, the Allied and Associated Powers will continue for fifteen years to occupy the territory west of the Rhine and the bridgeheads as provided by the armistice. If the conditions are carried out by Germany, part of the territory will be evacuated after five years, more at the end of ten. If Germany completely complies with all the terms of the Treaty, the evacuation will take place immediately. The German peace delegates protested against this occupation as unnecessary, and as detrimental to the economic recovery of Germany. While the Allies would not change the Treaty, they assured the Germans that a genuine and prompt compliance with the other provisions would result in a voluntary modification of the terms of occupation.

The Baltic provinces of Russia, which had been occupied by German troops, were to be evacuated when the Allies required it. The situation in these regions was very confused, with Lettish and Esthonian forces trying to maintain independence, Bolsheviki attacking, anti-soviet armies operating supposedly in the interest of a constitutional United States of Russia, German forces renouncing the control of Berlin and operating independently, Allied commissions trying to counteract German influences and to organize an attack on Petrograd, and the British

navy bombarding the Bolshevik warships and forts in the Gulf of Finland. When the Allies finally required Berlin to withdraw the remaining German troops considerable difficulty was experienced in bringing this about.

PART XV

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

The most important of the miscellaneous provisions which conclude the Treaty is the article requiring Germany to agree in advance to any treaties or conventions which the Allied and Associated Powers may conclude with Germany's former allies. In particular Germany is to recognize the territorial arrangements. Other clauses concern matters to be taken up with Switzerland.

Art. 434

Where German religious missions were operating in Allied territory, or territory to be under Allied control, the property is to continue to be devoted to missionary purposes. It is, however, to be handed over to trustees appointed by the respective Allied governments. The Allies, "while continuing to maintain full control as to the individuals by whom the missions are conducted, will safeguard the interests of such missions." This clause was regarded as necessary in view of the transfer of the German colonial possessions, in which there were numerous missionary enterprises. It was felt that these must not be in a position to stir up political agitation among the native population.

Art. 438

The last article of the Treaty forces Germany to recognize all decrees of allied and associated prize courts, but gives the right to the Allies to examine the proceedings of German prize courts.

The Treaty becomes effective when Germany and three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers exchange ratifications. "In other respects the Treaty will enter into force for each Power at the date of the deposit of its ratification."

The Treaty of Versailles was signed by plenipotentiaries in behalf of the various governments; but before it could come into operation it had to be ratified, and the ratifications had to be formally exchanged.

Under the British Constitution, the consent of Parliament is not required for treaties with foreign powers. In order to carry out some of the terms of the Treaty with Germany, however, an act of Parliament was necessary, and a bill was accordingly introduced. In effect this meant that the whole Treaty was before the representatives of the people, and it is probable that in the future this precedent will be followed, and that Parliament will thereby gain a greater degree of control over foreign policy. While the debates in the House of Commons brought out some opposition to the Treaty, chiefly from the Labor and Independent Liberal members, it was ratified by a large majority July 21. By another constitutional departure the Treaty was also laid before the legislatures of the four Dominions which had signed it, and was ratified by all of them by the

middle of September. On October 10 the King-Emperor signed the act of ratification for the British Empire.

In France, after a somewhat more prolonged debate, both houses of the Assembly ratified the Treaty, and the act was signed by the President October 14. In Italy and Japan the treaty-making power is by the constitution vested in the sovereign, and the necessity of submitting it to the legislature was thus avoided. Both these rulers ratified the Treaty in October. Poland had ratified on July 21, and Belgium in August. On July 9 the German National Assembly at Weimar had ratified the Treaty by a vote of 208 to 115. A number of the lesser Allied and Associated Powers also ratified before the end of the year.

Although the Treaty might have been put in operation in October, the exchange of ratifications with the Germans was delayed in the hope that the Senate of the United States would agree before long. When on November 19 the Senate voted 55 to 39 to reject the resolution of ratification with the Lodge amendments,¹ and 53 to 38 to reject unconditional ratification, it was decided to proceed without waiting for the United States. There was, however, a further delay caused by the demand that the Germans sign an additional protocol covering violations of the armistice terms. The Germans objected to surrendering 400,000 tons of dredges, floating docks,

¹That is, the 55 votes for ratification fell short of the necessary two-thirds.

etc., as reparation for the sinking of their fleet in Scapa Flow. They also refused to admit the right of the Allies to enforce the Treaty by military action. Finally the Allies agreed to reduce their demands to 275,000 tons, and to eliminate mention of enforcing the Treaty except as provided in the Treaty itself. Ratifications were accordingly exchanged on January 10 at Paris. On January 16 the League of Nations was formally inaugurated. The Great War was at last over, except for the United States.

CHAPTER VI

THE SUPPLEMENTARY TREATIES

I. THE TREATY WITH POLAND

When the Kingdom of Poland was divided up between Russia, Prussia, and Austria toward the end of the eighteenth century, Polish national sentiment did not die. On the contrary, the attempts to stamp it out during the nineteenth century made it stronger and more united than ever, and in all the real essentials of nationality the Poles became more of a nation after they had lost political independence than they had been before. In spite of official denials that there was any longer a "Polish question" it refused to be settled. One of the bonds between the autocracies of Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg was fear of a resurrected Poland. At the outbreak of the Great War, Russia announced that with victory Prussian Posen and Austrian Galicia would be added to Russian Poland to form a united and autonomous kingdom, but with the Czar as its head. But in the meantime no move was made to grant autonomy to Russian Poland, with the result that many Poles put no confidence in the Czar's promises. In times past the Czar had been lavish with promises in emergencies and callous in breaking them when the danger was over. The Central Powers made their bid for Polish support by promising an independent

Poland, and after the conquest of Russian Poland they even proclaimed the revival of an independent kingdom. Their immediate purpose was to raise a Polish army to fight on their side. It was evident, however, that in some form or other they intended to maintain control. It was further clear that Prussia was not going to permit Posen to be made a part of the new state; there was even talk of "rectification" of the frontiers which would have increased Prussian territory. The Austrians were unwilling to promise that Galicia should be incorporated until they could be assured that Austria would have some control over the new state. No final settlement of the question had been reached between Berlin and Vienna when revolution and the fortune of war removed the matter from their control.

The Allies had been in favor of a reunited Poland, though until 1917 they had been compelled to acquiesce in the Russian proposals that it should be under the suzerainty of the Czar. In this they were moved not only by the abstract desire to see an ancient wrong redressed, but also by the practical advantage to be gained by the erection of a new barrier against German and Austrian ambition.

When the unbelievable had actually happened, when the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian empires lay helpless, the Polish people, after some confusion, united to form a provisional government. There were sharp party differences to adjust, and divergencies of policy to reconcile; but enough harmony

and order were established to permit the recognition of the new Poland and its admission to the Peace Conference.

In addition to the urgent economic problems of the reform of the land system and the reorganization of industry, Poland was at once involved in a number of border wars, and in difficulties with dissatisfied minorities within. The government, backed by an influential and aggressive element of public opinion, tried to secure immediate possession of as much of the territory of the old kingdom as possible. There was fighting with the Prussians in Posen, and with the Czecho-Slovaks over the coal fields of Teschen. There was a fierce little war with the Ruthenians over eastern Galicia. On the east Lithuanian and White Russian territory was claimed, decidedly against the wishes of a considerable portion of the population. And in this area the Polish forces clashed with the Red Army of bolshevist Russia.

The Peace Conference assumed the right to fix all the boundaries of Poland. Those with Germany are settled by the Treaty of Versailles. On the south the old boundary of Galicia will remain, with the area around Teschen still unsettled. This little district, which Lloyd George admitted he had never heard of until Poles and Bohemians went to war over it, furnishes one of the most puzzling problems in Central Europe. Historically it belongs to Bohemia, and its coal fields are claimed as relatively more important to Bohemia than to Poland. It is needed

to keep an important railroad connection with the Slovak portion of the new state. On the other hand, a considerable portion of the inhabitants are Polish-speaking, or Germans. The Conference supervised the production and distribution of the coal, leaving the political settlement until later.

On the east there arises the question of Galicia¹ and the boundary toward the former Russian Empire. In this direction nothing could be settled until some order emerged from the Russian chaos. While the Allies, and particularly France, favored a strong Poland as a barrier against bolshevism and against Germany, they also feared lest the imperialism which entered into the Polish aspirations might lead to the inclusion of border provinces which were not properly Polish in sentiment. This they desired to avoid in the interest of future peace.

Art. 87

By signing the Treaty of Versailles, Poland agreed that "the boundaries of Poland not laid down in the present Treaty will be subsequently determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers." Poland also agreed to incorporate in a Treaty with these powers "such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said Powers to protect the interests of the inhabitants of Poland who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion," and provisions as to commerce.

This Treaty with Poland was signed at the same time as that with Germany. Its terms had been dis-

¹ See below, p. 215.

cussed for some months, and Poland had been given an opportunity to make suggestions. In a long letter¹ transmitting the text to the Polish government, June 24, Premier Clémenceau in behalf of the Conference explained its purpose. He pointed out that it did not constitute a new departure. "It has for long been the established procedure of the public law of Europe that when a state is created, or even when large accessions of territory are made to an established state, the joint and formal recognition by the great powers should be accompanied by the requirement that such state should, in the form of a binding international convention, undertake to comply with certain principles of government." In particular the Balkan states in 1878 had been required to recognize the principle of religious liberty. The powers feel it is their duty not to depart from this precedent. They also feel it is their right to do so, since it was through their efforts in the war, and their good will at the Conference, that Poland has recovered its liberty at all. The new international régime of the League of Nations makes it possible and desirable to place these guarantees under a new sanction. The particular circumstances attending the creation of the new Poland make it necessary to frame the guarantees in somewhat different terms from those of earlier conventions, but the principle involved is the same. Nothing is asked of Poland which is not supposed to be elementary in a modern

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, August, 1919, p. 275.

free state, and it is recognized that Poland has already freely expressed the intention of following these cardinal principles. Nevertheless it is hoped that their formal statement will go far toward reconciling minorities to their new status.

The Treaty between Poland and the five great powers represents the attempt to settle one of the most disturbing questions in Europe, that of racial, linguistic, religious, or nationalistic minorities within a state. The solution proposed is the incorporation of minimum guarantees in the fundamental law of individual states, with the League of Nations empowered to see that they are observed. Since the Polish Treaty was designed as a model to be followed for Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, the Balkan states, and presumably the new states that arise from the former Russian Empire, its terms are of great interest and importance.

Art. 1 Poland agrees that seven articles of the Treaty shall be recognized as fundamental, not to be affected by any Polish law or action. In the first place,

Art. 2 "Poland undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race, or religion. All inhabitants of Poland shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion, or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals."

This is as far as any state goes. There is of course room for differences of opinion as to what does

endanger public order and morals. We ourselves suppress Mormon polygamy and do not allow believers in mental healing to handle our smallpox epidemics. Poland must have liberty to determine in the first instance what practices it will not permit under the guise of religion.

All persons habitually resident within the boundaries of the new Poland become Polish nationals. Persons over eighteen may choose any other nationality which may be open to them; but within a year they must remove to the country of which they have chosen to become citizens. They may retain ownership of their immovable property and carry with them without export duty their movable property. Persons of German, Austrian, Hungarian, or Russian nationality born in territory now Polish, of parents habitually resident there, become Polish citizens even if they are not now residents. Within two years they may declare that they abandon this Polish nationality. Persons born in Poland who are not born nationals of another state become Polish. Arts. 3-6

All subjects of Poland are to be equal before the law. Race, language, or religion shall not affect civil or political rights, or admission to public employments, functions, or honors, or the exercise of professions or industries. "No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Polish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in the press, or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings. Notwithstanding any establishment by Art. 7

the Polish government of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Polish nationals of non-Polish speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts."

Art. 8 Racial, language, and religious minorities are to enjoy equal treatment and security in law with the majority, in particular having the right to establish at their own expense schools and other institutions, using their own language and exercising their own religion therein.

The foregoing provisions, which are the ones to be regarded as fundamental, were framed in the light of actual experience under Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Hungary. They are intended to forestall the numerous ingenious methods by which the attempt was made to coerce minorities, and to assimilate them to the dominant group. To persons in the United States or France or England these rights seem elementary, and their denial would be an outrage on the liberty of the individual. It might be expected that the Poles, having suffered from attempts to Germanize or Russianize them, would be the first to recognize not only the injustice but the futility of such efforts, and it is to be hoped that such will prove to be the case. If the Poles, as they assert, have no intention of coercing their minorities, these restrictions cannot prove irksome. If, however, in their zeal to consolidate Polish national sentiment they attempt unduly to hasten the natural processes of assimilation they may profitably be reminded of these solemn agreements.

Two additional articles deal with the vexed question of education. It is provided that in districts where a considerable proportion use some other than the Polish language there shall be adequate facilities for primary instruction in that other language. "This provision shall not prevent the Polish government from making the teaching of the Polish language obligatory in the said schools." Where there are considerable racial, religious, or linguistic minorities, "these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the state, municipal, or other budgets, for educational, religious, or charitable purposes." So far as Germans are concerned, these provisions apply only in the districts which were German in 1914. Jewish committees, subject to the general control of the state, will provide for the distribution of the proportional share of public funds set aside for Jewish schools.

Art. 9

Art. 10

These educational arrangements are on a somewhat different status from the others. In so far as they provide for the support of private schools out of public funds they do not at first appeal to American opinion. While we permit any privately supported schools, notably the Roman Catholic parochial system, to teach any religion, in any language, we are opposed on principle to giving them any support from public funds. In some country districts a considerable part of the instruction in the elementary public schools was given in some other language than

English. When the war brought this fact to the attention of the public, it was regarded with distinct disfavor. Our point of view is that we do not want permanent communities in this country that are not able and willing to speak our language.

But, it is objected, the Poles do not desire such minorities either. Why should they be forced to make concessions to them which we will not make? The answer is comparatively simple. The minority groups came to this country voluntarily, presumably knowing what our institutions are, and by implication accepting them. If they find them unsatisfactory, they may go elsewhere. In Central Europe, on the other hand, the minorities are in few instances recent and voluntary immigrants. They have been settled in their districts for centuries. Many of them have been detached from the main body of their fellows by political events which they could not control. By the present Treaty many of them are given a citizenship which they do not desire. In order to reconcile them to the situation it is necessary, as a measure of practical statesmanship, to grant them privileges which are entirely unnecessary in the United States. In the course of time it may be possible to modify the arrangements. But in the interest of good feeling the minorities should be treated generously.

One of the most difficult minority problems in Poland is that connected with the Jews. Here as elsewhere in Europe their unpopularity is due not so much to genuinely religious considerations as to

their resistance to the various nationalizing processes, and to their economic activities. Of late they have all suffered because of the bolshevistic tendencies of a few of them. During the last year there have been disquieting reports of massacres and persecutions of the Jews in Poland. Influential Jews in England, France, and the United States have appealed to the Conference to protect the three million Jews of Poland. While the stories of outrages have proved somewhat exaggerated, it is still true that the Jews need some special guarantees. Properly enough, the Poles have refused to recognize the Jewish population as constituting a state within the state and have rejected the demand made by some that they be allowed to organize their own militia for self-defense. But to the general guarantees for all the minorities one other was added, providing that Jews should not be compelled to violate their Sabbath except as incidental to military service. No elections or registrations are to be held on Saturday. Art. 11

Poland is reported to have placed the Jews under a disadvantage by enforcing a Sunday closing law. Since they cannot work on Saturday, their competitors have a day's advantage. Nothing in the Treaty forbids this, and a great many of our own state laws do the same thing.

"Poland agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern, and shall be

placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the consent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations." No one of the five great powers will withhold assent to modifications approved by the majority of the Council.

Poland agrees that any member of the League may bring to the attention of the Council an infraction, or threatened infraction, of these obligations, whereupon the Council may take any action it thinks effective and proper.

Differences between Poland and any member of the League arising out of these articles are to be settled as provided by the Covenant of the League.

The second part of the Treaty deals with the establishment of diplomatic relations, equality of treatment for commerce, freedom of transit, and Poland's adherence to various international conventions. Poland agrees to apply to the Vistula River and its main tributaries the régime applicable to international waterways set forth in the Treaty with Germany. Most of the provisions as to commerce and transit are reciprocal as between Poland and the other signatories. In conclusion, Poland agrees to assume such portion of the Russian debt as may be assigned under a special convention to be drawn up later. The obligation is not limited to the pre-war debt.

II. THE DEFENSIVE ALLIANCES

At the same time with the Treaty of Versailles and the Polish Treaty, there were signed two other

treaties of great importance. These were the defensive alliances between France and England and between France and the United States. In settling the status of the left bank of the Rhine and in discussing the form of the League of Nations, France had been desperately anxious to provide against any possibility of another German attack. In view of the disarmament of Germany, the demilitarization of the Rhine frontier, and the presence of the Allied Army of Occupation, the other nations did not regard this danger as very great. They were unwilling to agree either to the detachment of the Rhine provinces, or their permanent occupation by France. Neither was it regarded as feasible to have the League of Nations provided with a standing army and a general staff. They sympathized, however, with the French feeling on the subject, and in order to persuade the French representatives to recede from some of their extreme positions Great Britain and the United States agreed to sign defensive treaties with the French Republic. These treaties must be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for approval as not inconsistent with the Covenant. The terms are simple. The articles of the Treaty of Versailles dealing with the fortification of the Rhine zone are set forth, and it is provided that "in case these stipulations should not assure immediately to France appropriate security, the United States of America shall be bound to come immediately to her aid in case of any unprovoked

act of aggression directed against her by Germany." The British Treaty is almost identical in terms, except that "agrees" is used instead of "shall be bound." The British Dominions are not bound to send assistance to France unless their legislatures accept the Treaty. Here again is an indication of the new constitutional procedure in the British Empire by which the Dominions attain a real voice in the control of foreign policy. Equally significant is the provision that "the present Treaty shall, before ratification by his majesty, be submitted to parliament for approval." Liberal opinion welcomed this as an indication that in the future the House of Commons is to have a more genuine control over foreign affairs than has been exercised in the past.

Parliament ratified the Treaty without difficulty. Neither treaty becomes effective, however, until both have been ratified, and the United States Senate did not consider it at all while the Treaty with Germany was under discussion. The whole idea of these treaties has been criticized as exhibiting distrust of the efficacy of the League of Nations, and as tending to draw the United States into European entanglements. President Wilson defends the treaties, saying that they simply imply that "two governments who wish to be members of the League of Nations ask leave of the Council of the League to be permitted to go to the assistance of a friend whose situation has been found to be one of peculiar peril, without awaiting the advice of the League to act."¹

¹ The text of these Supplementary Treaties is given in *New York Times' Current History*, August, 1919.

CHAPTER VII

THE AUSTRIAN SETTLEMENT

The signing of the Treaty of Versailles seemed to many to have ended the war. Tension relaxed. President Wilson sailed for home, and in every country more attention was given to pressing internal problems. Nevertheless some of the most important and perplexing tasks of the Conference still remained to be accomplished. Peace had yet to be made with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

The preliminary draft of the Austrian Treaty had been presented to the enemy delegates on June 2. The terms were regarded in Vienna as a "death sentence," and the government strove desperately to secure some amelioration. The remnant of the Austrian Empire, however, which constituted the republic with which the Allies were dealing was bankrupt, starving, and threatened with revolution, and it was in no position to resist. The attitude of the Austrian negotiators was more conciliatory than that of the Germans had been, and as a result of the exchange of notes during July and August some concessions were made by the Allies. France, however, remained firm in refusing to permit a union with Germany.

The Allies pointed out to the Austrian Germans their responsibility in forcing the war, and insisted that the plight in which they now found themselves

was the natural and inevitable outcome of their prolonged "policy of ascendancy" within the old empire. With bitterness of spirit the Austrian Assembly bowed to the inevitable, and voted to accept the Treaty, though they protested particularly at the detachment of the Germans of Bohemia and the Tyrol, and at the prohibition of union with Germany, which they asserted violated the terms of the armistice. They also declared that the reparation clauses were impossible of fulfilment. On September 10 the Treaty was signed at St. Germain.

By joining in this act, China became a member of the League of Nations. Rumania refused at the time to sign the Treaty, because of its references to future agreements guaranteeing the rights of minorities. On December 9, after considerable discussion, Rumania agreed to the wishes of the Allies and the next day signed the Treaties with Austria and Bulgaria, and the special treaty dealing with minorities within Rumania. The Jugo-Slavs also withheld their signature from the Treaty with Austria.

THE TREATY OF ST. GERMAIN

The Treaty of St. Germain with the Republic of Austria is modeled on the Treaty of Versailles, with only such changes as circumstances made necessary. Clauses, sections, and even whole parts are repeated without changing a word. The Covenant of the League of Nations is made Part I. Like Germany, Austria is for the present excluded from the League, and admission is made conditional on good behavior.

Part II fixes in detail the boundaries of the new state. With Switzerland and Germany they are unchanged, but losses to the north and south reduce its area from over 115,000 square miles to about 6,000 and its population from 30,000,000 to something over 6,000,000. Broadly speaking there remains the German-speaking central district of the former empire, with three exceptions.

1. On the east the Odenburg region of Hungary, with several hundred thousand Germans, is added.

2. On the south about a quarter of a million German-speaking people are ceded to Italy with the southern Tyrol. This is in order to give Italy a strategic frontier. On the basis of self-determination it is utterly unwarranted, and it is only because of the Treaty of London, which brought Italy into the war, that it was granted. The frontier farther south which Italy demanded of Austria in 1915 would be greatly preferable, since it included very few Germans. While not so strong as the Brenner Pass line, it is much stronger than the frontier which Italy managed to hold during the war against Austria-Hungary. Since Austria-Hungary no longer menaces anyone, it ought to be safe enough for Italy, even apart from the protection promised by a general reduction in armaments and by the League of Nations.

3. Austria complained most bitterly over the inclusion in the Czecho-Slovak Republic of the 3,500,000 Germans of Bohemia. In many respects it

must be admitted that this is unfortunate, not least in view of the difficulties it may involve for Bohemia. There are, however, excellent reasons for the decision. The mountain square of Bohemia forms a natural geographic unit, and in view of the fact that Bohemia is exposed to attack on three sides from Germany, strategic considerations of defense should have some weight in fixing the frontier. Furthermore, the regions toward the mountains, which form the German fringe, contain the coal and iron and industrial districts which are necessary for the economic welfare of the Czecho-Slovak State. For centuries Bohemia was an independent kingdom, and only through force and fraud was it reduced to the level of a Hapsburg province. The boundaries which it now claims are those which have been recognized as Bohemian for nearly a thousand years. Finally, the inclusion of the German-speaking inhabitants of Bohemia in German Austria is geographically impracticable since the three most important groups are separated from each other and from Austria by intervening Czech districts. "The sole practicable alternative would be the union of the single sections with Bavaria (on west), Saxony (on north), Silesia (on north-east), and Austria (on south); and as this would at one and the same time mean economic ruin for themselves, and render the independent existence of Czecho-Slovakia impossible, it cannot be seriously entertained by anyone."¹ The old boundaries of

¹ R. W. Seton-Watson, in *The New Europe* (September 18, 1919), p. 227.

Bohemia have been slightly extended to include a few Czechs, and a bridgehead opposite Pressburg has been granted, to include a necessary railway junction. It is not to be fortified.

Art. 56

On the south, toward the new Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the area around Klagenfurt where the population is mixed is to decide its future by a plebiscite under Allied supervision. A southern zone votes first. If it decides to join the South Slavs, the northern zone then votes. If the southern part decides to join Austria, both districts remain Austrian.

Art. 49

The third part of the Treaty settles details as to the territory ceded to Italy, Czecho-Slovakia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Rumania.¹ Austria renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all territory outside its new boundaries not at present assigned to any state. This is to enable the Allies to adjust the question of the Ruthenian parts of Galicia. In this area the peasant majority is Ruthenian, and thus somewhat inclined to join the Ukraine. Historically it formed part of Poland, and the Polish minority controlling the land and predominating in some of the cities has always been the ruling class. Its oil fields make it particularly valuable. After the armistice the Poles proceeded to occupy eastern Galicia, and a great deal of irregular fighting with the Little Russians ensued. The disposition of the Peace Conference seems to be to create

¹ Rumania is to receive part of Bukovina, extending south from Galicia.

an autonomous East Galicia with Poland as mandatory for twenty years. This does not entirely satisfy the Poles. It is hoped that the arrangement will stimulate them to an effort to conciliate the Ruthenians and prepare the way for eventual union. Much will depend also on what happens across the border in the Ukraine in the course of the next few years. If the Little Russian national consciousness becomes solidified, and if the Ukraine becomes a prosperous independent state, or even an autonomous part of a free federal Russia, it may exercise a strong attraction for the kindred groups in Galicia.

Two of the most disturbing questions in Central and Eastern Europe have been the land question and the rights of minorities. The first of these the Treaty leaves to be settled by the individual states, but a definite attempt is made to settle the other. With the best will in the world, it is impossible to draw political boundaries which will not detach minorities from the main body of their fellows. Experience has shown that there is a tendency for dominant groups to attempt to impose their language, religion, and type of national culture on all under their rule. This attempt, though usually unsuccessful, has resulted in much bitterness of feeling, and it was one factor in causing the tension which prepared the way for the Great War. Groups which had themselves suffered persecution for nationality's sake learned no lesson of tolerance, and when the opportunity was offered they used against their own minorities the

methods to which they had objected. The Peace Conference desired to guard against this as much as possible. The Treaty with Austria therefore contains the provisions which were incorporated in the Treaty with Poland on this subject.¹ Political and religious equality, free use of any language, adequate educational opportunities—these are to be guaranteed by fundamental and unchangeable law. The League of Nations may investigate complaints.

Arts. 62-69

The new Austria will have relatively few non-Germans. But the Treaty provides also that these guarantees are to be incorporated in separate treaties with Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, and the South Slav Kingdom. The Czecho-Slovaks signed the Treaty readily; and there is reason to expect that they will treat the large German groups with fairness and good judgment. President Masaryk in particular realizes the importance of the problem, and has liberal and statesmanlike views on the subject. At the eastern end of the Slovak territory is a group of Ruthenians, separated by the mountain barrier of the Carpathians from the main body of Little Russians. They are to be made an autonomous province of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

Arts. 51, 57, 60

The South Slavs and the Rumanians objected seriously to being compelled to agree to these minority guarantees on the ground that they limited their sovereignty over their internal affairs. They refused for some time to sign the Austrian Treaty. Finally, however, they expressed a willingness to sign if the

¹ Except as to the Jews.

implications of the guarantees were more clearly expressed.

The necessity for effective guarantees of the rights of minorities with international sanctions in the background is emphasized by various charges and counter-charges since the armistice. Press dispatches have told of massacres and persecutions of Jews in Poland, of deportations of Slavs, of the suppression by the Italians of South Slav schools and religious freedom in Istria and Dalmatia, of discriminations against Italians by the South Slavs, of the repression of Magyar schools and the persecution of Protestants by the Rumanians in Transylvania. Denials have been made, and the reports are probably in some cases partisan and exaggerated. Nevertheless there is all too much likelihood that they have some foundation.

Criticism has been expressed of the failure to require Italy to give guarantees to protect the minority rights of the Germans of the Tyrol and the hundreds of thousands of South Slavs acquired along with the Italians who are at last "redeemed." Logically there is no reason for this omission, and theoretically Italy could and should have been asked to give these binding assurances. Italy, however, takes the lofty ground that all Italian subjects are equally protected by the law, that the Italian government never treats anyone unjustly, and that the mere suggestion of additional guarantees imposed from without is little less than an insult. Being a "great power" Italy is

able to maintain this position. Exactly the same arguments advanced by the smaller nations were overruled.

One other article in this third part of the Treaty is of great importance. It provides that "the independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the League of Nations," and binds Austria to do nothing which might compromise this independence. This of course is designed to prevent the union of German Austria with the German Empire. It is an absolute denial of the right of self-determination. Economically it is indefensible, for the fragment of the old empire which is left is not capable of self-support. Vienna, the eighth largest city in the world, with a third of the population of the republic, cannot be supported by the reduced area of which it will be the capital. The only reason for the provision is fear of a revived Germany. It is to be hoped that before long the great powers, particularly France, will feel it safe to relax their opposition to the reunion of the German people, if they desire to accomplish it. Art. 88

The fourth part of the Treaty deals with Austrian interests outside Europe. They are not extensive, but they are abolished in the same sweeping terms that are used with respect to the German interests in the Treaty of Versailles. Part V provides for the reduction of the Austrian army to a maximum of 30,000. Universal service is abolished, recruiting must be for long terms, the stock and manufacture of

munitions is limited, and the scheme of army organization is fixed. The entire navy is surrendered, and for the future will consist of three police boats on the Danube. The provisions as to prisoners and graves are the same as in the German Treaty. So also are the clauses providing for the surrender and trial of persons for violations of the laws and customs of war. Serbia in particular was the victim of atrocities the authors of which should be brought to justice. There is no demand for the extradition of the ex-Emperor Charles, who came to the throne during the war.

Part VIII

Reparation is demanded from Austria in the same terms as from Germany. The same admission of responsibility for all loss and damage caused the Allies is exacted. In view of Austria's inability to pay all, the obligation to pay for damage to civilians is to be recognized under the same ten categories as in the Treaty of Versailles. The Reparation Commission created under the Treaty of Versailles is to act also for Austria. Austria is required to pay a first instalment before May, 1921, the amount to be "a reasonable sum which shall be determined by the Commission." At that time the Commission will fix the amount to be paid by Austria, fixing also a schedule of payments running over thirty years. While differing in a few details, the provisions are substantially the same as for Germany. A number of jewels, works of art, and manuscripts which have in one way or another been taken to Austria are to be restored to the countries originally entitled to them.

In drawing the financial clauses several difficult problems had to be considered. The Dual Monarchy had ceased to exist. The Empire of Austria was a mere fragment. Four-fifths of its population had now been incorporated in the territory of Allied and Associated Powers. The representatives of the Vienna government urged that they were not the heirs of the Hapsburgs, and they declared that there was no justice in visiting on them the penalties for the sins of the old régime. The Allies pointed out that the German element in Austria had been entirely responsible for the policy of repression and aggrandizement; that it had made no effort to repudiate its leaders until the moment of military disaster; and that it must therefore to the limit of its ability make reparation for the damage done in the war which it so largely precipitated. Part IX

There was at first some disposition on the part of the Conference to balance the gains of territory, particularly of Serbia, against claims for reparation. The plan was not adopted. The states, however, which contained territory of the former empire were required to assume a proportional amount of the pre-war national debt. Austria remains saddled with the entire war debt, but no state to which former Austrian territory is ceded, or its nationals, "shall have recourse under any circumstances whatever against any other states, including Austria, in respect of the war bonds of which they or their nationals are the beneficiary owners." This of Art. 203
Art. 205

course makes a large part of the Austrian war debt worthless.

Art. 206 Austria and Hungary and the states to which parts of Austria and Hungary are ceded are to call in the Austro-Hungarian state banknotes current in their territory, and turn them over to the Reparation Commission. The Commission is to liquidate the affairs of the Austro-Hungarian bank and divide the assets proportionately. Austrian state property, including crown property and private property of the royal family, is transferred to the states acquiring the territory. Its value is credited to Austria in the reparation account.

Part X The economic clauses follow the Treaty of Versailles in securing to Allied and Associated governments most-favored nation treatment for their goods and their subjects resident in Austria. There are added, however, provisions to insure that Austria will be able to secure coal and raw materials from Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. After three years, unless the Council of the League decides otherwise, Allied and Associated Powers cannot claim most-favored nation treatment unless they accord it to Austria.

The remaining sections, dealing with the revival of treaties, and with debts, property, and contracts, are much the same as in the German Treaty. The most damaging result is the resulting liquidation of all property owned by subjects of German Austria in regions transferred to other states. An Austrian

estimate puts this at a billion dollars. The fact that Austria is to reimburse its nationals for their losses is cold comfort for the losers.

The remaining parts of the Treaty, dealing with aerial navigation, ports, waterways and railways, labor, and the miscellaneous provisions, differ from the Treaty of Versailles only in minor details.

In some ways the Allies were disposed to treat Austria a trifle more leniently than Germany. On the other hand, the transfer to Austria of the tremendous machinery designed to punish and control Germany seems to many unjust, or at least highly inexpedient.

The three aspects of the Treaty most generally criticized are the transfer of Germans to Italy and Bohemia, the veto on union with Germany, and the impossible burden of reparation. Since the armistice Austria has been in a condition of impotent despair. The republican government has just managed to maintain itself. Economically the situation has been extremely grave. Food is scarce, industry at a standstill. The Allies have extended what Lloyd George calls "soup-kitchen relief" to prevent literal starvation, but this cannot go on indefinitely. In part the problem of Austria must be solved in connection with the economic rehabilitation of all Europe. In part probably it must be met by a relaxation of the Treaty terms.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BULGARIAN SETTLEMENT

Bulgaria had been the first of the Central Powers to surrender, but the terms of peace were not handed to the Bulgar delegates until September 19, 1919. The Conference had felt that the peace with Germany was the most pressing matter, and that when it was settled a model would be at hand for drafting the settlements with the lesser enemies. There were moreover a number of points on which the Allies could not reach an agreement among themselves.

For generations the Balkans have been a storm center in European politics. It was a Balkan quarrel which was the immediate cause of the Great War, and on a satisfactory settlement of the Balkan situation the future peace of the world in no small measure depends.

In attempting to understand the Balkan problem, there are several fundamental considerations which must be kept in mind. In itself the Balkan Peninsula is not an enormously rich prize, although the possibilities of economic development are considerable. Its wider significance lies in the fact that with Asia Minor it forms a great natural bridge between Europe and Asia. For centuries its valleys have been the highways for commerce, conquest, and

migration between Central and Western Europe and the Near East. During these centuries of invasion and migration and shifting political control the population has become tremendously mixed in language, religion, race, and national consciousness. The mountain barriers have helped to prevent the growth of any feeling of Balkan solidarity. For two centuries and more the history of the Balkans has been dominated by three facts.

1. The Ottoman Empire, which once extended nearly to the gates of Vienna and into Southern Russia, has been steadily declining in power.

2. Russia and Austria, each ambitious to dominate the Balkan Peninsula, have advanced at the expense of Turkey. Behind Russian expansion was the desire to redeem Slavic and Greek Orthodox brethren, and most of all to realize the supreme ambition of reaching the open Mediterranean. The Hapsburgs wished to push down the Danube to the Black Sea and through Serbia down the Vardar to the Aegean. Particularly since they were expelled from German and Italian affairs, they have turned their attention eastward. These two lines of imperial expansion crossed in the Balkans, and Austria and Russia were naturally and inevitably rivals. With the growth of German ambition, with the rise of the Middle Europe idea, and in connection with the dream of domination from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, Germany too became vitally interested in the Balkan Peninsula. For Britain the question of

Constantinople was connected with the protection of the route to India; and for Europe as a whole the Balkan situation was intimately related to the balance of power.

3. In the course of the nineteenth century the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula awoke to a consciousness of nationality and struck for independence. Under the earlier Turkish rule the spirit of nationalism was dormant, surviving only in the language and traditions of the peasantry, and in connection with religion and the church organization. Some of the population turned Moslem to continue their economic hold on the peasants, and to share in the political privileges of the ruling group. Through control of the leadership of the Orthodox church the Greeks remained the dominant element among the subject peoples. Oppressive taxes, the tribute of children, and humiliating restrictions of all kinds made the life of the Christian "cattle" very miserable, but failed to crush all possibility of national consciousness. In the nineteenth century Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, and Rumanians rose against their oppressors and with some help from outside achieved first autonomy and finally independence. The development of these vigorous types of national consciousness in the dumb, undifferentiated mass of the "Greek" peasantry of the Balkans was a surprise and a disappointment to Russia and Austria, who had expected to absorb them without opposition as soon as the European situation permitted the final partition of

Turkey. Both empires entered a diplomatic struggle for control of the new states.

No one of the Balkan states was originally given all the territory which it claimed on linguistic, racial, and historical grounds. Each hoped and planned for enlargement, at the expense of Turkey, of Russia, of Austria-Hungary, and of the other Balkan states. There developed therefore within the Balkan Peninsula an internal struggle and the idea of a local balance of power. In the background Russia, Austria-Hungary, England, France, Italy, and Germany watched, intrigued, and occasionally intervened. Since 1878 the most acute problems arose in connection with the fate of the Christians still subject to Turkey in Macedonia and Thrace and Crete. When the Young Turks attempted after 1908 to Ottomanize the Empire, the Balkan powers at last united to drive the Turks from Europe. The war which resulted when they themselves quarreled over the division of the spoils left Bulgaria with a grievance against Greece and Serbia which was an important factor in the decision to join the Central Powers in the Great War.

With the conquest of Serbia in 1915 Bulgarian ambitions were satisfied, though the opportunity to seize the Dobrudja from Rumania was welcomed. When the war dragged on the strain became too great for Bulgaria, and at last army and people together collapsed and sued for peace. The discredited Czar Ferdinand abdicated, and the new

government prepared to rescue as much as possible from the ruins of the national hopes.

For some time students of Balkan affairs have agreed on several general principles as essential to a sound settlement. As usual the difficulty has been in reconciling the principles with each other and in applying them. Again there have been difficulties where the ambitions of the victors conflicted with these principles, or with each other. In essentials these principles did not differ from those for a general European settlement. It was clear that no boundaries could be drawn which would not leave some detached minorities, particularly if any weight was given to geographic and strategic considerations. But it was evident that peace would be promoted by leaving as few and as small minorities as possible. This implied that Bulgaria, even though defeated, should receive all territory that was incontestably Bulgarian. It was also obvious that access to the Aegean in some form ought to be secured. The minorities everywhere should be given equal rights, civil and religious, and should not be forced to adopt the language and religion of the majority. Every facility should be given those who so desire to move to the state which they prefer. If the different governments would cordially co-operate in an exchange of minorities, giving assistance in the sale of the old lands and the purchase of new homes, much good might be accomplished. Finally every encouragement should be given to the Balkan states to sink

their old antagonisms, forget past grievances, and co-operate in dealing with the many interests which they have in common. In view of the bitterness which has been developed between the Bulgars and their neighbors in the wars since 1913 this will be no easy matter. However, if the League of Nations amounts to anything, it should exert its influence along these lines.

President Wilson had declared¹ that the relations of the Balkan states to each other should be determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, with international guarantees of the political, economic, and territorial integrity of each state. Unfortunately few were in a mood for friendly counsel, and there were no lines of allegiance and nationality that were generally recognized.

The terms presented to Bulgaria follow closely the lines laid down in the treaties with Germany and Austria.² The parts containing the League of Nations Covenant and those dealing with aerial navigation, trial of offenders against the laws of war, labor, prisoners, and graves are the same in all important respects. Safeguards for minorities are included as in the Polish and Austrian treaties. The army is to be reduced to 20,000 within three months, and the gendarmerie is limited to 10,000.

¹ Point XI of the Fourteen.

² *New York Times' Current History*, October, 1919, p. 40; January, 1920, p. 8.

Voluntary enlistment for long terms replaces universal military service. Details of military organization are fixed, the amount of munitions limited, and trade in munitions is prohibited. There may be only one military academy and one munitions factory. The navy, which never amounted to much, is surrendered. Like Germany and Austria, Bulgaria is asked to admit responsibility for all losses and expenses of her enemies, but in view of the inadequacy of her resources, a lump sum of 2,250,000,000 francs (gold) is named as the total reparation to be demanded. An Interallied Commission is to supervise the working out a plan of half-yearly payments beginning in 1920.

In the matter of national territory Bulgaria loses comparatively little. Toward Rumania the boundary is to be that of 1914. This leaves to Rumania the 2,969 square miles of the Dobrudja seized for strategic purposes in the Second Balkan War, 1913. During the Great War Bulgaria had occupied all of the Dobrudja to the Danube. The whole of the district is claimed by the Bulgars on historical and nationalistic grounds. Since Rumania is making large gains in other directions, the Allied and Associated Powers promise that they will try to persuade Rumania to return to Bulgaria the purely Bulgarian portions of the Dobrudja. If the difficulties of the Allies in persuading Rumania to withdraw in Hungary are any indication, they will have a hard time in securing any very material concessions for Bulgaria.

On the west Bulgaria must cede three small areas to Serbia, including the projection around Strumnitza and two border strips farther north. The chief considerations here are strategic, in order to give Serbia control of mountain passes, thus preventing a repetition of the flank attack by which in 1915 the Bulgarian army cut the Nish-Saloniki railway down the Vardar Valley. It is unfortunate that in this instance, as in the Tyrol, the Conference followed the much-condemned policy of Austria-Hungary in annexing the Carpathian passes into Rumania. The old boundary between Greece and Bulgaria is retained, with a slight change to protect the Greek town of Buk. A small area northwest of Adrianople is also ceded. The most serious loss to Bulgaria is western Thrace, gained from Turkey in 1913, important as giving Bulgaria direct access to the Aegean.

The disposition of this area was one of the most disturbing questions which came before the Conference. The Greeks claimed the entire area of Thrace to the Black Sea, including the portion left to Turkey in 1913, and even Constantinople itself. Their arguments were clearly and temperately set forth in a memorandum submitted by Premier Venizelos to the Peace Conference.¹ He insisted that the attitude of Greece toward Bulgaria had always been conciliatory; but the pretensions of Bulgaria to a Balkan hegemony had been a constant source of trouble. By attacking

¹*Greece before the Peace Congress, American-Hellenic Society Publications, No. 7.*

her allies in 1913, by joining the Central Powers in 1915, by persistent and systematic persecutions and deportations of Greeks in territory under her control, and by atrocious methods of warfare,¹ Bulgaria has forfeited all claims to lenient or generous treatment. Bulgaria had a seacoast on the Black Sea, which, with the neutralization of the Straits, would give a free passage to the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Greece was willing to grant economic access to the Mediterranean across Greek territory in a manner to be guaranteed by the League of Nations. For the rest, the principle of nationality should govern, and on that basis the Premier declared that the Greeks had the best claim. The Greeks are much more numerous in Thrace than the Bulgars, and they constitute the most progressive and intelligent element in the population.² "There is therefore no reason," concludes Venizelos, "why a benevolent disposition should be shown to Bulgaria. She should content herself with the strict justice of the Allies, and nothing more. It would be a flagrant injustice to sacrifice to her the legitimate interests of other peoples. . . . Above all, this would be an act of bad policy. . . . Bulgaria seeks to play in the Balkan Peninsula the part that Prussia has played on the vast European stage."

¹ Established by an Allied commission. Report in *New York Times' Current History*, September, 1919, p. 524.

² Before the war Turkish figures for Thrace outside the Vilayet of Constantinople showed 366,363 Greeks, 508,311 Turks, 107,843 Bulgars, out of a total of 1,026,973.

On the other hand the Bulgarians, who were allowed a much greater freedom in carrying on propaganda than had been accorded Germany or Austria, pleaded to be allowed to keep western Thrace. On nationalistic grounds they even asked for parts of Macedonia held by Serbia and Greece, and for the Dobrudja, held by Rumania. They questioned the accuracy of the figures cited by the Greeks, and the conclusions drawn from them by the Greeks. They claimed as really Bulgarian in nationality the Pomaks, who had become Moslems in the seventeenth century. By transferring these "Moslem Bulgarians" from the Turkish to the Bulgarian column, and considering only western Thrace, the Bulgar delegates proved to their own satisfaction that there were in the contested district 177,925 Bulgarians as against 107,780 Greeks. They therefore invoked the principle of self-determination, and at the very least demanded a plebiscite. The need of Bulgaria for an economic outlet on the Aegean was also strongly urged.

In the midst of the usual snowstorm of pamphlets, treatises, ethnographic maps, and petitions, the commission of experts appointed by the Conference deliberated as to the disposition of Thrace. Finally a report was drawn up, concurred in by the American, French, British, and Japanese representatives, favorable to the Greek claims. Although the leaders of the Conference decided to compel Bulgaria to relinquish western Thrace, the ultimate disposal of this

region is still in doubt. Several factors have combined to cause the delay. For one thing, the question is related to the problem of Turkey in Europe, and indeed with the whole Near Eastern settlement. This in turn has been delayed, in large measure, waiting to see what the attitude of the United States may be, particularly with regard to accepting any mandates. The Italians, again, long opposed all the Greek claims because of conflicts of interest in Southern Albania, the Dodekanese Islands, and Asia Minor. When these differences were adjusted, the American attitude on the Bulgarian settlement caused difficulty.

The United States had not declared war on Bulgaria, or even severed diplomatic relations, and the Germans credited our consular representative with having taken a prominent part in arranging for the Bulgarian surrender. The American representatives at the Conference exerted their influence in favor of moderation and of recognition of the reasonable aspirations of the Bulgarians. This has been attributed¹ in part to the influence of Robert College at Constantinople, which has for years been in close touch with Bulgarian leaders and friendly to them. Through these and other missionary channels, and through influential friends in America, it was thought that the Bulgarian case was brought directly to the sympathetic attention of the President. It has been reported that the United States favored giving Greece

¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, January 8, 1920; *The New Europe*, July 4, 1918, pp. 266-71.

the eastern part of Thrace, and making the western part autonomous under the protection of the League, with Bulgarian access to the port of Dede-Agatch guaranteed. Recent dispatches indicate that it has been decided to give the debated territory to Greece, to which President Wilson may object. The Senate of the United States on January 21, 1920, passed a resolution favoring the incorporation of all of Thrace up to the Chatalja lines at Constantinople in the Greek Kingdom.

The efforts of the Bulgarians to obtain a modification of the terms were largely in vain, and November 27, 1919, the Treaty was signed at Neuilly, near Paris. Rumania finally consented to sign, but the South Slavs still delayed. Bulgaria feels very bitter at the size of the reparation demanded, at the loss of territory, and at the failure to secure any of the "unredeemed brethren" in Macedonia and the Dobrudja. On the other hand it should be noted that Bulgaria is allowed to retain something like half of the territory gained from Turkey in 1913, and that the right of using the Greek ports of Kavalla and Saloniki and of continuing to use Dede-Agatch is practically more valuable than the political possession of Dede-Agatch alone, since the latter is a very poor harbor.

The settlement is not entirely satisfactory, but no arrangement could please all concerned. It is earnestly to be hoped that the new Bulgarian government will give up all plans of conquest. For the

present of course Bulgaria is helpless, but if the neighbors feel that the Bulgarians are simply waiting for an opportunity to secure revenge, peace will be insecure. If all the Balkan states deal fairly by the minorities under their control, if they avoid tariff wars, preferably by a customs union, then better days for the troubled peninsula may come. Otherwise the Treaty of Neuilly, like the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, may prove only a truce.

CHAPTER IX

HUNGARY

The Magyars of Hungary share with the Pan-Germans the distinction of having contributed more largely than any other group to bringing on the Great War. During the thousand years since they left their Asiatic home and burst into Central Europe they have played a prominent part in many epochs of history. Settled in a compact mass in the plain of the upper Danube they have maintained political control over numerous Slavic and Rumanian groups. After 1867 Hungary was an equal partner with Austria in the peculiar Dual Monarchy. Though always restless and insistent on their own independence the Magyars maintained a working agreement with the Germans of Austria. Together the two groups could keep an ascendancy over the minorities, and united they ruled one of the great powers of Europe. Both dominant groups knew that the break-up of the Dual Monarchy would reduce them to insignificance.

Within the historic limits of the Hungarian Kingdom, the Magyars even by their own exaggerated statistics constituted just over half of the total population. Nevertheless by various suffrage limitations, by the gerrymandering of electoral districts, supplemented by intimidation, force, and fraud, they maintained an absolute political mastery. Transylvania,

with its large Rumanian population, was deprived of the autonomy which it had enjoyed in earlier periods, and Croatia, although it retained some local self-government, was kept under the closest possible control. For fifty years all the resources of the government have been devoted to Magyarizing the minorities. This process, accompanied by the usual attempts to force the use of the Magyar language in all the schools and courts, to keep down the number of non-Magyars in the state service, and in general to stamp out the separatist nationalistic consciousness in the minority groups, had the usual result. The minorities more and more despaired of securing political, religious, or cultural equality, and turned increasingly to the ideas of freedom and of union with kindred groups outside of Hungary.

The Magyars were aided in maintaining their ascendancy by the fact that the minority groups were scattered geographically and had little in common except resistance to the policy of denationalization. On the east the Transylvanian district within the curve of the Carpathians contains a large number of Rumanians, though there are compact islands of Magyars (Czecklers) and Germans. On the north are the Slovaks, a people closely related to the Czechs and Moravians, though somewhat more backward. A small group of Ruthenians, detached from their kinsmen by the barrier of the Carpathians, have chosen to become an autonomous part of the

new Czecho-Slovak State. On the west adjoining Austria is a narrow strip, the German population of which was added to Austria by the Treaty of St. Germain. In the southern province of the Banat of Temesvar the Rumanians, Serbs, and Germans all outnumber the Magyars. The city of Fiume, which was Hungary's port on the Adriatic, has an Italian plurality. Throughout the war all these subject groups fought without much enthusiasm, and with the collapse of the Dual Monarchy they hastened to throw off the control of the Magyars.

In October, 1918, a revolutionary government in Budapest proclaimed a people's republic and severed all connection with Austria. By the terms of the armistice which they concluded with the Allies the Hungarian troops were withdrawn from certain border areas. It was expected that English, French, Italian, and American troops would occupy these regions until the final settlement. This plan was carried out only in part, and instead the Czechs, Rumanians, and South Slavs pushed in to secure long-coveted territory, and presently only the Magyar center of the old kingdom remained under the control of the capital. The occupation of the border districts made the economic situation increasingly distressing, and bolshevistic agitation made the position of the provisional government precarious. An attempted uprising in February, 1919, was crushed, but when in March the Allies ordered the Hungarians to withdraw their troops from a strip in the east in

order to leave a neutral zone, Count Karolyi made this an excuse for turning over the government to the Communists. The neighboring states, fearing the spread of bolshevism, and in particular the linking up of the Magyar forces with the Russian soviet army, began to close in on Budapest. The Red Army resisted and at some points gained victories. The Council at Paris had been waiting for the establishment of a stable government in Hungary, representative of the popular will, with which peace might be concluded. Being unable to come to any understanding with the Communists, the Allies appealed to the Hungarians to overthrow Bela Kun, promising to raise the blockade, make peace, and evacuate strictly Hungarian territory. The Rumanians advanced on the capital, and occupied it August 4. A few days earlier a moderate Socialist government had replaced the Communists. The Rumanians issued a drastic ultimatum to the Hungarian government, demanding 30 per cent of the available farm animals and farm machinery, half the railway supplies, and large amounts of munitions and river shipping. The Rumanians explained this breach of the armistice terms as necessary in order to crush the menace of bolshevism; the requisitions, they said, were merely the recovery of part of the losses they themselves had suffered under the Austro-Hungarian occupation. The leaders of the Peace Conference vigorously protested against the action of the Rumanians, insisting that the whole question of reparation

should be left to the Conference. The Rumanians returned evasive answers, and in defiance of the orders from Paris proceeded to strip the country of food, farm animals, rolling stock, and machinery, destroying much that they could not carry off.

A provisional government under the Archduke Joseph was set up with Rumanian approval, but it was not recognized by the Allies, and at their demand it finally resigned. The Rumanians at last agreed to withdraw their troops, and to list the goods taken from Hungary to be deducted from their share of the reparation. For months, however, Rumanian troops remained some distance to the west of the line fixed by the Conference, in spite of seventeen Allied "ultimatums."¹

The governments which have succeeded the Communists have all been conservative, even reactionary, and strongly nationalist. They have proceeded to punish the Communists, a number having been executed and many imprisoned. Some observers report that the conservative White Terror is worse than the Red Terror, though this is energetically denied.² While economic conditions were going from bad to worse, and while the Allies were waiting for some government to be established with which they could negotiate, a national assembly was elected. Its membership indicates a desire for a constitutional monarchy, though the Allies announced that they

¹ *New York Times' Current History*, March, 1920, p. 448.

² *Ibid.*, February, 1920, p. 269; March, p. 450.

would not tolerate the restoration of the Hapsburgs. On March 1 Admiral Horthy was chosen regent. Internally one of the most pressing problems is land reform, for the Magyar peasantry have been exploited by the ruling classes and excluded from political power almost as much as the Slavs and Rumanians. The city proletariat is not so numerous as in the states with a greater industrial development, but all danger of revolutionary disturbances is not ended.

Externally the problem is to make peace and resume economic relations. The Allies had agreed on the terms of the Treaty in September, but it was not until January, 1920, that Count Apponyi was summoned to Paris to receive them. In general the Treaty follows very closely the German, Austrian, and Bulgarian treaties. The Hungarian army is limited to 35,000. Responsibility for reparations is to be admitted, the amount to be fixed by the Commission. In particular Hungary is to furnish coal to the Jugo-Slav State for five years. On all sides territory is surrendered to neighboring states. The states to which this territory is added are to assume a proportional share of the pre-war Hungarian debt.

The Allies extended the time for considering the terms, and in February the Hungarian delegates submitted their criticisms and counter-proposals.¹ Objections centered around the provisions as to

¹ *Springfield Weekly Republican*, February 26, 1920; *New York Times' Current History*, March, 1920, p. 448.

reparations and boundaries, though complaint is made that the army allowed would be too small for safety. How could Hungary, which was being deprived of wood and ore and coal, be expected to furnish them by way of reparation, especially after the country had been despoiled by the Rumanians? To the Magyars the new boundaries seemed to have been drawn in order to furnish strategic and economic advantages to Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia, and the South Slav Kingdom. Everywhere, it was asserted, a strip of purely Magyar territory from thirty-five to forty miles wide was being taken from them. The new political boundaries crossed and recrossed railway lines in a most impractical fashion. The Magyars denied that the border districts, which had been under their control for nearly a thousand years, were in favor of separation. The principle of self-determination was invoked, and a plebiscite was demanded. In Transylvania the Rumanians, though the largest group, made up only 43 per cent of the total. Many of them, it was alleged, were reconciled to Hungarian rule, and others asked no more than the autonomy which Hungary was willing to grant. At least, they should be allowed to express their choice.

Press dispatches in March indicated that some of the Allies favored a modification of the boundaries in favor of the Magyars, but that the French opposed reopening the question. In any event the Magyars will find themselves disarmed, reduced to less than

half their former size, and burdened with heavy reparations. "Hungary's coffin is being built," said Premier Huzar; and for a proud, ambitious, and intensely nationalistic group the outlook is indeed gloomy, but, like the Prussian Junkers, the Hungarian ruling caste have only themselves to blame.

When Rumania entered the war in 1916 the Allies promised that in the event of victory they would allow the annexation of Hungarian territory up to a line which was fixed in considerable detail. This was done without the consent of Serbia, whose claims in the Banat of Temesvar conflicted sharply with those of Rumania. In this instance, as in the secret treaty with Italy, the South Slavs felt that their interests were being sacrificed. The Allies believed that the military necessities justified the concessions.

The Magyar census of 1900 showed that the Banat contained 578,789 Rumanians, 362,487 Germans, 351,938 Serbs, and 170,124 Magyars. After the armistice some difficulty was experienced in preventing the Rumanians and South Slavs from coming to blows in Temesvar. The South Slavs asked the Peace Conference to give them the territory west of a line drawn southward from Arad, including the city of Temesvar. This territory they claimed had more Slavs than Rumanians. A frontier farther west was strategically untenable. The Rumanians on the other hand claimed the whole Banat. The compromise line rather favors the Rumanians. The western portion (the county of Torontal) is to

be assigned to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the larger eastern portion to Rumania. The boundary proposed cuts across the railway lines in an unsatisfactory manner, and neither side is particularly pleased. Perhaps it will be modified by further direct negotiations between the interested states.

CHAPTER X

ELEMENTS OF THE NEAR-EASTERN SETTLEMENT

A year and a half after the armistice the fate of the different portions of the Turkish Empire was still undecided. This is in many respects unfortunate. In 1918 the war-weary population would have been glad to accept almost any reasonable settlement that promised them peace and food. But while the Conference debated other matters, while the United States hesitated about accepting any responsibility for the future of the Near East, and while the Allied nations negotiated with each other over annexations and protectorates and spheres of influence and mandates, unrest among the native populations has increased. In particular the nationalistic spirit of the Turks has revived and other groups have enlarged their ambitions, until now the prospects of an amicable settlement are not bright.

Two general principles for the new order have been agreed upon. First it is understood that the rule of Turks over non-Turks must be ended. Second, the signatories of the League of Nations Covenant recognize that the welfare of these formerly subject groups is a collective responsibility of civilization. The League of Nations, through mandatories who so far as possible shall be agreeable to the different groups,

is to help them toward complete independence as rapidly as possible. In carrying out these principles there are the usual fundamental difficulties. For one thing, the subject races are so mixed together that it is impossible to draw boundaries that will even approximately group persons of the same language and religion together. The problem is still further complicated if attention is paid to defensible frontiers, natural resources, or access to the sea. For another thing, the European nations, England, France, Italy, and Greece in particular, cannot agree on the terms and the distribution of the mandates. The four powers have ambitions which clash with each other and with the wishes of important elements of the native population.

During the course of the war a number of secret agreements were made as to the future of Turkish territory. The late entrance of Greece into the war, the collapse of Russia, the recognition of the Arab Kingdom of the Hedjaz, and other developments have caused a progressive modification of plans. Finally the adoption of the scheme of mandatories has necessitated a complete revision. The settlement of the boundaries of the reduced Turkish State will be only a first step to a final adjustment.¹ Bolshevism in Central Asia, Young Turk nationalism in Anatolia, Arab nationalism in Syria, Zionism in Palestine, and other complicating forces threaten to reopen war in the Near East, or at least to keep

¹ As this is written the Turkish Treaty has not been made public.

conditions disturbed. Much will depend on whether the mandatory scheme is carried out in an unselfish and effective manner, or whether, as many fear, it will prove indistinguishable from the old order of protectorates and spheres of influence. It seems clear that in distributing the mandates the agreements made during the war will form the basis.

As a result largely of bolshevistic revelations from the archives at Petrograd a part of the negotiations between the Allies has become known. The details are complicated, earlier arrangements have been modified or superseded, and only a summary of their principal features need be given in this connection. By the Treaty of London, April 26, 1915, Italian claims in Asia Minor were recognized, but not in detail. Early in 1916, England, France, and Russia parceled out Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and most of Asia Minor. Some territory was to be annexed, some was to be left to native governments under foreign "protection," still other territory was to be within the sphere of influence of one or another power. France received the right to administer "after agreement with the State or Confederation of Arab States" the coast of Syria from Tyre north to Mersina and into Asia Minor past Sivas, Harput, and Mardin. The British were similarly to administer Mesopotamia up to a line somewhat north of Bagdad. Palestine was to be under an international administration to be determined later. By a later agreement at St. Jean de Maurienne, and in subse-

quent conferences (1916-17), Italy was assigned a zone in Southern Asia Minor, including Smyrna and Konia. Meanwhile the Arab chiefs were being promised an independent state or confederation in the interior to include Damascus, Homs, Hamath, Aleppo, and Mosul. The northern portion of this Arab region was to be in the French sphere, that is France had a "right of priority in regard to enterprises and local loans [and] the exclusive right to provide advisers or foreign officials at the request of the Arab State or Confederation." In the southern zone, extending from Egypt to Mesopotamia, Britain had similar rights. The ports of Haifa and Acre were to go to England, who granted freedom to French commerce. British commerce had similar rights at Alexandretta in the French area.

There has been difficulty in reconciling the promises made by Britain to the French on the one hand and the Arabs on the other. One section of French opinion has felt that the claims of the Republic were not being adequately recognized, and that Britain was backing the Arabs with the hope of dominating the entire situation. Not until September, 1919, were British troops withdrawn from Syria and replaced in part by French troops. The interior is under Arab rule, but the French are supposed to be consulted on political matters. On November 9, 1918, a joint British-French declaration spoke of encouraging and protecting native governments in Syria and Mesopotamia. Greek claims to

Smyrna have made it necessary to modify the agreement with Italy. Since the armistice Greek and Italian troops have been landed at Smyrna and Adalia. The British control Mesopotamia as far as Mosul, and presumably their mandate will extend as far as the borders of Armenia. The Anglo-Persian agreement (August 9, 1919), while it does not establish a technical protectorate, leaves Great Britain dominant in Persian affairs.

The new arrangements create a broad belt of territory from Egypt to India in which British influence will be supreme. This will protect the Suez Canal and the approaches to India; but it will in turn need protection, and some observers in England are wondering whether the new extended frontiers will be as strong as the old. To what extent the British wish to take the place of Russia in Central Asia is hard to determine. Their cardinal policy, as always, is to safeguard India and the Canal. The present menace lies in bolshevistic agitation, which seems inclined to join forces with Turkish nationalism in an attempt to rouse the Turanians of Central Asia against England.

Before attempting to describe some of the specific problems of the Turkish settlement, it is well to recall briefly the historical background, and some of the fundamental factors in the situation. The Near East—the region from the Black Sea to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, including Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Arabia—has been and

is and must continue to be important for three principal reasons. In the first place its geographical situation has made it the historic meeting-place of Eastern and Western civilization through uncounted centuries. The great land highways between Asia, Europe, and Africa cross it. From the days when Joseph's brethren lifted up their eyes and beheld the camels of the Ishmaelite traders bearing spices to the land of Egypt until the present, the commerce of three continents has flowed to it and from it. It was with a sure instinct and a grasp of world-conditions that the Germans centered their hopes of expansion in the Bagdad railway. At the Dardanelles and the Isthmus of Suez the Near East dominates two of the most important lines of world-communication. In the very nature of things, then, this region is of the greatest strategic and economic importance.

But the Near East is more than a gateway; it is in itself a region of no small importance. It contains important natural resources, as yet largely undeveloped. With proper cultivation it can support a much larger population than it now has, and its favorable climate makes it a not impossible field for European settlement. In any event it is a tempting area for exploitation by European capital.

Finally, besides possessing numerous other cultural and historical associations, this region has been the birthplace of three of the world's greatest religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. It contains sacred places dear to 560,000,000

Christians, 12,000,000 Jews, and 220,000,000 Moslems, in all nearly half the human race. That part of the world which contains Santa Sophia at Constantinople, Nazareth and Galilee, the site of the Temple at Jerusalem, Calvary, the manger at Bethlehem, the River Jordan, the tomb of Abraham, the Prophet's second home at Medinah, and the Kaaba at Mecca, with countless other sites only less holy, has a sentimental value which can scarcely be overestimated. Nor has the world outgrown the possibilities of religious jealousies, misunderstandings, and conflicts.

For six centuries the politically dominant group in this critically important area has been the Ottoman Turks, but for the last two hundred years they have been steadily losing power. Their territory has passed in part to Russia, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, and Italy. In part subject nationalities, Greeks, Rumanians, Bulgars, Serbs, have won independence. For a century and more the Turks have remained in power for four main reasons.

1. The Turks are good fighters themselves, and they have prevented the subject groups from organizing and arming. Nevertheless the Turks have utilized the ablest men from the non-Turkish elements in the army and government to supplement their own officials. The ruling caste in Turkey, including the royal family, has a negligible amount of genuinely Turkish blood in its veins. From any Western point of view the old Turkish government was hopelessly corrupt and inefficient, but somehow it did govern.

2. So long as non-Turkish elements kept quiet they were allowed a considerable degree of local self-government. The Christians paid heavy taxes, and were subject to various disabilities; but in compensation they were not allowed (until after 1908) to serve in the army. As a rule they were treated with a kind of contemptuous tolerance, and within their own "communities" were permitted to manage their own churches, their education, and many of their own local affairs. Persecutions and massacres of Christians have been more political and economic than genuinely religious, although the government has not scrupled to arouse religious fanaticism against them when it served its purposes. The Armenians, Bulgars, and Greeks have been murdered, robbed, and deported as potential rebels and as easy victims rather than as Christians. Before Turkey began to fear the separatist movement among the subject races there was remarkably little religious persecution, less in fact than in many Christian countries of the same period. In many regions the Moslem peasantry has suffered nearly as much at the hands of the Turkish government as the Christians. However, the Turks knew enough not to interfere too much with the local independence of such refractory fellow-Moslems as the Albanians, the Kurds, and the Arabs.

3. The Turks, though a minority, kept in power by fostering dissension among their subject groups. No rulers have more steadily followed the old maxim "Divide and Conquer."

4. It has been the same principle in foreign policy that has really been their salvation. For a century and a half nothing has prevented the conquest of Turkey by Russia and Austria, and more recently by France, England, Germany, Italy, and the Balkan states except the impossibility of agreeing on the division of the spoils. It was by playing England against Russia, and France against England, and Bulgaria against Greece, and Germany against England, and so on, that the Sultans have kept themselves in Stamboul.

When in 1908 it seemed that the European powers at last were about to agree on a Turkish policy the Young Turk revolution took place. This was in no small measure a desperate attempt to save Turkey from partition by reorganizing and modernizing the Turkish State. Although it started with high hopes, the new régime failed tragically, and in its failure directly contributed to the chain of events which led to the Great War. In some respects the situation in Turkey was like that in the Dual Monarchy, and the leaders had the same choice between granting local autonomy to the subject nationalities and reorganizing as a federal state, and a policy of forcible unification. The minorities in Turkey expected the revolution to bring them more freedom. Instead they found themselves the victims of an attempt to Ottomanize the whole Empire. The Young Turk leaders took the position that all Ottoman subjects should share in a common patriotic

devotion to their country. To this end the use of the Turkish language was made compulsory in schools and government business. Military service was made universal, and the special privileges of the Christian communities were to be abolished. The disillusioned Christian groups gave up hope of freedom within the Empire, and thought again of independence. The success of the Young Turk policies would have meant that the Balkan states would have found it impossible to realize their ambitions, and they therefore joined in 1912 for a concerted attack to liberate their oppressed fellows in European Turkey. Meanwhile the attempt to collect taxes from and impose military service on the Albanians and the Arabs led to revolts. The effort to suppress these uprisings cost the government men and money which it could ill afford. The ambitious program of reforms which the new régime attempted called for even heavier taxes than under the old Sultan. Many of the old officials held on, and there was no real improvement in the honesty or general efficiency of the public service. The people as a whole were entirely unused to the machinery of representative government, and the unofficial Committee of Union and Progress dominated the elections in a fashion which left the Young Turks masters of the situation and the minorities hopelessly out of power.

Besides their internal difficulties the new leaders had to face a suspicious and even hostile Europe. While liberal opinion professed sympathy for the

constitutional order, practical men realized that a rejuvenated Ottoman Empire would probably attempt to reassert genuine control over Bulgaria, which was practically independent, and over Cyprus, Crete, Egypt, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which though nominally parts of the Empire had long been in fact controlled by England, Greece, and Austria-Hungary. Furthermore if the Sick Man recovered, his long-coveted estate could not be divided up. Consequently Austria-Hungary declared the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina annexed, Bulgaria proclaimed its complete independence, Italy attacked Turkey and annexed Tripoli, and the Balkan states united and all but drove the Turks from Europe.

Such was the situation when the Great War burst. At once Turkey pledged support to Germany, though the agreement was kept secret for some months. This was in part because Germany had for years been building up a position of influence at Constantinople. More particularly, however, the decision was due to the fear of Russia, the hereditary enemy, known to be inflexible in its determination to control the Straits. The prospect of driving England from Egypt and of rebuilding a renewed and greater Turkish Empire in the Near East was also attractive. Turkish leaders recognized the danger of vassalage to Germany, but they counted it a lesser menace than the advance of the Czar. The Entente powers offered in return for Turkish neutrality to give the most solemn assurances that the Turkish

Empire would not be broken up, but the pro-German faction in the government forced the issue, and war with Russia was made inevitable by the use of the navy in the Black Sea.

During the war the Turks attempted to kill off as many as possible of the Armenian, Greek, and Syrian Christians in the interest of national unification. Hundreds of thousands were massacred or allowed to starve. This of course weakened the military and economic forces, and when the Arabs began to revolt the situation became desperate, and finally hopeless. Crushed by the British in Palestine and Mesopotamia, with Arabia lost, with the Central Powers collapsing, Turkey surrendered unconditionally. The great gamble had been lost.

In considering the future of the Ottoman Empire a number of regions and nationalistic groups must be considered separately.

1. *The Turks and Constantinople.*—The central portion of the Anatolian Plateau in Asia Minor is the real home of the great body of Ottoman Turks, a sturdy, simple peasantry with many excellent qualities. They suffer, however, because of the faults and ambitions of the old ruling caste, with which they have little in common. There has never been any question that the genuinely Turkish parts of Asia Minor are to remain independent, with perhaps temporary assistance from a mandatory power. The difficulties have arisen over the future of Constantinople and in fixing the boundaries in Asia

Minor. In the course of the war the Allies agreed, probably with some secret reluctance, to allow Russia to annex Constantinople and the Straits, together with Armenian territory in the eastern part of Asia Minor. After the Russian collapse Lloyd George indicated that England would allow the Turks to remain in the capital, although the Straits must be placed under some form of international control. At a later time the indications were that the fragment of European Turkey from Adrianople to Constantinople, together with the opposite side of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, would be placed under international control, preferably with the United States as mandatory. From the point of view of peace in the Near East this is probably the best possible solution, but public opinion in this country apparently does not favor assuming the responsibility. The claims of Greece to Constantinople were not pressed with much hope of success, nor have they been very seriously considered. Still more recently the idea of leaving the Sultan in possession of the capital, with the freedom of the Straits guaranteed by the League of Nations, has been revived, and a semi-official announcement to that effect has been made. All of Thrace is apparently to be assigned to Greece, though the Turks are to retain some sort of control over the sacred places in Adrianople. This settlement of the problem of Constantinople has been strongly urged by the Moslems of British India. On the other hand

liberal opinion in England and the United States has been aroused at the prospect of leaving the "unspeakable Turk" in possession of one of the world's most important cities, after all he has done to forfeit any shadow of a claim to it. Indignation is increased by the reports of new massacres of Armenians. One fundamental trouble is that neither England nor France will permit the other to control the Straits, as mandatory; Russia is out of the question; America holds back; Greece is at once too weak and too ambitious. The most reasonable alternative would seem to be control by the League of Nations; but international administration has not proved a success. The problem of Constantinople is still further complicated by the revival of Arab independence, with control of the Mohammedan holy places of Medinah and Mecca transferred to the Kingdom of the Hedjaz. The question is raised whether the Caliphate, the headship, that is, of the Moslem world, now held by the Ottoman Sultan, is to pass from him to the King of the Hedjaz. There is no doubt that the possession of Constantinople could strengthen the Sultan, and that its loss would be felt by all Islam as a serious blow. The Arabs, however, have no love for the Turks, and feel that the leadership of Islam belongs properly to them. For Great Britain, which rules over nearly half of the Moslems in the world, the whole question is of vital importance, for a wrong decision might have disastrous consequences.

At present the Allies control Constantinople, and the Turkish government there is helpless. A disquieting feature is the revival of Turkish nationalism. This appears in the Turkish Parliament and Cabinet, but more seriously in the interior of Asia Minor. Here there seems to be a definite preparation to resist the detachment of parts of Asia Minor for transfer to Greece, Italy, France, or Armenia. Whatever decisions are finally made will probably have to be backed by troops.

2. *The Armenians*.—For at least three thousand years the Armenians have maintained their separate identity in Eastern and Southern Asia Minor. It is their boast that they were the first people to adopt Christianity as an organized group. In the course of their checkered career this remarkable people have been at times independent, or semi-independent, with varying boundaries, but since the Middle Ages they have been subject to Seljuk Turks, Crusaders, and Ottoman Turks. In the nineteenth century the Russian advance brought some of them under the Czar, but they found their religious independence threatened, and the attempt was made to assimilate them to the Orthodox church.

The Armenians have always lived interspersed with other groups, Turks and Kurds and Georgians. When after the Treaty of Berlin there seemed to be danger that the powers would interfere in favor of Armenian autonomy or independence the Turkish government set to work to massacre and deport the

Armenians so that no district could be called "predominantly Armenian." The massacres and deportations during the Great War were deliberately planned to settle the Armenian question forever by settling the Armenians. In all the outrages, besides this political motive, plunder has been more important than religious fanaticism, though this has been present. But the Armenians have been much more thrifty and prosperous on the average than the Turks and Kurds, and the infidels have been attacked for their property quite as much as for the glory of Allah. While accurate figures are impossible, it is probable that 800,000 Armenians, at least, perished in the course of the war. There are left perhaps a million or more, but so well have the Turks succeeded in their outrageous program that no considerable area is left where the Armenians make up the bulk of the population. But, as Venizelos, for one, points out, "it is obvious that Turkey should not be allowed to profit by the systematic annihilation of the Armenian nation," and the powers are committed to an Armenian republic. If the district from Russian Armenia to Armenia Minor on the Mediterranean, with the port of Alexandretta, should be set apart it would contain most of the Armenians who survive, but it would contain even more Turks, Kurds, and Greeks.¹ These boundaries would also encroach on the area reserved for France. On the north and east there is

¹ There are 350,000 Greeks in the Black Sea province of Trebizond and 70,000 around Adams that Venizelos is willing to see included in Armenia (*Greece before the Peace Congress*, p. 20).

difficulty in fixing the boundary between Armenia and the small states of Georgia and Azerbaijan, which extend south of the Caucasus from the Black Sea to the Caspian. Because of British oil interests in the Baku field, and as a barrier to the spread of bolshevism, England seems inclined to recognize and support these little republics.

With the possible exception of the Greeks, the Armenians are the most prosperous and intelligent element in Eastern and Southern Asia Minor. As a people they have many admirable qualities, and their indomitable spirit in clinging to religion, language, and national consciousness through the most terrible trials deserves the most cordial appreciation. And yet in self-protection they have been forced to develop less admirable traits, and even their friends sometimes become exasperated with them. In order to survive at all they have been compelled to outwit and deceive their oppressors. They have had very little chance to practice self-government on any large scale, and when suddenly placed in a position of superiority to their former masters have shown a tendency to be overbearing and tactless. The Kurds, who live intermingled with them, have been among their most bitter persecutors. Many of the Kurds are still semi-nomadic freebooters, only half-converted to Islam, and they will be a difficult element to control. Whatever boundaries are fixed for Armenia the new republic will for some time need the help of a strong and disinterested

mandatory to see that equal rights are secured for all the elements. There is no doubt that the Armenians would prefer the United States, with England as second choice. England, however, does not desire the task, and France is interested only in the district to the west. The whole outlook is distinctly unpromising.

3. *The Greeks*.—From very early times the western coast of Asia Minor has had a large Greek population, and at many periods its cities have been among the principal centers of Hellenic culture. Greeks are found also along the Black Sea coast and in the interior, chiefly as merchants in the towns, forming everywhere an enterprising, thrifty, and relatively well-educated element. Since the Greeks of Hellas secured their independence they have desired to bring all those who speak their language into one political organization. In recent years the Greek subjects of Turkey have felt the stir of this irredentist movement, and have increasingly regarded Athens and not Constantinople as their national capital. The Turkish government has reacted somewhat as in the case of the Armenians. Particularly after the Balkan Wars a policy of persecution and deportation began which drove 450,000 Greeks to seek refuge in Greece. During the war several hundred thousand more were sent into the interior of Asia Minor, where many if not most of them perished.

For geographical reasons some 83,000 Greeks must be included in the Turkish State, and 360,000 must share the fate of Constantinople and its environs.

In Western Asia Minor, however, and in the islands of the Aegean, there is a fairly compact Greek population numbering about 1,200,000. The islands certainly and the coast probably will be assigned to Greece, either as a part of the kingdom, or under a mandate. Some of the islands, the Dodekanese, have been occupied by Italy ever since the war of 1911-12, and they were claimed under the treaty of 1915. On nationalist grounds, however, Italy has agreed to let them go to Greece, retaining one island as a naval base. It is true that on the mainland there are also a million Moslems, and there is some objection to detaching them from the Turkish State. Venizelos makes the interesting suggestion, which is applicable also to other mixed areas, that by arrangements between the governments, supervised perhaps by an international commission, there might be an exchange of populations. The Greeks of the interior and the Moslems of the coast would sell their property and receive an equivalent in their new homes. The Turks who left European areas lost to Christian powers have been taken care of after a fashion by the old Turkish government, and a systematic extension of the scheme is well worth considering. In addition there should be reciprocal guarantees that those who do not care to move should be protected in their language and religious rights. The Greeks are willing to guarantee that Smyrna shall continue to be available as the port for commerce to and from the interior.

Since the armistice the Allies have allowed Greece to occupy Smyrna and the adjoining region. There has been minor fighting with the Turks, and the occupation is proving a costly burden.

4. *The Italian sphere.*—For many years Italy has been attempting by the method of economic penetration to create a “sphere of interest” in Asia Minor centering in Adalia. By the Treaty of London, confirmed by the later agreements, the Allies promised that in the event of the partition of Turkey Italian claims in this region would be recognized. The substitution of the mandatory scheme has somewhat changed the situation. Italian troops have been landed at Adalia, and presumably Italy will have to receive a mandate for the region. The Italians have no claims on nationalistic grounds, there is no evidence that the population cares for Italian guardianship, and the only justification apparently is that everyone else is getting a section and Italy must not be left out.

5. *Syria.*—For years, in fact ever since the Crusades, the French have taken a sentimental interest in the Near East. French culture and the French language have made a considerable impression on the upper classes. The French government has been active in protecting Catholics, and in supporting Catholic missionary and educational enterprises. French investors hold 60 per cent of the Ottoman public debt, and they have furnished half the foreign capital invested in private enterprises. French opinion was somewhat reluctant to see Egypt

pass wholly under British control, and it is not enthusiastic at the prospect of a British mandate for Palestine. All the more France is insisting on predominance in Syria, which has long been recognized as in the French "sphere." Back of the Lebanon Mountains is the new Arab Kingdom of the Hedjaz, controlling the important cities of Damascus and Aleppo. Although it was reported that the Emir Feisal, son of the King of the Hedjaz, had agreed to accept the French as mandatories, it is a question whether the population will be satisfied. It contains considerable Christian elements, particularly in the Lebanon above Beirut, but there are many Moslems. There is a distinct movement in favor of a united Syria as an independent state, although France and England refuse to recognize the action of a Congress at Damascus making Syria a kingdom under the Emir Feisal. Since the French troops replaced the British forces there have been several clashes.

6. *Palestine*.—A peculiarly difficult problem is furnished by Palestine. The British are interested because of the need of defending the Suez Canal and Egypt. Most of the population are Arabic-speaking Moslems; some are native Christians, a few are Jews. By the agreement of 1916 the status of Palestine was to be fixed later. The powers are committed to making Palestine in some sense a home for the Jews, but the details are hard to work out. Zionists themselves are not agreed as to what they

want. It is clear that the Jews cannot be made politically dominant over the Moslem majority, nor can they be given land at the expense of those already in the country. The leaders of the Arab Kingdom profess friendship toward the Jews, and express a willingness to see them come in with equal political rights. If the Jews develop an industrial life and by scientific methods reclaim land at present unused they can find homes in Palestine in large numbers. The Moslems and Christians, however, would undoubtedly unite to resist the creation of a purely Jewish state. For the present some mandatory, presumably Great Britain, will have to maintain order and work out some scheme by which the rights of the different elements can be secured and an increasing degree of self-government allowed.

7. *Mesopotamia*.—The valley of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the traditional site of the Garden of Eden, once one of the world's most prosperous and civilized areas, was one of the great world-prizes sought by Germany. With an orderly government and with scientific irrigation, this region can become again populous and productive. There are understood to be immense untouched natural resources, notably of oil. Conquered by Great Britain in the war, Mesopotamia will naturally fall under a British protectorate. The population is mostly Arabic-speaking and Moslem, and outside of a few cities leads a very primitive existence. The British have already done a great deal to improve conditions. A

railroad has been built from the Gulf to Bagdad. The region north of Bagdad to the mountains of Asia Minor was supposed to fall to the Arab Confederation, being within the French sphere of influence. The British, however, continue in control. Geographically the region should be administered as a whole, particularly in connection with irrigation projects.

8. *Arabia*.—The Kingdom of the Hedjaz is the last of the divisions into which the former Turkish Empire will probably fall. Arabia is the birthplace of Mohammedanism, and for centuries the Arabs regarded themselves as the leaders of Islam. They have never been reconciled to the rule of the Turks. Indeed it has been only for short periods and in an incomplete fashion that the rulers of Constantinople have controlled the holy cities of Medinah and Mecca, to say nothing of the nomadic tribes of the interior. Soon after the Great War broke out the Arabs began to revolt against the Turks, and with active British assistance a new kingdom was set up under the Sherif of Mecca, a descendant of the Prophet. In the conquest of Palestine the Arab forces gave important assistance. Great Britain is pledged to an independent Arabia, with boundaries reaching far north into the back country of Syria. Without perhaps being a mandatory, Great Britain will undoubtedly attempt to continue close and friendly relations with the Arabs. The difficulty of reconciling the French and Arab claims in Syria has already

proved something of an embarrassment. There may also be trouble over the manner of satisfying the Zionists in Palestine. The natives seem to prefer a united and independent Arab state to the arrangements provided by the French and English diplomats.

CHAPTER XI

ITALY, THE SOUTH SLAVS, AND THE ADRIATIC

Each time that one begins a discussion of a new topic connected with the peace settlement, one is tempted to say that "among the many perplexing problems which threatened to disrupt the Conference and cause serious misunderstanding between the victors, none is more significant," and so forth. The world has become so hardened to crises and deadlocks and ultimatums that a few more or less seem to make little difference. For all that, truisms however boring remain true, and it is an unescapable fact that until a satisfactory settlement of the conflicting claims of Italy and the new Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom is reached there is grave danger of another war.

The areas involved in the dispute are not large compared with other regions which have been reassigned, nor are they particularly fertile or wealthy. They are, however, so situated as to be of considerable importance strategically and economically; and the question of their control and of the allegiance of their inhabitants has become a matter of national honor and prestige. Questions of this type are especially delicate. Concretely the clash is over the political future of the eastern part of the Istrian Peninsula, the town and district of Fiume, northern Dalmatia, and

a number of the islands of the eastern Adriatic. Closely linked with these is the future of part of Albania. With the exception of the city of Fiume, which enjoyed a degree of local self-government under the Hungarian crown, the disputed areas formed part of the former Austrian Empire. The population is predominantly South Slav, but in the towns, and notably in Fiume and Zara, there is an important Italian element. By the terms of the Treaty signed by Austria, and that presented to Hungary, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are to dispose of these territories. Italy has therefore the advantage of being both a judge and a claimant.

The great mass of arguments, maps, statistics, and rhetoric emanating from the rival camps may be roughly grouped as geographic, including strategic considerations and economic outlet to the sea; historical, cultural, and nationalistic; and political, diplomatic, and practical. Perhaps the best way to secure some idea of the opposing points of view is through a summary of the claims and counter-claims, arguments and refutations, under these general headings.

The Italians assert, with a wealth of handsome relief maps, that the "natural" frontier of Italy follows the watershed of the Alps around the north-east curve of the Adriatic and down the mountain crests into Dalmatia and Albania. They are invincibly persuaded that Nature intended the Adriatic to be an Italian lake. Their military and naval

experts point out that the eastern coast of Italy possesses very few good harbors or naval bases, while the opposite coast of the Adriatic contains many. In order to end forever the possibility of a hostile navy in the Adriatic, Italy must control all points of strategic value on the farther shore. Otherwise one of the principal objects of the war would be lost. From the military point of view the defensible mountain barrier of Dalmatia is a necessary precaution against a possible Balkan Confederation or a revived Pan-Slavism.

The South Slavs and their sympathizers reply that they have no navy, that they could not possibly afford to build one, that they are willing to agree to disarmament under the League of Nations, to demilitarization of the eastern coast, and to the possession by Italy of a number of islands. They point out that from the military point of view the defense of a narrow strip of difficult country, with poor communications and across a body of water, would call for a large army, and would in an emergency prove a weakness rather than a source of strength, particularly if it were purchased at the cost of the friendship of the South Slavs.

The Italians have had some hopes of using the Dalmatian base for commercial penetration of the Balkans. Again the South Slavs warn of the bad psychology of making enemies of potential customers. But vigorously and affirmatively the South Slavs claim the entire coast north of Albania as necessary

to that "free and secure access to the sea" which is guaranteed them by the eleventh of the Fourteen Points. To the Italian assertion that ample sea-coast is left to them without northern Dalmatia and Fiume they retort that the closeness of the mountains to the sea makes it impossible to make extensive use of any port but Fiume except at prohibitive cost for construction and hauling. Only at Fiume is there a standard-gauge railroad to the interior, and nowhere else is it practicable to build one. The Italians keep insisting that something "just as good" might be improvised elsewhere, but neutral geographers seem to agree with the Jugo-Slavs. It is admitted that Fiume is the natural outlet for the great hinterland of Hungary, for much of the South Slav territory, and in part for Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania. The Italians insist that under their control it would continue to be available for this purpose. Some critics, however, express the suspicion that in practice Trieste would be favored. When the Italians point out that only a relatively small part of South Slav commerce used to go through Fiume the obvious answer is that the new situation would be entirely different from that of the Magyar régime.

Historically neither state has claims of any particular force. The Italians go back to the days of the Roman Empire, and the time when the Republic of Venice held a part of Dalmatia. They point to the Roman ruins; they speak feelingly of the impress of Italian culture on the whole eastern shore of the

Adriatic. More stress is laid upon nationalistic arguments, and much emotion has been roused in favor of redeeming the Italian-speaking communities at Fiume, Zara, and other scattered centers. The South Slavs are equally vigorous in their nationalistic claims. They deny that the culture of the region is predominantly Italian. The language statistics show that about 97 per cent of Dalmatia is Slavic. Even granting the most extreme Italian corrections of the Austrian census, not over 10 per cent of the population is Italian. To the argument that this minority is the educated, progressive, civilized, capable, and hence politically dominant element, the South Slavs indignantly reply that the principle of self-determination precludes the surrender of overwhelming majorities to any alien rule. They offer the most solemn guarantees that the Italian minority will be protected in its linguistic, religious, educational, and cultural rights; but an arrangement which would sacrifice nine or ten Slavs for the sake of "redeeming" one Italian they denounce as a travesty, not a vindication, of the principle of nationalism.

From the practical point of view, both sides speak of the sacrifices made during the war, and the right to demand compensation. Officially they point out the advantages of concessions for the sake of future friendship; unofficially they accuse each other of imperialism. The Italians keep referring to the Treaty of London; the Slavs retort that they have never been officially informed that such a treaty

exists; that they never agreed to it; and that in any case it has been rendered inoperative by the acceptance of the Fourteen Points.

As a matter of fact the terms of the Treaty by which Italy was promised Istria and Dalmatia soon became known to the South Slavs both in Serbia and Austria-Hungary. The Serbians regarded themselves as rather badly treated, and the Austro-Hungarian authorities used the news to stimulate their Croatian and Slovene recruits to hatred of Italy.

In the spring of 1918 there was held in Rome a Congress of Oppressed Nationalities attended by representatives of the groups subject to the Dual Monarchy. Part of its work was the drawing up of an agreement between semi-official spokesmen for the Italian government and representatives of the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. Each people expressed itself as vitally interested in seeing the completion of the other's national unity. The liberation of the Adriatic and its defense against future enemies were declared to be important common interests. Both sides pledged themselves "to solve amicably the various territorial controversies on the basis of the principles of nationality and of the right of people to decide their own fate, and in such a way as not to injure the vital interests of the two nations." Each guaranteed the rights of minorities.¹

The Austrian armistice required the evacuation of the territory assigned to Italy by the pact of

¹ *The New Europe*, May 2, 1918, p. 54.

London, and it was occupied by Italian troops. Just before the armistice, in the confused days when Austria-Hungary was falling to pieces, the city of Fiume had proclaimed its desire to be united with Italy. The Croatians attempted to gain possession of the town for the new South Slav State which was forming, but Italian and later other Allied troops occupied it. Throughout the negotiations at Paris the question of the disposition of Fiume caused grave difficulties. The Italians seemed willing to modify their claims to Dalmatia if Fiume, to which they had no claim under the Treaty of London, were given to them instead. The South Slavs insisted on having both Dalmatia and Fiume and a large part of eastern Istria, enough, that is, to control the main railroad to Fiume. President Wilson distinctly favored the Jugo-Slav claims, and his public explanation of his position gave great offense to the Italian delegates and caused them to leave Paris for a time.

In the city of Fiume the Italians have a plurality, though not a majority; but if the adjacent suburbs are included there is a Slav majority, and the surrounding region is solidly South Slav. As things stand the port of Fiume, with its connecting railway, is the natural and in fact the only adequate economic outlet for the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the regions farther north. The situation in many ways resembles the Polish outlet at Dantzic, and the proposal to make Fiume a free city under the protection of the League of Nations was soon put forward.

Difficulties then arose as to the customs régime to which the town should belong, and as to the nation which should look after its diplomatic interests in other countries. England and France, though they felt bound to carry out the Treaty of London if Italy insisted, were anxious to see a compromise which should satisfy both sides.

It is understood that an arrangement had almost been reached when a dramatic stroke threw everything into confusion once more. On September 17, 1919, Gabriele D'Annunzio, the Italian poet and soldier, who had been fervently pressing the extreme nationalistic claims, persuaded some Italian troops to seize Fiume in the name of the annexationist cause. No one dared to put a forcible end to his comic-opera adventure for fear of causing a popular uprising in Italy.

On December 9 an agreement was reached between the English, French, and American representatives in Paris on the general principles which should determine the Adriatic settlement. President Wilson had long before indicated the boundary line in Istria which seemed to him satisfactory. In general the South Slavs were willing to accept it, but the Italians did not regard it as strategically adequate. The creation of a separate buffer state of Fiume was now proposed. Dalmatia was to go to the South Slavs.

In their conferences at London early in 1920 the Italian, French, and British premiers drew up a somewhat different settlement, and attempted to force

the South Slav Kingdom to accept it on penalty of having the Treaty of London put in force. President Wilson with unexpected vigor denounced this proposal, and insisted that the principles of December 9 should not be modified. The compensation of the South Slavs at the expense of Albania, which was part of the suggested settlement, he refused to countenance for a moment. All concerned then urged Italians and South Slavs to attempt to reach a settlement by direct negotiation.

CHAPTER XII

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SETTLEMENT

It is not the purpose of this volume to give a critical discussion of the merits or defects of the peace settlement, but a review of the more important reactions to the work of the Conference is not out of place.

As is perfectly natural, many persons and groups have been disappointed and angry. In all the Allied countries there have been a number of hard-shelled anti-Germans who regretted that the armistice saved Germany from invasion. To them the Treaty of Versailles seems entirely too mild. The prospect of Germany's recovering any degree of prosperity or occupying a position of independent influence in the world distresses them. They would be glad to see every German farmer, miner, and factory hand working for the rest of his life to pay the entire war debt of the Allies. This group, however, is not very large, and it seems to be growing less vindictive.

From quite an opposite angle many who had been pro-German, or inclined to a somewhat sentimental type of pacifism, have expressed sympathy for the plight of the poor, dear, misguided German people. The earlier remarks of Allied leaders distinguishing between the German people and their wicked militaristic rulers were quoted, the German revolution was recalled, and the thoroughly democratic nature of

the new German government emphasized. Now that the Germans had seen the light and repudiated their false guides forever, were they to obtain no benefit? Were they to be doomed to the outer darkness of exclusion from the society of nations, condemned to economic serfdom, national humiliation, and despair, and to destruction as a great civilized and civilizing power? Did not the terms of the Treaty prove that England had indeed been bent on the destruction of the fleet, commerce, industry, and colonial empire of her most dangerous rival?

Another somewhat different group, including many whose anti-Teutonic record was unimpeachable, admitted that the Germans deserved any conceivable punishment, but expressed the opinion that the Treaty went far beyond the armistice terms. Germany surrendered on the promise of a Wilsonian peace. If the armistice saved Germany from invasion, it also saved countless thousands of Allied lives. By every consideration of honor the Allies were bound to the most scrupulous observance of the Fourteen Points. Instead of this they proceeded to stretch and twist and interpret them to justify whatever they desired. Instead of a healing peace, based on great fundamental principles of justice, they made one which in many respects was an old-fashioned settlement of grab and barter, based on might. Instead of laying the foundation for a new era of international harmony they had sowed the seeds of new wars. They had betrayed those who had died

to make possible a new order of things; they had missed the supreme opportunity of modern times.

Still others held that although the Treaty was in essentials just it was impracticably severe. Its terms could not be carried out literally, and to make the attempt would drive the Germans to bolshevism. Self-interest should lead to a modification of the terms. Germany was an industrial nation, drawing an annual surplus from manufacturing. Without manufacturing millions would be forced to emigrate or starve. But to destroy the productive capacity of Germany is to destroy the prospect of recovering any reparation whatever. The wisdom of the ages is against the policy of killing a goose which is expected to lay golden eggs.¹

The various Treaties are not without their defenders. A few regard them as sound in all particulars. They are stern, but just. They conform to the Fourteen Points, properly interpreted. As to their terms being impracticable, it is too early to tell. The first thing to do is to try them. When they prove unworkable, but not before, they may be modified. Others admit that the Treaties contain serious defects. This is natural, since they are the result of the compromise of many conflicting interests and principles, applied to situations of the greatest complexity and inherent difficulty. But the wrongs of Alsace-Lorraine and Poland are righted. The

¹ These and other arguments are developed with force and skill by J. M. Keynes in his *Economic Consequences of the Peace*, a book which has had a considerable influence on public opinion.

long-thwarted national aspirations of the Czechoslovaks and South Slavs are satisfied. The Rumanians of Hungary are freed. The Greeks regain millions of their enslaved brethren. The Armenians and other groups are freed from the tyranny of the Turks. The Germans are called on to repair the damage they have done up to the limit of their capacity. The punishment of war criminals is demanded. Prussian militarism is destroyed. The League of Nations is founded, pointing the way to a new and better international order. The Germans and other former enemy groups are invited to demonstrate their fitness to join it. If the settlement is defective, as perhaps in the matter of the Shantung award, the League will be able from time to time to make the proper readjustments and modifications. Still others who do not particularly like the details of the settlement defend it as better than nothing and urge its acceptance. Perhaps the most striking exposition of this point of view is the memorandum of General Smuts, of South Africa, which he issued at the time he signed the Treaty of Versailles:

I signed the Peace Treaty, not because I consider it a satisfactory document, but because it is imperatively necessary to close the war. . . . The promise of the new life, the victory of the great human ideals for which the people have shed their blood and their treasure without stint, the fulfilment of their aspiration toward a new international order and a fairer and better world are not written in the treaty. . . . A new heart must be given, not only to our enemies but also to us—a spirit of pity, mercy, and forgiveness for the sins and wrong

which we have suffered. . . . There are territorial settlements which in my humble opinion will need revision. There are guarantees laid down which we all hope will soon be found out of harmony with the new peaceful temper and unarmed state of our former enemies. There are punishments foreshadowed over most of which a calmer mood may yet prefer to pass the sponge of oblivion. There are indemnities stipulated which cannot be exacted without grave injury to the industrial revival of Europe, and which it will be in the interest of all to render more tolerable and moderate. The real peace of peoples ought to follow to complete and amend the peace of the statesmen.

Since the Treaty with Germany was signed a number of modifications of its terms have already been made. The coal deliveries to France are for the time reduced. The German army, in view of the danger of internal disorder, remains above the figures fixed. The Kaiser is to continue under guard in Holland instead of being tried. The German war criminals are to be tried first by their own government, and only in case the Allies feel that justice is not done will they demand their surrender. It is not improbable that further changes will be made.

In the United States the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles has become a domestic political issue. In the November elections of 1918 the Democrats lost control of Congress. The Senate resented the fact that it was not consulted in the course of the negotiations at Paris, and when the Treaty was finally submitted to it the atmosphere was somewhat unfriendly. Opposition developed along three lines. Some of it was partisan, based on a desire to discredit

the Democratic administration on the eve of another election, or growing out of personal dislike for the President. This latter feeling was shared by some of the Democratic Senators. Other Senators were quite sincerely desirous of protecting the interests of the United States as they understood them. For this purpose they desired to qualify our acceptance of the League of Nations Covenant. Others opposed the Treaty because of its defects. Reservations acceptable to a majority of the Senate were finally adopted, but they twice failed to secure the two-thirds vote necessary for ratification. The President has opposed the reservations largely because they seem to him to show a spirit of suspicion which would "chill" our relations with the other members of the League of Nations.

It is difficult to see how the issue can be placed before the people in a clear-cut fashion. The country probably wants the Treaty ratified; it is tired of delay; it resents the failure of the Senate to reach some sort of a compromise, and it is inclined to criticize the President for his unyielding attitude. Both parties will probably declare for a ratification of the Treaty "with such reservations as are necessary to protect the vital interests of the United States." A Resolution of Congress declaring the state of war with Germany at an end is of doubtful constitutionality and would have an uncertain status in international law. Meanwhile, we cry Peace! Peace! but there is no peace.

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